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INTRODUCTION

hard cases, festering scandals make bad law. As public
perceptions shift so that conduct once tolerated becomes seen
as illicit, political pressures develop that can result in hastily improvised responses by the legal system to fill the newly perceived
vacuum. This generalization is advanced to question neither the
inalienable right of the public to be scandalized, nor the need for
corporate reform, but to approach a highly problematic dilemma:
hurried, moralistic responses to a perceived evil often prove not
only ineffective, but even counterproductive. The serious student
of complex organizations may recognize this assertion as a slightly
altered variant of Forrester's Law. That law, coined by a student
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of organizational behavior, says simply that complex systems behave counter-intuitively; the plausible tends to be wrong.'
Percolating throughout this article will be the theme of an inherent conflict between "moralistic" legal responses, which seek to
maximize the public reprobation and symbolic denunciation of the
conduct in question, and "pragmatic" legal responses, which focus
instead on prevention and therefore seek to optimize whatever
conditions within the system most inhibit the disapproved conduct.
Closely linked and often overlapping with this theme will be another recurrent one: the differing effectiveness of positive and
negative incentives in changing behavior within the corporation's
own social system. The relevance of these themes will become
clearer as we turn to the familiar topic of corporate misconduct,
with particular emphasis on questionable payments. For the past
four years, the business pages of American newspapers have carried a continuing story of corporate misconduct with the same
daily regularity as the sports pages have reprinted the baseball box
1 See J. FORRESTER, WORLD DYNAMICS (1971); J. FORRESTER, URBAN DYNAMICS (1969). For
an incisive application of Professor Forrester's concepts to the context of the corporation,

see P. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, PRACTICES 507-11 (1973) [hereinafter

cited as P. DRUCKER]. Professor Conard's provocative comments on the divergence between
"idealistic" and "realistic" models of behavior for directors also suggest the continuing
relevance of Forrester's Law in this area. See Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Director's
Liability for Negligence, 1972 DuKE L.J. 895.
Because the basic argument of this article is that the corporation must be understood
as a bureaucracy and can only be effectively regulated once the realities of behavior within
large organizations are understood, it seems useful to collect at the outset some of the principal works of the organization theorists who have attempted to describe those realities. In
addition to P. DRUCKER, supra, a basic list includes C. ARGYRIS, INTEGRATING THE INDIVIDUAL
AND THE ORGANIZATION (1964); G. DALTON, L. BARNES, & A. ZALEZNIK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF
AUTHORrrY IN FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS (1968); A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1966); P.
DRUCKER, THE CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION (2d
PLANNING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS (1969); R.

ed. 1972); J.

LIKERT, THE HUMAN

EMERY,

ORGANIZATIONAL

ORGANIZATION (1967); J.

ORGANIZATIONS (1958); W. MORRIS, DECENTRALIZATION IN MANAGEMENT
G. TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY (1965); 0.
WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975); 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR (1970) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE CONTROL]; THE CORPORATE SOCIETY (R.
Marris ed. 1974); MODERN ORGANIZATION THEORY (M. Haire ed. 1959) (containing probably
the broadest spectrum of organizational perspectives and with P. DRUCKER, supra, the best
MARCH & H.
SYSTraEs

SIMON,

(1968);

introduction). See also Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime,
85 YALE L.J. 1091 (1976).
On a more popular level, M. MACCOBY, THE GAMESMAN: THE NEW CORPORATE LEADERS
(1976), and J.K. GALBRAITH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967) share at times a similar

perspective with the foregoing theorists (though each may be accused of tunnel vision).
For a short but sophisticated analysis of Galbraith's idea of the "technostructure" as it
applies to corporate behavior, see Marris, Galbraith,Solow, and the Truth about Corporations, 11 PUB. INTEREST 37 (1968).
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scores.2 It appears that commercial bribery has been a competitive
technique as important for some corporations as price or product
competition.3 To date, well over 350 public corporations, 4 includ2 Because our focus will be on the internal dynamics of the corporation, and not the
socio-political environment surrounding it, this article will not attempt to summarize in
detail the tidal wave of disclosures that the improper payments controversy has elicited or
the ensuing reaction by courts, Congress, and administrative agencies. The most important
official study in this area is still SENATE BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMM.,
94TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE

AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as
SEC PAYMENTS REPORT]. But see also STAFF OF SUBCOMM.

ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE HOUSE COMm. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG.,

2D SESS., SEC

VOLUNTARY

COMPLIANCE PROGRAM ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE (Subcomm. Print 1976)
(criticizing SEC PAYMENTS REPORT, supra, and studying certain of its case examples in

more detail). The final report of that subcommittee contains one of the most thoroughgoing attempts by a governmental body to rethink the problem of corporate accountability
in light of the improper payments controversy. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM.

ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG.,

FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM 33-42, 51-53

2D SESS.,

(Subcomm. Print 1976).

The most comprehensive survey of recent legal developments is Herlihy & Levine,
Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 L. & PoL'Y INT'L BUs. 547 (1976).
(the authors are both attorneys in the SEC's Division of Enforcement). See also Brownlee &
Queenan, Questionable Corporate Payments: Dealing with Fluid, Uncertain Factors, in
N.Y.LJ. Special Report: SEC '77, 176 N.Y.L.J. No. 112, Dec. 13, 1976, at 27; Kohlmeier,
The Bribe Busters, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1976, § 6 (Magazine), at 47; Stevenson, The SEC
and Foreign Bribery, 32 Bus. LAw. 53 (1976); The Corporate Rush to Confess All, Bus.
WEEK, Feb. 23, 1976, at 22; The Big Payoff, TIME, Feb. 23, 1976, at 28.
From the special standpoint of this article, the following articles provide insights into
the internal corporate decisionmaking process underlying the crisis: Faber, How I Lost Our
Great Debate About Corporate Ethics, FORTUNE, November, 1976, at 180; Guzzardi, An
Unscandalized View of Those "Bribes" Abroad, FORTUNE, July, 1976, at 118; Gwirtzman, Is
Bribery Defensible?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 19; Hougan, The Business
of Buying Friends, HARPER'S, December, 1976, at 43; Robertson, The Directors Woke Up
Too Late at Gulf, FORTUNE, June, 1976, at 121; Sampson, Why Arms Merchants Have to
Pay Off Adnan Khashoggi, NEw YORK, Apr. 15, 1976, at 44; Tracy, How United Brands
Survived the Banana War, FORTUNE, July, 1976, at 145.
3 The controversy has spawned a new literary genre: the post-mortem corporate self
study. It usually is prepared by a special committee of the board and provided to stockholders, generally as a precondition for the settlement of an SEC civil action. The following
two reports are well known within the securities industry and are instructive in their
diagnoses:
(a)

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GULF OIL CORP., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REvIEW COIMMITrEE OF

30, 1975) (This report, which
is popularly known as the "McCloy Report" after its chairman, John J. McCloy, has
been published in paperback as J. McCLoY, THE GREAT OIL SPILL (1976) [hereinafter
cited as J. MCCLOY];
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GULF OIL CORPORATION (Dec.

(b)

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF EXXON

COMMITTEE ON LITIGATION

CORP.,

DETERMINATION

AND REPORT OF THE SPECIAL

(Jan. 23, 1976) [hereinafter cited as EXXON REPORT].

4 SEC's Program for Voluntary Disclosure of Questionable Payments May End Soon,
Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1977, at 4, col. 2. Also, the SEC has brought over 30 civil actions
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ing such flagships of our free enterprise system as Exxon, Gulf,
and even General Motors, have acknowledged payments ranging
from de minimis amounts to nearly $60 million, 5 and aggregating
in excess of an estimated $300 million.' In addition, governments
have been toppled, prime ministers and generals jailed, dictators
deposed, and a monarchy threatened.7
More important than the corrupt activities uncovered, however,
is the recurring dysfunction within the organizational structure
of the corporation itself that these disclosures have revealed. Part
of this dysfunction involves a recurring management style-overzealous, action-oriented, and characterized by a remarkably low
level of risk aversion.' Although the dominance of such a style may
not be startling, given the rough and tumble world out of which
against companies not participating in the program. Id. For a partial list of these civil
actions, see Herlihy & Levine, supra note 2, at 580 n.188.
5 For the "nearly $60 million" estimate, see Political Slush Fund Hid Other Spending,
Cost Exxon Millions, Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6. See also Gall v. Exxon Corp.,
418 F. Supp. 508, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (placing the number at $59 million).
6 This estimate has been made by the Council on Economic Priorities. See Hershey,
Payoffs: Are They Stopped or Just Better Hidden? N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1977, § 3 (National
Economic Survey), at 23. Although Exxon's $59 million in payments makes it the unchallenged leader, a number of other corporations appear to have played in the same
league, despite much lower revenues and earnings. For example, Lockheed's recently issued
report (which itself cost $4 million) placed the total questionable payments made by that
corporation between 1970 and 1975 as high as $38 million. Lockheed Puts Foreign Payoffs
Near $38 Million, Wall St. J., May 27, 1977, at 4, col. 2. Estimates have placed the questionable commission payments that Northrop and Grumman contracted to make in connection with individual arms sales contracts as high as $45 million and $28 million, respectively. See The Big Payoff, supra note 2, at 33. See also SEC PAYMENTS REPORT, supra
note 2, at 13-17. Gulf has acknowledged spending over $12 million. See J. MCCLOY, supra
note 3, at 2.
7 See generally The Big Payoff, supra note 2, at 34-36; Damage to Governments Friendly
to U.S. Is Seen in Disclosure of Lockheed Bribes, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1976, at 7, col. 1. The
falls of the Tanaka government in Japan, the junta led by General Rene Barrientos in
Bolivia, and the administration of President Arellano in Honduras all frequently have
been attributed to the disclosures made respectively by Lockheed, Gulf, and United
Brands. See, e.g., Italy Explores Banana Bribery, N.Y. Times, May 24, 1975, at 33, col. 1.
8 It seems more than coincidental that close observers have characterized the chief
executive officers of three of the corporations most prominent in the improper payments
controversy (Northrop, United Brands, and Gulf) as strong-willed, imperious men who
totally dominated, and seldom confided in or relied upon, their boards of directors. See
Clearing Payoff Storm, Northrop Chief Keeps Firm Hand on Controls, Wall St. J., Dec.
15, 1976, at I, col. 6; As the Storm Abates, United Brands Seeks to Turn Itself Around,
Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1976, at 1, col. 6; Robertson, supra note 2, at 209 (Gulf). On a more
generalized level, these descriptions seem to fit one of the typologies offered by Maccoby
to characterize the modern business executive: that of the jungle fighter and empire
builder. See M. MACCOBY, supra note 1, at 76-85. See also note 101 infra.
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corporate managers emerge, the surprising discovery is the apparent absence of any countervailing system of internal checks
and balances within the corporationY
The revelations emerging from the "improper" payments controversy do not stand alone. Other recently newsworthy corporate
misdeeds-such as participation in the Arab boycott of Israel, violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, large-scale substitution of allegedly inferior automobile engines, alleged diversions of natural
gas supplies, and a host of garden variety antitrust and tax law
violations '10 -also share certain distinguishing features in common
with improper payments. First, the conduct typically has involved
at worst a regulatory offense ("malum prohibitum" rather than
"malum in se"). Second, the current state of the law generally has
been sufficiently uncertain that a corporate official, usually at some
9 On the general absence of such a countervailing system today, see C. BROWN, PUTTING
15-21 (1976).
10 Again, a complete litany of every allegation recently levied at corporations is neither
possible nor useful. But the following is a representative sample:
(1) The recent conviction of the nation's sixth largest bank on 445 misdemeanor
counts of "laundering" funds for narcotics dealers. See Chemical Bank Cited for
Failureto List Big Cash Exchanges, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1977, at 1, col. 1; Chemical
Bank Fined $225,500 in Misdemeanors, Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1977, at 8, col. 3.
Similar "laundering operations" appear to have been conducted at other major
New York banks. Other N.Y. Banks Studied for Laundering Operations,Wash. Post,
Feb. 26, 1977, at C9, col. 5;
(2) The acknowledged sale by General Motors of 43,000 Oldsmobiles containing
Chevrolet engines. G.M. Sued on Switched Engines; Illinois Asks Restitution to
Buyer, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1977, at 41, col. 4;
(3) The tacit participation of American banks in the Arab boycott of Israel through
enforcement of anti-Israeli terms in commercial letters of credit. Allan, The Arab
Boycott and the Banks, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1976, § 3 (Business and Finance),
at 9, col. 1;
(4) The improper diversion by Tenneco of natural gas contracted to interstate
customers in order to sell it at a higher price in the intrastate market. Tenneco
Admits Improper Shifts of Natural Gas, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1977, at 1, col. 5; and
(5) The much-publicized conviction of Allied Chemical for permitting Kepone to be
dumped in the James River. Following its conviction and a record fine, Allied
Chemical entered into a consent agreement with the SEC under which its senior
management agreed to install new controls and warning devices to alert it to misconduct by lower-echelon corporate officials. Chemical Firm Bows to SEC Over
Kepone, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 1977, at A-11, col. 3. For further discussion of this
case, see text accompanying notes 605-07 infra.
In all of these cases, a common denominator seems to have been that the locus of the
misconduct apparently was at a level well below that of senior management.
THE CORPORATE BOARD TO WORK
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lower level within the corporate hierarchy," felt the risk of illegality to be acceptable. Finally, and most importantly, corporate
officials have engaged in these various forms of misconduct to
benefit, not to injure, the corporation.
This last point is particularly significant, because such "benevolent" misconduct vastly differs from the type of misconduct on
which modern corporate law commentators have principally focused: misconduct arising out of conflicts of interest between
management and its stockholders . 2 When the action is undertaken to maximize corporate profits, one can only perceive a conflict, rather than an identity, of interests between these two groups
by moving to a higher level of abstraction and postulating a difference either between the levels of risk aversion that characterize
management and its stockholders or between the time frames in
which they wish to maximize profits. 3 Although there may exist
11 The SEC Payments Report suggests that corporate misconduct typically occurs at
a much lower level within the corporate hierarchy than the senior executive suite. While
in some cases the chief executive's office did direct the payments program (e.g., Gulf, Lockheed, United Brands, and Northrop), this pattern typifies only the minority of the
cases. Of the first 89 cases studied by the SEC, top management had knowledge in only
40 cases (or 47%). See SEC PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, at 41. Similarly, a survey by
the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations found a 40% figure to characterize the 25 additional companies they investigated. See FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 2, at 33.
12 The discovery of a deep-rooted conflict between management and stockholders, and
a tipping of the balance of power to the former, was the major and original perception of
Berle and Means. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932). Because of the separation between ownership and control, Berle and
Means questioned the assumption that management operated in the interests of shareholders. Id. at 121. This same perception seems to supply the starting point for Professor
Eisenberg's recent heroic attempt to suggest a new legal model for the corporation,
which would enhance the shareholder's powers and capabilities. See M. EISENBERG, THE
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976). For another interesting attempt in the same
vein, see Anderson, Toward a Theory of Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and
Corporate Structure, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. (1978). Without challenging the importance
or accuracy of the theme of conflict, this article will suggest that, in light of modem
organization theory, the problem of "control loss" within the large decentralized corporation may deserve a higher priority in our thinking than problems of conflict of interest.
13 In other words, to the extent that management is significantly less risk averse
or more interested in short-run profit maximization (at the expense of long-term growth)
than the majority of its investors, there again emerge unresolved conflicts of interests between fiduciary and beneficiary. There are a variety of reasons why such differences
might exist. First, management's interest may be particularly focused on the short
term, while the investor's is on the long term, because managerial performance is likely
to be judged over the short term. See Bower, On the Amoral Organization,in THE CORuORATE SoclEry, supra note I, at 178, 191-92. Second, the reward structures for each are different. Management is interested typically in its salary and in incentive compensation such as
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considerable evidence to support such a hypothesis, it can be
neither uniformly true (because corporate misconduct has not
always carried a high level of risk) nor empirically verifiable in any
given situation. In any event, we are left with the possibility that
the proposals for new systems of corporate accountability that have
been designed primarily to combat traditional conflicts of interest
may not be well adapted to deal with this newer species of corporate misconduct, whose hallmark is managerial overzealousness.
As we identify a common pattern of managerial overzealousness
behind these practices, fairness requires that we also acknowledge
a partially countervailing perception. Examination of the specific
factual contexts surrounding many improper payments evokes
some sympathy for, and at times even a visceral sense of identification with, the corporate manager caught in a difficult dilemma
between long-established local customs of extortion and our own
more rigorous standards of corporate ethics. Whether this sympathetic reaction undermines deterrence to an unacceptable degree is
debatable. But seemingly, if we could structure into a comprehensive legal response to corporate misconduct some safe harbor for
the corporate manager trapped in such a situation, we would have
struck a more desirable balance. Basic concepts of fairness argue
for some limits on the degree to which corporate officials seeking
to benefit (and perhaps actually benefitting) the corporation
should be held liable in order to deter others.
An alleged final symptom of corporate dysfunction that has surfaced recently has involved an attitude on the part of those who
should have been guarding the corporation against managerial
bonuses and stock options, which depend on performance in the short term, while the
investor is more interested, in part for tax reasons, in long-term capital appreciation.
Third, management has a defensive motivation for accepting risks that the investor would
prefer to reject: it has to be concerned with short-run profit maximization because of the
danger to it of hostile takeovers and tender offers.
A final empirically based reason for differences between investors and management
in their attitudes towards risk is that the new corporate executive may simply enjoy
taking risks, and also finds it a means of advancing his career within the corporation (at
the possible expense of the corporation). M. MACCOBY, supra note 1, at 48-49. Thus, risk
taking for the manager can be both an aspect of careerism and a pleasurable private avocation, and unrelated to the investor's risk preferences. In this light, the implications of
Maccoby's findings conflict particularly with Galbraith's view that the basic tendency
of the technostructure is towards autonomy, security, and the elimination of competition
in favor of a system of administered prices and stable, orderly growth. See J.K. GALBRAITH,
supra note 1.
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overzealousness, the corporate directors. This attitude has been described as resembling that of the "shut-eyed sentry" in Kipling's
poem, who deliberately averts his glance in order to avoid witnessing misconduct. 14 In fact, this theme of "directors who do not direct" 's has a long and popular history among commentators on
corporate law." If the sentries have been derelict, the obvious answer would appear to be to court-martial them in order to deter
others from sleeping at the guard post. Translated into legal terminology, such a prescription would ask us to revive, expand, and enforce the ancient and largely somnolent common-law rule that a
director owes a duty of due care to his corporation. But this article
will argue that such a prescription, standing alone, is unduly simplistic, because it is based on a fundamental misconception of
where existing systems of corporate accountability have broken
down.
At this point the conflict between a moralistic and a pragmatic
response reappears to interfere with the simple progression from
diagnosis to prescription. To begin with an obvious problem, increasing to a draconian level the potential liabilities of corporate
officers and directors would be counterproductive, intimidating
exactly that class of persons upon whom we will most likely depend
7
to prevent corporate misconduct: potential "outside" directors.1
14 The McCloy Report coined this term. See J. McCLoY, supra note 3, at 295. The
quotation from Kipling reads: "But I'd shut my eyes in the sentry-box/So I didn't see
nothin' wrong." Robertson, supra note 2, at 210.
15 Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1305 (1934).
16 This theme dates back at least to the turn of the century, see, e.g., Dwight, Liability
of Corporate Directors, 17 YALE L.J. 33 (1907), and survives today, see, e.g., Bishop, Sitting
Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and
Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968).
17 While previous predictions that independent directors would be driven off corporate
boards by the threat of liability have proven premature, there is considerable evidence that
the effect of several large settlements in recent shareholder suits plus the increasing unavailability of meaningful liability insurance may now be producing this result. The
multimillion dollar settlement of the recent Gulf Oil shareholder suits is but one
example. See Gulf Directors Approve Settlement Terms of Eight Shareholder Suits on Slush
Fund, Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1976, at 34, col. 2. See also Conard, supra note 1, at 899-903;
Why Lawyers and Bankers Desert the Board, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 29, 1976, at 100.
One director of four companies recently estimated that he is a defendant in ten such
lawsuits, and commented, "It worries the hell out of me. I feel like the Israelis-I can't
afford to lose one." The Hot Seat: Outside Directors Get Tough After Payoff Scandals,
Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1976, at 16, col. 1. Particularly worrisome for the outside director
is that standard officers' and directors' liability insurance policies, when available, now
contain exclusionary clauses expressly directed at the payoff scandal. As Suits Rise, Firms
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But a more important objection is that although some directors undoubtedly have served as "decoys," or at least have been sleepyeyed sentries, there is no assurance that diligent directors would
have performed much better. Paradoxically, there are even some
indications that replacing the current club-like intimacy between
the board and management with the adversarial atmosphere that
would accompany diligent monitoring by a moralistic board probably would increase internal secrecy and reduce the flow of information to the board.' 8 Thus, at the risk of belaboring Forrester's
Law, there is a need here to focus on the social system we wish to
influence as a whole: the internal corporate hierarchy. Piecemeal
changes may well produce unintended and counterproductive
consequences.
Accordingly, what general goals are we seeking to realize? Because our preliminary diagnosis suggests that within what might
be termed the psyche of the American corporation there is a fundamental imbalance between a strong ego and a weak superego, an
intelligent prescription might seek to encourage the institutionalization of a stronger corporate superego. Phrased in the language
of lawyers, this would mean the creation of a system of internal
checks and balances by which to restrain managerial overzealousness. But how do we accomplish this? Do we even know what internal configurations of authority and communications within the
corporation will maximize the deliberate and responsible decisionmaking that we desire?
Unfortunately, the short answer here is that corporate law currently lacks not only a solution to this problem, but even any
criteria by which to evaluate the relative efficacy of competing
proposed answers. To be sure, there has been no recent shortage
of proposed solutions put forward by lawyers.' 9 But most of these
Scramble to Increase Insurance for Directors,Wall St. J., July 12, 1976, at 1, col. 6. The
average phyout under such policies rose from $770,000 in 1974 to $865,000 in 1975. Estes,
Outside Directors: More Vulnerable Than Ever, HARV. Bus. REv., January-February,
1973, at 107.
18 See text accompanying notes 163-68 infra.
19 In overview, recent proposals for structural change in the current status of the
private corporation fall under one of four main headings:
(1) "Politicalization"of the Corporation.The most radical alternative, this approach
would require the presence of various representatives of "public interest" groups on
the corporate board. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAuZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORA-

TIONS (1976) [hereinafter cited as NADER REPORT].
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reform proposals share a common deficiency. They lack any real
underpinning either in a theoretical understanding of organizational behavior or in an empirical observation of actual corporate
decisionmaking. The reformers are not necessarily wrong, but
their strategies are based at critical junctures on intuitive guesses
in an area in which Forrester's Law makes intuition highly
20
suspect.
What is most lacking here is a workable model of how a corporation behaves internally. We cannot "constitutionalize the corporation" until we understand it. With such a model, lawyers might
assume their accustomed role as policy engineers, manipulating
the model to achieve desired results. Yet, the absence of such a recognized model is less because the preparatory theoretical work has
not been done than it is because of insularity within the legal profession. Although lawyers as a group are frequently inattentive to
developments in allied social sciences, the field of corporate law
(2) Federal Control Over the CharteringProcess. Here the debate is between the
advocates of "federal minimum standards" versus those of direct "federal chartering."
Compare Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974), with Schwartz, Federal Charteringof Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J. 71 (1972). However, the difference between these two positions often seems minor and to involve basically a dispute over their relative
palatability to the business community.
(3) Enhanced Stockholder Power. The leading advocate here is Professor Eisenberg.
See M. EISENBERG, supra note 12; Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure
in the Modern Corporation:Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REv.
375 (1975); Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REv.
1489 (1970); Note, A Proposal for the Designation of Shareholder Nominees for
Director in the CorporateProxy Statement, 74 CoLUNI. L. REv. 1139 (1974).
(4) Use of the Securities Laws to Prevent Corporate Misconduct. See Sonde & Pitt,
Utilizing the Federal Securities Laws to 'Clear the Air! Clean the Sky! Wash the
Wind!', 16 How. L.J. 831 (1971); Stevenson, The SEC and the New Disclosure, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 50 (1976).

The Nader proposals have met with almost unanimous skepticism. See Corporate Rights
and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 57, 333-36, 381-83, 383-85 (1976) (statements of A.A. Sommer, Jr., Detlev F. Vagts,
Donald E. Schwartz, & David Ratner. Mr. Sommer is a former SEC Commissioner, and the
latter three witnesses are professors of corporate law at Harvard, Georgetown, and Cornell,
respectively.).
20 Far from disagreeing with many of these proposals, particularly those of Professor
Eisenberg, I am impressed by their logic. But, absent a theoretical model and some means
of verification (which only the social sciences can provide), there is little basis either for
concluding that a given strategy has worked or, if it has failed, for hypothesizing a more
likely alternative approach. The case for a theoretical model rests chiefly on the predictive
power it should give us, not on any claim that it will disprove earlier commentators.
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presents an egregious example of cultural lag. Dominated by
centuries-old fiduciary concepts borrowed from the law of agency
and the law of trusts, corporate law has not considered to any
significant degree the relevance of the social sciences. Ironically,
the one discipline that corporate law has borrowed from at allneoclassical economics-now faces challenge from within its own
ranks, on the grounds that it too has ignored the internal tensions
that actually shape the behavior of the individual firm. 21 As a result, both corporate practitioners and legal academicians tend to
view the corporation as a "black box," 22 which need not be understood in its internal workings in order to be operated.
This phenomenon of cultural lag probably is most acute in the
area that is the focal point of this article: the problem of corporate
accountability. While law students still are drilled in the fundamentals of directors' duties, most empirical observers of the corporation have long discounted the significance of the board,23 and
microeconomists have virtually dismissed the topic as unworthy of
theoretical interest. 24 Of course, this disdain in itself does not imply
21 Professor Oliver Williamson of the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard Professors
John Kenneth Galbraith and Harvey Leibenstein have challenged the orthodox view of
the firm as automatically seeking to maximize value for its shareholders. See CORPOaRATE
CONTROL, supra note 1; MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra.note 1; J.K. GALBRAITH, supra note
1; H. LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN (1976). Galbraith's emphasis is on the inertial
forces within the large corporation that make it seek stability and assured growth, rather
than risk and competition. Williamson, in contrast, focuses on the diseconomies of scale
that hobble the large corporation and make the structure of the corporate hierarchy
often more important than the structure of the market. Leibenstein, the most heretical of
the three, has coined the term "selective rationality" to express his views that individuals
making economic decisions only sometimes act to maximize economic gains. In common, all
have developed economic theories of corporate behavior that find previously undiscovered
dynamics at work within the corporate hierarchy and that reject the simplistic notion that
the sole corporate motivation is profit maximization.
22 This phrase is borrowed from C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 121 (1975). Stone has
defined many of the central themes examined here-the problems of information flow
within the corporate hierarchy, the limited utility of negative reinforcement, the conflict
between individual goals of managers and those of the organization-better than any
other contemporary legal writer. See generally id. For other attempts to connect behavorial
theory and corporate law, see Conard, supra note 1, and Rohrlich & Rohrlich, Psychological
Foundations for the Fiduciary Concept in CorporationLaw, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 432 (1938).
23 The classic in this regard is M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 47-48 passim
(1971). For a summary of recent findings, see M. EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 139-41. See
also S. VANCE, THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR: A CRITICAL EVALUATION (1968); Feis, Is Shareholder Democracy Attainable?, 31 Bus. LAW. 621 (1976).
24 It is virtually impossible to find an economist who has devoted serious attention
to the board of directors. Williamson and others have suggested explicitly that the chief
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that the law should follow suit, because it has special concerns that
may justify an emphasis on normative principles. But, when preoccupation with the normative obscures our understanding of the
organizational realities underlying corporate behavior, then it
serves not as an effective means of analysis, but only as a set of
intellectual blinders. Thus, a subsidiary theme of this article is
that the "fiduciary ideology" of corporate law has resulted in a
tunnel vision that has led reformers to frame issues of corporate
accountability in terms of how a fiduciary would behave if guided
by "the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive." 25 Unfortunately,
not all problems reduce themselves neatly to questions of honorable conduct or are resolvable simply by exercising other admirable virtues, such as diligence and foresight. Some problems addressed in the next section of this article seem to require structural
reform, a possibility that fiduciary ideology inherently ignores.
What is most regrettable about the poverty of the intellectual
resources underlying contemporary corporate law is that the last
two decades have seen substantial growth in a variety of disciplines focusing on organizational behavior and the actual processes
of decisionmaking within institutions. Political scientists have
examined the difficulties experienced by those possessing formal
authority within organizations in securing compliance with their
policies; 26 they have described the bargaining required for such
officials to obtain consensus from their own subordinates,2 7 and
have dissected the defensive strategies employed by those below
to resist commands from above.2 8 Similarly, communication theorists have studied the information flow within corporations and
suggested methods by which a fuller and more accurate flow of relexecutive officer and his staff have assumed the traditional role of the board in the
modern decentralized corporation. See text accompanying note 161 infra.
25 The quotation is, of course, from then-Chief Judge Cardozo's description of the
"'standard of behavior" expected of a fiduciary in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464,
164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
26 See G. TULLOCK, supra note 1, at 142-93 passim. For a study of one corporation, see
G. DALTON, L. BARNES, & A. ZALEZNIK, supra note I.
27 On the subject of the "side payments" that have to be made within the organization to hold together a coalition of subunits for any given objective, see Cyert & March,
A Behavioral Theory of Organizational Objectives, in MODERN ORGANIZATION THEORY,
supra note 1, at 76, 78-83.
28 On the topic of group defenses of organizational stability, see Dubin, Stability of
Human Organizations, in MODERN ORGANIZATION THEORY, supra note 1, at 218, 237-43.

Virginia Law Review

1112

[Vol. 63:1099

evant data can reach top decisionmakers' Psychologists and motivational experts have assessed the conflict between the aspirations
of the individual and those of his organization, 30 the effects of this
tension upon behavior of subunits within the firm, and the tendency of individuals holding middle-echelon positions in the corporate hierarchy to become captives of their unit, rather than enforcers of the policies of senior management. 3 1 Other theoristsincluding students of game theory, business school professors, and
microeconomists-also have emphasized the centrifugal forces within organizations that lead individuals and units to pursue subgoals
32
which are either irrelevant or contrary to overall corporate goals.
This work has an obvious relevance, which corporate law has
largely ignored, to the phenomenon of corporate misconduct.
There remain commentators still content to describe reality with
the simple norm, expressed in numerous state corporation codes,
that "the board of directors shall manage the business and affairs
of the corporation." 31 If pressed, some will retreat to the position
that the board "possesses" the corporation's authority, but has
"delegated" it to senior management.34 The persistence of this
confusion of the normative and the empirical, forty-five years after
Berle and Means first reported that the locus of power within the
supra note 1, at 11-66; J. MARCH & H. SIMON, supra note 1, at 158-60;
supra note 1,at 25-35; MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 1, at
122-24; Dubin, supra note 28, at 227-29; Marschak, Efficient and Viable Organization
Forms, in MODERN ORGANIZATION THEORY, supra note 1, at 307, 313-20. A recent major
synthesis of decisionmaking research ably summarizes modern developments in this area.
See I. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION MAKING, 10-41, 179-80 (1977).
30 See C. ARGYRIS, supra note 1; R. LIKERT, supra note 1; Haire, Introduction-Recurrent
Themes and General Issues in Organization Theory, in MODERN ORGANIZATION THEORY,
supra note 1, at 1, 4-6.
31 See CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 1, at 47-52.
32 See id. at 47-52; Haire, supra note 30, at 5.
33 For a list of the standard authorities that still recite this view, see M. EISENBERG,
supra note 12, at 2 n.2. See also id. at 140-41; H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 203, 207
(2d ed. 1970).
34 See, e.g., H. HENN, supra note 33, at § 212. Delaware recently has amended section
141(a) of its Corporation Law to indicate that the corporation is to "be managed by or
under the direction of" the board of directors. DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1976)
(emphasis added). The ABA's Committee on Corporate Laws has adopted similar revisions
in section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act, apparently in the belief that such
a change might reduce the liability of the outside director. See ABA Comm. on Corporate
Laws, Report of Committee on Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAW. 501, 502, 504-05 (1975).
29

See J.
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corporation had shifted to senior management, 35 is disappointing.
But it is even more obsolete today, when the contemporary organization theorist tells us that power within the modern decentralized
corporation is a very elusive commodity, one seldom effectively
monopolized by any one group or level in the corporate hierarchy,
not even senior management.3 6
Our focus obviously has expanded to include consideration of
more abstract issues than simply the legality of improper payments.
The specific topic of such payments, however, does provide a microcosm in which we can approach the broader questions and test
the utility of those insights offered by the organization theorists.
Professor Christopher Stone has already posed the scope of our
basic inquiry.3 7 What ideal configuration of authority and information flow within the corporation, he asks, would ameliorate the
current dysfunctions? 38 For our purposes, this inquiry divides into
three parts: (1) to what extent can we discern patterns in a specific
controversy, such as the improper payments controversy, that
correspond to the abstract models suggested by theorists; (2) to
the extent we see such relationships, can these theoretical models
suggest remedies; and (3) to what extent are those remedies feasible? In turn, this last question subdivides into two parts: (1) to
what extent are the proposed remedies achievable by the present
common law, and (2) to what extent is legislative reform necessary?
These questions serve as the roadmap for this article. Part I will
consist of a search for criteria. It will move from the specific to the
abstract, from a survey of individual cases of malfunctioning to the
increasingly rarefied generalizations of the theorists. Thereafter,
Part II will survey the common law relevant to corporate misconduct that has evolved in the context of the derivative suit. Again,
the principal concern will be an attempt to identify those legal
doctrines, either existing or foreshadowed in the case law, that
relate to the critiques developed in Part I. To the extent that the
35 See note 12 supra.
36 Essentially, this is what Williamson means when he refers to the

"control loss
phenomenon" in large decentralized corporations. See CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 1,
at 14-35. For a fuller explanation of Williamson's views and the critical "span of control"
concept that he and Mason Haire share, see text accompanying notes 155-61 infra, and
Haire, Biological Models and Empirical Histories of the Growth of Organizations, in
MODERN ORGANIZATION THEORY, supra note 2, at 272, 293-305.
37 See C. STONE, supra note 22.
38 Id. at 120-21.
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potential of the common law does not satisfy the needs of theory,
we at least may define the areas which demand legislative reform.
Finally, in Part III, a comparison of models for reform is attempted in light of recent experience with SEC efforts to utilize
the securities laws to reform corporate behavior through mandatory
public disclosure. 3 9 The criteria that have been developed in
earlier parts will be used to evaluate the potential of this major
new external approach to corporate reform. The drumbeats of this
impending advance of "therapeutic disclosure" 40 have not gone
unheard. The private bar has vigorously attacked the Commission's jurisdiction to use disclosure as a means designed less to protect investors than to achieve substantive reform of corporate
conduct. 41 Particularly where the amount of the payment is economically insignificant, the claim has been made with some merit
that the SEC is using disclosure not to provide a disinfecting sunlight, but only the artificial klieg lighting for a carefully staged
morality play in which the businessman has been forcibly miscast
39 For a sympathetic overview, see Herlihy & Levine, supra note 2, and Stevenson, supra
note 19. For a detailed description by SEC officials of the mechanics of current SEC
practices with respect to questionable payments cases, see the following three articles
in Volumes I and II of ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: FRAUD, INSIDE INFORMATION, AND
FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER RULE 1Ob-5 (May 12-13, 1977) [hereinafter cited as ALI-ABA
STUDY]: Ferrara & Brandon, QuestionableForeign Payments Decried and Decreed: Securities

and Exchange Commission Enforcement Actions, in 2 ALI-ABA STUDY, supra, at 689;
Ferrara &-Williams, Deputizing the Private Sector: The Hired Hands Search for Sensitive
Payments, in 1 ALI-ABA STUDY, supra, at 429; Levine & Ferrara, Tradition or Corruption:
The Defendants and the Volunteers in the Securities and Exchange Commission's Domestic
Questionable Payments Program, in 1 ALI-ABA STUDY, supra, at 33.
40 See Sommer, Therapeutic Disclosure, 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 263 (1976).
41 See Borden, The S.E.C. Should Not Be Making Law, N.Y. Times, March 6, 1977, § 3
(Business and Finance), at 12; Freeman, The Legality of the SEC's Management Fraud
Program, 31 Bus. LAw. 1295 (1976); Lowenfels, Questionable Corporate Payments and the
Federal Securities Laws, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1976); Address by Bruce Allan Mann to
ABA Comm. on Federal Regulations of Securities, 1975 Annual Convention (Aug. 20, 1975),
reported in [July-Dec. 1975 Transfer Binder] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 316, at A-4.
Perhaps the most articulate critic of the SEC's current policy is former SEC Commissioner
A.A. Sommer, Jr., who was present at the creation of the SEC's "management fraud" policy.
See, e.g., Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., A Parting Look at Foreign Payments, before the
Ohio Legal Center Institute (Apr. 2, 1976); Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Slippery
Slope of Materiality, before the Practicing Law Institute (Dec. 8, 1975). See also S.E.C. Is
Criticized by Outgoing Aide, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1976, at 51, col. 5. For another critical
view, see Malley, Far-Reaching Equitable Remedies Under the Securities Acts and the
Growth of FederalCorporate Law, 17 WaM. & MARY L. REv. 47 (1975).
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as the stereotypical villian. 42 Although the issue of the Commission's jurisdiction has been debated elsewhere,43 and is beyond our
scope, the limits of disclosure as a remedy must concern us. Disinfectants are not, after all, a universal panacea; sometimes surgery
is required. Thus, Part III compares the basically internal reforms
discussed in Parts I and II against the external remedy of mandatory disclosure of corporate misconduct under the securities laws.
A topic beyond the scope of this article is that perennially debated theme, the corporation's social responsibility. We need not
reach this question, because it may be assumed that the interests of
the corporation itself, whether narrowly defined as only long-term
profit maximization or broadly defined in terms of greater social
objectives, are likely to be better served in a closely regulated
economy by corporate decisionmaking that is reflective, deliberate,
and risk conscious.

I.

TOWARD A THEORETICAL VIEW:

FROM OBSERVATION TO MODEL BUILDING

What basic patterns of conduct are discernible from a comparative examination of the experiences reported to date by corporations that have disclosed "questionable payments"? This section
outlines that information and then, in ascending order of abstraction, moves from the particular controversy of improper payments
to the more generalized empirical observations that commentators
have recently offered about corporate decisionmaking, and finally
to the pure models of the organization theorists.
A.

A Quick Tour of Yesterday's Headlines

Improper payments stories first began to trickle out from the
swamp of Watergate when the Special Prosecutor's Office discovered that a sizable number of American corporations had made
42 See, e.g., Despite Early Gains, Anti-Payoff Campaign Is Beginning to Sputter, Wall
St. J., July 9, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (comments of chairman of management consulting firm
of Booz, Allen, & Hamilton). Those chief executives who have been removed as a result
of questionable payment disclosures have been quick to portray themselves as victims
of a witch hunt and have raised the troubling theme that their fiduciary duties to their
employees justified making payments not strictly forbidden by law in order to save the
jobs generated, for example, by a major aircraft contract. See Kotchian Calls Himself the
Scapegoat, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1977, § 3, at 1, col. 1;J. McCLoY, supra note 3, at 105.
43 See sources cited notes 40 & 41 supra. Most recently, the SEC's own Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure has concluded that the use of disclosure "to serve groups
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illegal political contributions during the 1972 presidential campaign. This freshet quickly swelled to a steady stream with the
subsequent investigation initiated by the SEC to determine
whether the absence of disclosure surrounding these payments had
violated the federal securities laws." The floodstage was reached,
however, only after the revelation of an unrelated and unsuspected
scandal: "Bananagate." The dramatic exposure of United Brands
misconduct occurred after the suicide of its prominent chief executive officer, Eli Black, whose death followed the commencement of
an SEC investigation into a $1.25 million payment, authorized by
Black, to the President of Honduras, apparently to avoid the imposition of a confiscatory export duty on bananas." "Bananagate"
shifted the focus of both SEC and popular attention from illegal
domestic political contributions to the broader issues arising out
of foreign and commercial bribery.4 6 It thus set the stage for the
unfolding of the incredible saga of Lockheed Corporation and its
worldwide efforts to bribe senior ministers of friendly foreign
governments.47 Other notable instances of such payments, such as
those of Gulf in South Korea, Exxon in Italy, and Northrop and
Grumman in the Middle East, have been described in detail elsewhere, 48 and in the aggregate suggest a level of corporate hubris
and unchecked ambition reminiscent of Commodore Vanderbilt
and the nineteenth century robber barons.
The SEC's course tacked several times during these developments, reflecting well-publicized disagreements within the Commission.49 While its staff was experimenting with increasingly
other than investors would exceed the Commission's statutory authority." Advisory Panel
Supports SEC Disclosure Plan, Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1977, at B9, col. 6.
44 For a concise summary of these events, see SEC PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, at
2-6; Herlihy & Levine, supra note 2, at 548-58; Kohlmeier, supra note 2.
45 Tracy, supra note 2, at 146; Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1976, supra note 8.
46 Brownlee & Queenan, supra note 2, at 27.
47 See Lockheed Paid $38 Million in Bribes Abroad, Wash. Post, May 27, 1977, at E9,
col. 1; Wall St. J., supra note 6.
48 With respect to Gulf and Exxon, see the reports of their special investigations listed
note 3 supra. With respect to Northrop, see Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1976, supra note 8.
With respect -to Grumman, see Herlihy & Levine, supra note 2, at 561-62; Iranian Aide
Attacks Grumman President on F-14 Sale Issue, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 1976, at A2, col. 5.
49 Former Commission Chairman Hills has conceded that there has been disagreement
among the Commission members in this area and has acknowledged "uncertainty" as to
his own position. See Address by Roderick M. Hills to the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York (Mar. 15, 1976). Former Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr.
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strong negative incentives, in the form of novel consent decrees,5 °
against questionable payments, the Commission itself seemingly
adopted a positive incentive policy almost by inadvertence." Faced
with a potentially enormous number of companies that had made
such payments, and thus a severe burden on its enforcement resources, the Commission instead inaugurated in the summer of
1975 its Voluntary Disclosure Program. Under it, companies making voluntary "generic" disclosures of the aggregate amount and
basic purposes of questionable payments (and agreeing to take
certain other remedial steps) could escape both the constraints of
a consent order injunction and the embarrassment of having to2
make public the delicate details of who got what, when, and why.
The combined effect of the SEC's approach was a carrot-and-stick
policy: the ability to make a "generic" disclosure rather than a full
scale public confession constituted the "carrot," with the "stick"
being the Enforcement Division's increasingly restrictive consent
decree. Unquestionably, it worked. The SEC's initiation of this
differentiated policy triggered a deluge of corporate disclosures involving several hundred companies? Thus, to state a theme to
which we will return, one lesson about influencing corporate behavior that stands out in overview from this "brief but passionate
era of corporate history" 54 is that of the efficacy of combining
positive and negative incentives.
has been most critical. See notes 40-41 supra. Both former Commissioner Garrett and Commissioner Loomis have been described as "uncertain" and equivocal in their attitudes
towards the recent trend of the Division of Enforcement's management fraud program.
Stevenson, supra note 19, at 69. Only Commissioners Pollack and Evans appear to have
given unqualified endorsement to the view that acts involving illegality or misconduct
are "per se" material. See The Corporate Rush to Confess All, supra note 2, at 22: Address
by John R. Evans, SEC-Catalyst for Competitive Free Enterprise, before the Brookings
Institution (Mar. 25, 1976). In contrast, the most recently appointed member of
the Commission, Roberta Karmel, has indicated that she is "not terribly concerned" about
the questionable payments controversy, but is "wary" of attempts to legislate corporate
morals. See A New Perspective at the S.E.C., N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1977, § 3 (Business &
Finance), at 5, col. 1.
50 See text accompanying notes 543-47 infra; Ferrara & Brandon, supra note 39;
Kohlmeier, supra note 2.
51 See Stevenson, supra note 2, at 72.
52 For descriptions of the Voluntary Disclosure Program, see SEC PAYMENTS REPORT,
supra note 2, at 6-13; Herlihy & Levine, supra note 2, at 584-94.
53 The Corporate Rush To Confess All, supra note 2; Wall St. J., supra note 4.
54 Address by Roderick Hills, Doing Business Abroad-The Disclosure Dilemma, Yale
Law School (May 1, 1976), reprinted in 23 YALE L. REP., Fall, 1976, at 4, 8.
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The Basic Patterns:An Arrangement In Gray and Black

Distinguishing degrees of impropriety is always an uncomfortable task. Such an attempt here is not only disquieting, but difficult.
As we penetrate behind the black-and-white world of the newspaper headlines, the colors of the surrounding landscape become
increasingly dominated by the muted grays of moral ambiguity
and legal uncertainty. As in a Whistler canvas, grays and blacks
blend into each other in a way that obscures basic patterns. Nonetheless, a moral continuum is discernible on which the prototypical
foreign payments would rank in the following descending order of
culpability.
1.

The "Aggressive" Payment

As the disclosures about Lockheed, Northrop, and other corporations have made clear, the success of some American corporations
has apparently depended on management's secret skills in the
private auction market of commercial bribery. In such cases, the
race may not have gone to the most efficient, but rather to the
most corrupt.
However, before we frame a remedy based on the assumption
that the Lockheed case is typical, it is important to note that the
best evidence to date suggests that this form of bribery, the large
payment directly exchanged for new business, is more the exception than the rule. Of the first 100 corporations to participate in
the Commission's Voluntary Disclosure Program, "fewer than
twenty," according to Chairman Hills, could be so classified. 5
Similarly, a self-reporting survey conducted by the Conference
Board indicated that such practices tended to characterize only
certain industries, most notably heavy capital goods industries,
particularly those selling to government purchasers. 6 Companies
possessing a substantial competitive edge, especially in high technology equipment, have proven largely immune to such bribe re57
quests.
55 Id. at 6.

See J. BASCHE, UNUSUAL FOREIGN PAYMENTS:
OF U.S. COMPANIES 15-17 (1976).
57 Trowbridge, Foreword to id., at v.
56
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The "Defensive" Payment

What then is the characteristic improper payment? Both the
SEC Payments Report and a report by the Conference Board have
found that the leading targets of requests for improper payments
were precisely those companies that are most dependent on the attitudes of government regulators. Pharmaceutical companies and
corporations involved in petroleum refining stood out in particular. In each case, the characteristic profile is that of a business that
makes relatively low sales to governmental purchasers but is highly
sensitive to political control. 8 In the view of the involved corporate
officials, the payments were felt necessary to protect existing operations against adverse political actions.
The difference between the "aggressive" payment and the "defensive" payment to avoid adverse governmental action is presumably the element of duress. Arguably, duress may supply a
defense to corporate officials in a derivative suit brought with respect to such payments. 9 But, putting aside temporarily this tactical consideration, how valid is the distinction between aggressive
and defensive payments? Some nuances emerge if we contrast two
celebrated examples of defensive payments: Gulf Oil and United
Brands. The case of Gulf Oil in South Korea provides the clearest
paradigm. With a $300 million fixed investment in South Korea,
Gulf's chairman received threats in 1970 from officials of the dominant Korean political party that the company's investment would
'be jeopardized unless it made a $10 million "contribution" to that
party. ° Similarly, in the case of United Brands, where the threatened catastrophe to the company from a confiscatory export duty
on bananas appeared at least as great, the original bribe request
came from Honduran officials. 61 But, unlike Gulf's situation, the
payment to the President of Honduras was designed to frustrate a
deliberate governmental policy, collectively agreed upon with
58 J. BASCHE, supra note 56, at 16-17; SEC PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, at 37. A
survey by the Council on Economic Priorities has found that out of the first 175 companies to disclose, 22 were in the drug and health care field, 22 in the oil and gas industry,
14 in aerospace and air travel industries, and 14 in chemicals. 175 Firms Admit Bribes of
$300 Million Overseas, Wash. Post, Dec. 19, 1976, at D13, col. 1. Thus, four industries
account for roughly one-third of the total experience.
59 See notes 393-406 infra and acompanying text.
60 J. McCLoY, supra note 3, at 101-05.
61 United Brands Bribe Called "Aberration," N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1976, at 29, col. 5.
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several other Central American nations. Because of this aspect, the
United Brands example forcefully raises the questions of whether
there should be limits to a duress defense and whether we can
seriously postulate a corporation's right to determine for itself
that governmental action is sufficiently arbitrary to justify resistance by extra-legal means.
Even if there are necessary limits to any exculpatory concept of
duress, it still must be asked: who caused the losses in these cases?
If we grant that sometimes the payment of bribes, even if illegal,
mitigates or averts larger losses to the corporation, traditional
common-law concepts, such as proximate causation, interfere with
our ability to use the common law to deter corporate misconduct.6 2
Arguably, liability should not accrue to the corporate officer whose
actions, while harmful, result in net beneficial effects to the corporation. In other words, even if the Gulf and United Brands cases
can be distinguished in terms of the relative justification for the
payment (Gulf alone having been threatened with extra-legal pressures), they are alike in two other respects. First, the payments
were made to avoid a larger loss. Second, permitting the individual
shareholder to sue derivatively and hold corporate officials strictly
liable for such payments would enable him to prevent the corporation from defending itself in a way that the majority of shareholders might prefer. The nagging root question here raised
(consideration of which must be postponed) concerns the extent
to which the derivative suit should serve as the vehicle for the
private attorney general.
3.

The "Grease" Payment

By far the greatest number of revelations have not involved
large bribes intended either to secure new business or to protect
existing operations. Rather, the most frequent payments have
been relatively small sums delivered to lower echelon officials to
expedite services, to avoid bureaucratic red tape, or to obtain the
performance of duties to which the corporation is entitled. Such
62 The problem of proximate causation is discussed at text accompanying notes 407-15
infra. Also complicating the issues in this United Brands example is the often overlooked fact that the public policy of Honduras, which United Brands attempted to
frustrate, was the formation of a price-fixing cartel whose existence certainly was contrary to United States policy. Thus, to argue that a U.S. corporation must always comply
with local public policies may be unduly simplistic.
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"facilitating" payments-variously called "tea money" in Asia,
"dash" in Africa, "pots de vin" in Europe, "baksheesh" in the
Middle East, and "la mordita" in Latin America-characteristically are made for prosaic purposes such as obtaining permits or
allocations of scarce resources.0 3 To the extent such grants involve
an exercise of discretion by the official receiving the payment, it is
usually a very limited discretion and generally in a context in
4
which such payments unofficially are recognized as traditional.
Revealingly, even those in Congress who have most adamantly opposed foreign bribes have carefully exempted the grease payment
from the scope of proposed criminal proscriptions. 65
In the initial reaction against questionable payments, a number
of American corporations adopted sweeping codes of ethics that
proscribed all forms of questionable payments, including the
ubiquitous grease payment." Since then, a number of companies
have found such a goal to be unattainably idealistic and have in a
7
variety of ways quietly conceded the inevitability of venial sin.
In some cases, this concession has even taken the form of the
63 See J. BASCHE, supra note 56, at 4-5, 9-12; SEC PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, at
26-27; Hills, supra note 54, at 6.
64 Gwirtzman, supra note 2, at 100.
65 For an exhaustive summary of all recent legislative proposals, see Ferrara & Williams,
Saints and Sinners Revisited: The Legislative Approach to Questionable and Illegal CorporatePayments, in 2 ALI-ABA STUDY, supra note 39, at 529 (summarizing the contents of
31 recent legislative bills). Representative of the stricter form of legislative approach, which
makes specified types of payments actually illegal rather than simply requiring their
disclosure, is S.305, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S7193 (daily ed. May 5, 1977). The
bill was proposed by Senator Proxmire, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, and
was approved in slightly different versions by both the Senate and the House. At the
time this article went to press, both houses had agreed to the conference report on S.305.
See Corporate Bribery Bill Is Approved, Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 1977, at Dl, col. 6. While it
contains tough criminal penalties, the bill is carefully tailored to reach only payments
made directly or indirectly to governmental officials and political parties, thus excluding
the grease payment. See also 122 CONG. REc. S15,789 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1976) (statement
of Senator Proxmire with respect to predecessor of S.305 in 94th Congress; noting that the
bill's definition of "bribery" was narrowed).
66 During late 1975 and 1976, the issuance of guidelines and corporate codes of ethics
became an almost obligatory item on the agenda for innumerable corporate boards. See
SEC PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, at 45-46; More Concerns Issue Guidelines on Ethics
in Payoffs Aftermath, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1976, at 1, col. 6. For representative examples,
see J. BASCHE, supra note 56, at 30-42 (most of which provide no exceptions for "grease
payments").
07 Several corporations have publicly announced that they will continue to make
"grease" or "facilitating" payments. SEC PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, at 46-48; Wash.
Post, supra note 58.
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institution of formalized procedures for senior management review
of requests by subordinate officials to make such payments.6 8
Once again, issues of legal significance surface. Should the
common law of fiduciary duty tolerate some level of venial sin
when committed by a corporate official in the shareholders' interest? Or must the law deal in moral absolutes? If the latter
course is the answer, it can be assumed that such grease payments,
although de minimis on an individual basis, are sufficiently large
in the aggregate that, after public disclosure under SEC prodding,
they will attract the attention of the derivative suit bar. Thus, the
hidden corollary of these questions may be whether we prefer a
structure in which senior management can monitor and supervise
the involvement of subordinates in questionable activities, or do
we prefer to maximize the symbolic repudiation of such conduct,
thereby fostering a system in which senior management may not
accept the risk of liability that would come with a close monitoring
of grease payments? If this is the net effect of a "moralistic" legal
response, the upshot may be to encourage management to respond
with the averted glance of the "shut-eyed sentry"-a consequence
potentially leading to greater disaster.
4.

Bribery by Proxy: Use of the Middleman

As the SEC's investigation intensified during 1975, an assortment of exotic and unsavory characters began to emerge from the
woodwork of obscurity-and then to reappear with astonishing
regularity. These middlemen 69 proved to be ubiquitous because
68 In most of the cases where companies have not completely terminated such payments,
the approach taken has been to authorize them only "if no reasonable alternative exists"
and if approved by senior management. SEC PAYMENTS REI oRT, supra note 2, at 46-48.
Bristol-Meyers in fact has apparently adopted detailed procedures for the supervision of
questionable payments under which they must be reported to its audit committee unless
"insubstantial in amount" or approved by its general counsel. Bristol-Meyers Questions
$3 Million in Payments, Wash. Post., Sept. 10, 1976, at D-11, col. 5. The goal here seems
to be greater accountability rather than total elimination. In addition to this shift to
procedural reform, as opposed to substantive prohibitions, some observers have questioned
whether companies are truly enforcing the policies to which they publicly subscribe. See
Wall St. J., supra note 42, at 1, col. 6.
69 The best known of these was the flamboyant Adnan Khashoggi, who was simultaneously the agent of Northrop, its competitor Lockheed (from whom he has earned
$106 million in commissions), and a number of other American corporations. Sampson,
supra note 2. Notwithstanding his notoriety, he apparently remains the agent of some
major American corporations. Wall St. J., supra note 42, at 1.
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they fulfilled a vital corporate need: the creation of a "buffer
zone," 70 an insulating layer between the corporation and actual involvement in any negotiation over a bribe. Should the activities of
the agent result in scandal, the corporation can then profess dismay
and disown its agent.
From a common-law perspective, deliberate use of such an approach presents a number of familiar issues dressed in only slightly
altered guise. These include the traditional problem of form
versus substance, and the tension between the principle of respondeat superior and the common law's general distaste for vicarious liability. For our purposes, however, the more important
question is whether the game is worth the candle if such a simple
subterfuge can solve corporate management's legal problems. Even
if the veil of this artifice can be pierced, will the next obvious solution, turning the agent into either a consignee or an independent
layer in the distribution network, achieve the same result? Perhaps this would be the likely consequence of placing American
corporations at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their European counterparts." If so, the main message here may be to reconsider the
moralistic approach and focus more carefully on what it is we want
to change.
5.

The "Legal" PoliticalContribution

At the other end of the continuum that began with the "aggressive" bribe lies the lawful political contribution. While contributions by corporations to candidates in federal elections long have
violated United States law,72 no such prohibitions exist in many
other nations, 73 and even in some states.7 4
70 See J. BASCHE, supra note 56, at 13-15, on the utility of such a device for many
corporations.
71 Basche suggests that some American corporations use "distributors, agents, [and]
franchisees" for exactly this reason. Id. at 13.
72 This prohibition is now codified as part of the Federal Elections Campaign Act.
See Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 112(2), 90 Stat. 490-92 (1976) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b),
discussed in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
73 Examples are Germany, Italy and Switzerland. See generally J. BASCHE, supra note 56,
at 6-7.
74 A recent survey prepared for a Practicing Law Institute conference shows 16 states
without any such prohibition. See PRACTICING LAW INSTITuTE, THE CORPORATON IN PoLITIcs
93-117 (1976). A number of other states permit some corporate contributions, generally
below a specified dollar level. See id.
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The result is that "[w]hen political contributions are lawful,
they are expected and solicited, and a business enterprise cannot be
sure of the impact of a refusal." " While some contributions appear to be barely disguised "aggressive" and "defensive" bribes,
a fair characterization of the majority of political contributions is
that they seem intended less to obtain a specific benefit than to
obtain a favorably disposed "attentive ear" within government in
the event of future problems. 76 The payments are analogous to
insurance premiums: in return for a sum immaterial to the corporation, access to political decisionmakers in a future crisis is
assured.
The largest corporate political contributions on record-those
totaling nearly $60 million made by Esso Italiana S.P.A., an Exxon
affiliate-reveal above all else a basic confusion of motives. Eventually, a major reason for their continuation became the self-perpetuating fear of reprisals for terminating such a sizable program. 7
While some payments resembled bribes intended to resolve contractual disputes with government agencies,7 8 and others were
somewhat quixotically motivated by a desire to forestall the spread
of the Italian Communist Party, the predominating motive was
again this desire to preserve an "attentive ear." 71
Ultimately, tle Exxon case seems more interesting as a symptom
of several distinct problems than as a substantive evil itself. First,
the corporation somehow spent nearly $60 million for uncertain
purposes without triggering any internal alarm that alerted the
board of directors. Second, it appears that for years before the payments program was terminated, the president of Exxon's Italian
subsidiary had resisted pressure and even commands from Exxon's
senior management to cease and desist such practices. 80 Third, the
devices by which the recalcitrant official was able to resist senior
management "generated an atmosphere of non-control," 81 which
EXXON REPORT, supra note 3, at 31.
76 See Note, Civil Responsibility for Corporate Political Expenditures, 20 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 1327, 1348 & n.lll (1973).
77 EXXON REPORT, supra note 3, at 25.
78 Id. at 33, 53-56.
79 "The unarticulated hope is . . . that, in decisions involving judgment or discretion, the disposition toward the donor will be, if not sympathetic, at least free from
hostility ....
."Id. at 31.
80 Id. at 24-28.
81 Political Slush Fund Hid Other Spending, Cost Exxon Millions, Wall St. J., Nov. 14,
75
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itself may be of more concern than any substantive evil involved.
Thus, Exxon's Italian Connection is a symptom not only of the
board's remoteness from the corporation's internal functioning,
but also of another tendency, one that organization theorists call
"persistence behavior." 82 That term refers to the inertial force that
seems to exist within some organizations leading a subunit within
the organization to continue in a pattern of behavior because of the
"sunk costs" involved, long after the conduct in question has be83
come counterproductive to the enterprise as a whole.
C.

The Undefined Duties

Incomplete as the foregoing account of "improper payments"
may be, it suffices to provide our microcosm. Disregarding for the
moment any discussion of the legal duties of corporate officials, we
can detect four different sets of pressures acting upon the typical
middle-level managers who usually receive such payment requests.
First, they face the competitive pressure of corporations based
outside the United States, which to date appear not to have been
inhibited by the burgeoning dimensions of the scandal within the
United States. 4 Second, they are acutely aware of the uncertain
and shifting nature of the line that separates extortion from
bribery. Third, they are under the pressure created by the weight
of precedent and the inertial force that keeps a program, once
commenced, in operation. Commercial bribery has a long, if not
honorable, history, antedating even the corporation itself.8 5 Finally, the fourth factor is the atmosphere of rampant moral relativism
1975, at 1, col. 6, & 24, col. 1. See note 510 infra (comments of Exxon's former general
auditor).
82 MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 1, at 121.
83 For other examples of such recurring behavior, see notes 128-32 infra.
84 See Herlihy & Levine, supra note 2, at 565-66 (describing the more tolerant French
and British attitudes toward questionable payments and their amusement at the
moralistic reaction of the United States). The French defense ministry has apparently
become popularly known in some quarters as the "Ministry of Bribes." Multinational
Corporationsand United States Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.,
pt. 12, at 354-55 (1975).
85 Herlihy & Levine, supra note 2, at 560; see Guzzardi, supra note 2, at 118 (noting
that Bethlehem Steel won the contract to supply steel for the Trans-Siberian railroad
at the turn of the century by making a gift of a diamond necklace to the mistress of the
Czar's nephew); Gwirtzman, supra note 2, at 19 (pointing out that such practices were
used by the early joint stock companies, such as the East India Company, before the
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in which the corporate manager of a multinational corporation
operates abroad. It is not only that "everybody does it," but that
managers and others are profoundly divided and uncertain as to
whether they must abide by the moral standards predominant in
the United States or by the local "rules of the game." Il
These factors have a generalized significance that transcends the
context of illegal payments. Competitive pressure, the inevitability
of operating "close to the line" in some areas of the law, the force
of tradition, and the existence of conflicting standards are equally
characteristic of environmental, antitrust, tax, and other legal and
social problems to which the corporate manager must respond.
Ironically compounding the middle-level manager's dilemma,
in a way that also may be representative, has been the inconsistent,
even contradictory, performance of governmental regulators. Reputable businessmen have reported that officials of the State and
Treasury Departments in some localities have carefully coached
them as to whom to bribe, whom to refuse, and what middlemen
to hire as sales agents.8 7 Even more aggravated has been the degree
of involvement of the Defense Department, which appears to have
haggled recurrently over the size of the bribes to be paid on foreign
arms sales. 88 Such involvement by the federal government renders
understandable the skepticism on the part of corporate managers
when confronted with official rhetoric about corporate morality.
If one single scene could sum up this transition from complicity to
condemnation, it would be that moment in Casablanca, when
corporation as we know it existed). Former SEC Chairman Hills also has noted that the
history of commercial bribery stretches back "for centuries." Hills, supra note 54, at 6.
86 See J. BAsCHE, supra note 56, at 25 (reporting that 48% of the executives responding
to a Conference Board survey answered that American companies were entitled to adopt
the prevalent "commercial modes and moral standards" of the countries where they did
business, even if those conflicted with standards in the United States). Before we fault
businessmen too quickly for their uncertainty on this point, it should be noted that Yale
Divinity School Professor Charles W. Powers has argued that bribery may be morally
defensible in some cultures. Powers and his colleagues argue that a multinational ethical
code must be based on the host country's values, not those of the United States.
J. SIMON, C. POWERS, & J. GUNNEMAN, THE ETHICAL INVESTOR (1972). See also Ethics Experts Wax Inconclusive on Bribery Abroad, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1975, § 3 (Business and
and Finance), at 1, col. 1.
87 E.g., How A Multinational Avoids Paying Bribes Overseas - Probably, Wall St. J.,
April 14, 1976, at 1, col. 6, & 15, col. 1.
88 Sampson, supra note 2, at 53 (describing meetings between Pentagon officials and
Adnan Khashoggi).
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Claude Rains as the venal chief inspector announces his shock at
the gambling in Rick's Cafe-and then is handed his winnings.
Hypocrisy is, of course, an ancient prerogative of governments
and bureaucrats. The point here is only that, if we could achieve
a stronger corporate superego without visiting harsh retribution
on all subordinate corporate officials who act unwisely in what
they believe to be the best interests of the corporation, such an
approach would seem desirable from the standpoint of fairness.
Additionally, by creating some safe harbors for the corporate
executive, such a legal strategy might meet far less resistance from
within the corporate community.
D.

The Breakdown in Corporate Norms

If the individual corporate manager seems an undeserving
scapegoat, where then should responsibility lie? If we feel that
the directors of the corporation have functioned as little more than
"shut-eyed sentries," they become inviting targets. But if we seize
only on evidence that confirms this critique, we tend to filter out
many of the particularly troubling characteristics of the improper
payments phenomenon. For example, a study of the Gulf debacle
more pointed and less diplomatic than the McCloy Report found
not so much inattention on the part of the board as deliberate
concealment of information by officers of the corporation. 9 Actual
deception by the chief executive officer in the face of direct inquiries from the board accompanied a disturbingly slow and indifferent investigation by the orginal outside counsel retained by
the board.9 0 Similarly, neither the United Brands nor Lockheed
boards appears to have received notification from its chief executive about matters involving fundamental risks to which its
89 Robertson, supra note 2, at 121. This study notes that (1) Gulf Chairman Dorsey
"kept secret from the board, for more than a year and a half after the scandal broke, the
fact that he had personally authorized the largest political payments-$4 million" to South
Korean officials, and (2) "Gulf's general counsel and lawyers retained by the company
withheld some devastating details that they had turned up .... " Id. While diligent, the
board "found it difficult to pierce the veil of politeness" and get truthful information
from its own employees. Id. at 122.
90 The attorney initially retained to conduct the investigation "volunteered very little
of what he knew" and failed to give the board a full accounting of illegal campaign contributions until eight months after he had given the same information to the Watergate
Special Prosecutor. Id. at 124.
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business was subject.9 Before dismissing these boards as passive
entities populated by "decoy duck" directors, we must note that
the Gulf and Lockheed boards, once fully informed, did act decisively and removed their chief executives.92
Thus, the problem of inadequate information flow to the board
is significant. In 40% of the cases studied in the SEC Payments
Report, senior management was aware of the payments and the
surrounding circumstances." "Inside" directors also frequently
were conversant with these practices. 94 But in no case does the
report clearly indicate that the outside directors were apprised of
the situation.9 5 Rather, elaborate steps appear to have been taken
to prevent disclosure to the board.96 Compounding this deliberate
isolation of the board has been the behavior of the outside professionals. In Gulf and several other instances, the attorneys appear
to have been highly selective in the information they revealed to
the board. 97 More frequently, the outside accountants have tolerated the creation of "slush" funds " and the falsification of corpo91 See also EXXON REPORT, supra note 3; J. MCCLOY, supra note 3. This phenomenon of
selective revelations by senior management to the board is not limited to large or traditionally profit-oriented corporations. For a tale of similar deception by the President of the
First Women's Bank, see Welles, Ms. Management at the First Women's Bank, NEw YORK,
Apr. 4, 1977, at 78.
92 As is well known, the chief executives of Gulf and Lockheed were fired, and Northrop
Chairman Jones was forced to surrender his title of President. See articles cited note 8
supra. Nor are these instances atypical. There have been an "unprecedented" number of
instances recently in which boards have removed chief executives in whom they had lost
confidence or by whom they felt deceived. Barmash, Heads Rolling in the Board Room,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1976, § 3, at 1, col. 3 (noting that the chief executive officers
recently had been fired at "20 of America's best known companies" and attributing this
trend to a new assertiveness on the part of the board).
93 See note 11 supra.

94 See SEC PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, app. A.
95 See id.
N Id. at 42.

97 See, e.g., note 90 supra. Similar accusations have been made in other recent
cases. Summarizing the recent report of Lockheed's special review committee, the Wall
Street Journal has noted that "the name of . . . [Lockheed's] chief counsel and assistant
secretary is sprinkled throughout the pages of the report in connection with helping to
facilitate questionable payments." Lockheed Puts Foreign Payoffs Near $38 Million, Wall
St. J., May 27, 1977, at 4, col. 2. See also Kickbacks, False Statements by Emersons Alleged,
Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1977, at C6, col. 1.
98 The Internal Revenue Service's study of corporate slush funds found them to exist in
54% of the 896 corporations studied. SEC Forces Delay in Falstaff Brewing Stockholder
Meeting, Wash. Post, June 7, 1977, at D6, col. 5. In most cases, the accountants at some
point became aware of the general nature of the payments program.
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rate books and records without notifying the board, even in instances where an audit committee existed to serve as a conduit by
which such information could reach the board.99 The "almost
universal characteristic" of the cases the SEC studied was "the
apparent frustration of our system of corporate accountability." -100
In short, if the fundamental principle of corporate government
is that the board of directors shall manage the corporation, then
the improper payments controversy has exposed a number of
extreme instances of corporate malfunction. Three basic symptoms,
none wholly distinguishable from the others, appear with some
regularity. Each is discussed in turn below.
1.

The Dominance of Operations over Policy

A maxim of business behavior, so well recognized by businessmen that it has become something of a cliche, is that "operations
make policy." 101 In the absence of clearly articulated and enforced
policy guidelines, short-term concerns will override and indeed
shape long-term goals. Given this tendency, it is revealing that the
Conference Board found that only 25,% of the corporations it
surveyed had written guidelines concerning the permissibility of
questionable payments. 2 While many of the rest claimed to rely
on oral guidance and unwritten rules, the general picture that
emerged from the survey was one of relatively little restraint on
basically autonomous managers. In most cases, enforcement of
these written or unwritten rules depended almost totally on the
99 In the Lockheed case, Arthur Young & Company discovered the payments in 1971
and brought them to the attention of the corporation's audit committee on two occasions,
but senior management was able both times to prevent the audit committee from alerting
the full board. Wall St. J., supra note 97. In the case of Gulf, its outside accountants had
"some knowledge" of Gulf's foreign payments. J. McCLoY, supra note 3, at 205-09. However,
although Gulf had an audit committee since 1971, there is no indication that they
discussed any of these payments with the committee. Id. at 212.
100 Introduction to SEC PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, at (a).
101 C. BROWN, supra note 9, at 32. One distinguished social scientist observed that in fact
many chief executive officers of large firms tend to give an almost irrational priority to
short-term goals that "[t]hey are single-mindedly, almost slavishly, committed to achieving
.
Argyris,
..
The CEO's Behavior: Key to Organizational Development, HARV. Bus.
REv., March-April, 1973, at 55, 57. That this happens is of course further testimony to the
difficulties inherent in making the board into a balancing force capable of "moderating
the management's understandable internal interest in day-to-day achievement." Andrews,
Can the Best Corporation Be Made Moral?, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June, 1973, at 57, 64.
102 J. BASCHE, supra note 56, at 18-19.
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use of financial controls to detect unauthorized payments. 10 3 Only
in a few cases did companies report a practice of instructing managers that they would be evaluated in terms of their ability to live
within the guidelines promulgated. 0 4 Reports of disciplinary actions taken against noncomplying employees were rare.' Against
such a backdrop, even where written guidelines exist, the corporate
manager may perceive the instructions from above as amounting
to little more than that time-honored injunction: "Don't Get
Caught."
2. The Imbalance Between the Board and the Chief Executive
Officer
The fairest generalization that can be made on the evidence to
date about the role of the board in the illegal payments controversy is that its function usually has amounted to little more than
crisis intervention. Generally, only when affairs have gotten so out
of hand that management has been discredited has the board asserted itself, often under pressure from derivative suit plaintiffs.0 6
Perhaps the best evidence of the eclipse of the board as a source of
policy is the finding of the Conference Board that in 75% of the
surveyed cases, managers were subject to no more than unwritten
guidelines regarding foreign payments.0 7 Necessarily, oral guidance comes from corporate officers and not from the board; inherently it is subject to varying interpretations, and often is formulated on an ad hoc basis at times when shortrun goals loom irresistably large. It is also virtually immune from review and supervision by the board. In short, dependence upon oral guidance and
informal advice undercuts the board's monitoring capacity, because it is frequently difficult to reconstruct, particularly in the
aftermath of a debacle, just where responsibility for a given decision lay.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 24.
105 See id. at 22-24.
106 In cases such as Gulf, Northrop, and Lockheed, it seems particularly clear that the
board acted only after litigation had been commenced and a demand made on the board
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
107 See J. BASCHE, supra note 56, at 18-19.
103
104
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The Problem of Information Blockages

Adverse information, particularly information relating to contingent liabilities, appears not to be reaching the board until a
crisis has become unavoidable.'
The improper payments controversy provides several hundred recent examples of serious
structural deficiencies in the information flow and internal compliance monitoring within large corporations. 0 9
A variety of reasons appear to share responsibility for these information blockages: (a) a shared feeling on the part of subordinate officials that they owe their loyalty chiefly to senior management and not to the board; (b) a belief that the board is interested
only in "hard" quantitative information, such as capital costs,
financial ratios, and expected rates of return; (c) a sense that
"everybody knows anyway," coupled with the perception that the
board would rather not be put on formal notice as to the ugly
"facts of life" of doing business abroad; and (d) a "lack of congruence" between the interests of the corporation and the career aspirations of individual corporate officials. 110 More simply, this last
point means that what is good for General Motors is not necessarily
good for its Assistant Vice President. If he fails to use sensitive payments, or if he discloses to his superiors any questionable practices
he does use, he may appear less successful than his compatriots
who hide such information from their superiors. To be sure, the
tendency to report information selectively, emphasizing the positive while filtering out the negative, is characteristic of all bureaucratic organizations (whether the information relates to guerrilla
108 On the pervasiveness of this problem, see C. STONE, supra note 22, at 201-09.

109 The Lockheed situation provides a particularly good illustration of how such
information blockages can develop within a large organization so as to prevent critical
information from reaching those with primary monitoring responsibilities. An "informal
internal organization" that made or approved the payments and prevented others from
becoming aware was found to have evolved within Lockheed. For example, Lockheed's
chief financial officer, who should have been aware of such payments, was excluded from
this process and was largely "the victim of a plan by [Lockheed's senior two executives] to
keep him uninformed." Wall St. J., supra note 97. A similar "informal" organization
within the corporate bureaucracy has been reported in the case of Firestone, whose chief
financial officer ran a domestic political contributions program without the knowledge of
any other corporate official. See Firestone Inquiry Finds Officer Ran $1.16 Million
Fund, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1976, at Dl, col. 1. See also How the Bond Balloon Burst At
Chase, FORTUNE, July, 1977, at 78 (describing how one relatively senior bank official withheld information about his own $34 million misjudgment); notes 510-I1 infra.
110 C. STONE, supra note 22, at 46.
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warfare in Vietnam, environmental hazards of a major governmental project, or the illegal means by which a profitable contract
has been secured). But distinguishing the corporate context is the
comparative absence of any institutionalized mechanisms by which
to penetrate and break down these information blockages. While
armies have inspectors general, and governmental projects face the
necessity of environmental impact studies, no currently enforced
legal norm requires the corporation to internalize a means of forcing potentially adverse information to the attention of the board.
How serious is the need for a legal strategy tailored to these
problems? To answer this question, we need to take a broader
look.
E.

An Overview of Internal Corporate Decisionmaking

In appraising the improper payments controversy, the first idea
to discard is that it is unique. A close parallel to the current controversy was the major price-fixing conspiracy uncovered throughout the electrical equipment industry in the late 1950's."' Then
as now, moralists were shocked, Congress concerned, and business
spokesmen baffled at the dimensions of the scandal. But one
anomaly of that scandal has special relevance to the current controversy: despite the size of the conspiracy and subsequent careful
scrutiny, no evidence was uncovered of involvement by the senior
management of any of the major participants.
In the aftermath of that scandal, both congressional committees 12 and commentators 113 identified several common root causes
within the structure of the participating corporations that had
permitted the conspiracy to continue undetected for a substantial
period. First, senior management had been unable to communicate
to the operating levels of the corporation its concern about exposure to antitrust liabilities. 1 4 Second, this failure of internal
communications was compounded by a fixed belief on the part
of subordinates aware of the formal corporate policy that senior
111 For a comprehensive study of this period, see Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate
Executive Part 1, 47 VA. L. REV. 929 (1961), and Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate
Executive Part 11, 48 VA. L. REV. 1 (1962). Some 29 corporations and 44 individuals were
indicted. 47 VA. L. REV. at 929 n.1.
112 See Administered Prices: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly

of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 28 (1961).
113 See Whiting, supra note 111, at 48 VA. L. REv. 15-18.
114 Id. at 15.
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management did not really mean what it said." 5 Third, senior
management was so isolated from those at operational levels as to
be effectively unable to monitor or control closely conduct at
operational levels. 16
The problem of management isolation from operations was in
turn found to be the product of a series of factors, such as a decentralized corporate structure, 11 7 a hierarchical command system
that required orders and responses to travel along narrow linear
channels of communication,"18 and a technical orientation of those
at operational levels that made them inattentive to both the signs
and risks of illegality."19 One study of that conspiracy found that
even when subordinates had sought to protest orders they considered questionable, they found themselves checked by the linear
structure of authority, which effectively denied them any means
by which to appeal. 20 For example, one almost Kafkaesque ploy
utilized to prevent an appeal by a subordinate was to have a person
substantially above the level of his immediate superior ask him to
engage in the questionable practice. The immediate superior
would then be told not to supervise the activities of the subordinate
in the given area. 2 ' Thus, both the subordinate and the supervisor
would be left in the dark regarding the level of authority from
which the order had come, to whom an appeal might lie,
and whether they would violate company policy by even discussing
the matter between themselves. By in effect removing the subject
employee from his normal organizational terrain, this stratagem
effectively structured an information blockage into the corporate
communication system. Interestingly, there are striking similarities
between such an organizational pattern and the manner in which
control over corporate slush funds deliberately was given to lowlevel employees, whose activities then were carefully exempted
from the supervision of their immediate superiors. 22
115 Id. at 16.
116 Id. at 17.
117 Id. at 18.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 17. In addition, one cardinal rule recognized by the participants in the price
fixing was "not to tell the lawyers anything." Id. at 17-18.
121 Id.
122 The classic recent example is that of William Viglia, Gulf's admitted "bagman" in
the Bahamas. A low-level employee, he was totally detached from the ordinary chain of
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Other examples of gaps in what Christopher Stone has called
the corporation's "information net" are not hard to find. 1 23 In each
case, the result is to interdict the upward flow of adverse information. But, the problem is hardly unique to the area of corporate
misconduct. Recent SEC studies of such corporate collapses as
Penn Central 124 and Stirling Homex 125 have found the boards to
have been unaware of the impending disasters. 'While the SEC has
cited these instances as evidence of inadequate diligence by the
outside directors, others have identified a different pattern: the
systematic censorship by those controlling the flow of information
to the board of warning signals that might have alerted outside directors.26 Surveying a host of examples, Peter Drucker, the acknowledged dean of American theorists on management, has observed that the board "was always the last group to hear of trouble
in the great business catastrophes of the century." 127
But why? An example that reveals in more microscopic detail
what Drucker has observed on the macroscopic level is the recent
command, with no immediate superiors or associates familiar with his activities. Viglia
reported directly to Gulf's Pittsburgh home office rather than its nearest regional office in
Coral Gables. See J. MCCLOY, supra note 3, at 42-61. Viglia's activities were sufficiently
shielded from his superiors that even Gulf's Comptroller was once told by Gulf's Executive Vice President not to inquire into them despite the large flows of cash to Viglia. Viglia
himself appears to have understood that he could not describe his activities even to such
a high ranking official. See Ex-Chief of Gulf's Bahamian Unit Says Silence Was Ordered on
Political Fund, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1975, at 5, col. I. Such a pattern is, of course, a
paradigm of what this article terms an "information blockage." The purpose of this
extreme secrecy was not only to prevent external discovery of the payments, but also to
keep those within the organization who would protest from discovering. See J. McCLoY,
supra note 3, at 33. See note 109 supra for instances fitting a similar pattern at Lockheed
and Firestone.
123 C. STONE, supra note 22, at 199.
124 SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATONS OF THE HOUSE INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE COMM., 93D CONG., 2D SEss., THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL CoMPANY (Subcomm. Print 1972) (Staff Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission).
See also C. STONE, supra note 22, at 196.
125 Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of Investigation in the
Matter of Stirling Homex Corporation Relating to Activities of the Board of Directors
of Stirling Homex Corporation, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
180,219 (July 16, 1975).
126 See Harris, Directors of Industrial Companies: Special Problems, 31 Bus. LAW. 1235,
1237-40 (1976).
127 P. DRUCKER, supra note 1, at 628. See also J. ARGENTI, CORPORATE COLLAPSE: THE
CAUSES AND SYMPTOMS 121-32 (1976) (reviewing the common symptoms in most major
recent corporate insolvencies and finding "one-man rule" by a managerial "autocrat" to
be the most common factor).
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insolvency of W.T. Grant Co., the giant retailer. 2 s A major cause
of the collapse was Grant's lack of even rudimentary internal controls over inventory or credit. Those at lower echelons within the
corporation exploited this lack of central control by deliberately
contriving an upward flow of misinformation. As the final collapse
approached, for example, the company's buying department appears actually to have increased its purchases of large capital goods
items, where profit was least likely, in order to prevent cutbacks
in its own staff. 29 Similarly, individual store managers unrealistically extended credit to meet their own sales quotas. 30 In some
cases, vendors were even deliberately overpaid, subject to an oral
agreement to treat the overpayment as a loan, so that store managers could manipulate their fourth quarter profits to show a
rising trend at year's end by recalling these loans. Given the weakness of the internal controls, it should not be surprising that there
also was evidence of suspicious payments resembling kickbacks. 131
This pattern of conflict between the interests of the subunit and
those of the firm equally characterizes corporations not on the
brink of insolvency. Recently, the Washington Post uncovered a
similar example, involving two wholly owned subsidiaries of U.S.
Steel. Both of the subsidiaries have been actively lobbying with re32
gard to proposed legislation, but on opposite sides.
Economists and other theorists have termed this type of organizational schizophrenia "subgoal pursuit.' '1 33 The theory is that given
an opportunity to exercise discretion, managers at lower levels
within a firm will tend to act not to maximize the firm's welfare,
but rather the interests and autonomy of their own unit or division. 4 Such behavior is virtually inevitable, organization theorists
have found, because the subunit chief executive who fails to act as
the zealous advocate of the interests of his own unit, even when
those interests conflict with the firm's overall welfare, "is not apt to
128 For studies of the W.T. Grant debacle, see Investigating the Collapse of W.T. Grant,
Bus. WEEK, July 19, 1976, at 60; Grant Testimony Shows It Lacked Curbs on Budget, Credit
and Had Internal Woes, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1977, at 6, col. 3.
129 Wall St. J., supra note 128.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Corporate Killer Fish Are Circling Waterway-Tolls Bill, Wash. Post, June 19, 1977,
at A15, col. 1.
133 See, e.g., CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 1, at 47-49.
134 Id. at 47-52, 174; MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 1, at 125.
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be viable for long." 1' The captive of his constituency, he must act
as the partisan representative of its interests or risk abandonment
by his own subordinates. Thus, even at this still mild level of abstraction, the problem of information blockages ceases to be only a
technical failure of communications or the consequence of careless
inattention, but becomes instead part of a predictable and deliberate strategy rationally employed by lower echelons to protect their
own interests from both senior management and the board alike.
Similarly, the other symptoms noted earlier-the imbalance between the executives and the board and the tendency for operations
to shape policy-also become clearer at a more generalized level
of abstraction. Increasingly, recent commentators have diagnosed
the root problem to be the absence of any functioning system of
checks and balances within the corporation.13 Empirical surveys
have documented the limited impact of the board in most forms
of corporate decisionmaking1 37 Boards do not set policy, do not
veto management, seldom intervene short of a major crisis, and do
not even select their own successors or the next chief executive officer. Why is the board so unable to exercise control? Here the empirical approach of observation and reportage is inadequate to answer this question in any depth. Instead, it is necessary to turn to a
higher level of abstraction and to the organization and communication theorists who have examined the modern large firm.
Studying governmental bureaucracies in the 1960's, Gordon
Tullock observed the phenomenon of "authority leakage." He
described this as a progressive loss of control over subordinate
units within the same bureaucracy as the organization expanded
and the distance between such units and those at the agency's top
135 CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 1, at 51. Central to this argument is that the
modem organization is a "prolific generator of anxiety and insecurity." V. THOMPSON,
MODERN ORGANIZATION 24 (1961), cited in CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 1, at 51; see

M. MACCOBY, supra note 1, at 189-90 (containing considerable empirical evidence on the
level of anxiety among corporate managers). As a result, each subunit within the organization has a bias for expansion and growth in order to create more opportunities and
security for its members. Given this virtually instinctive urge to grow, Williamson
argues, the subunit will abandon, undercut, and eventually revolt against any functional
chief who seeks to restrict its expansion. See also Burns, On the Rationale of the Corporate
System, in THE CORPORATE SocIET, supra note 1, at 121, 160-66.
136 See, e.g., C. BROWN, supra note 9, at 15-21.
137 The most notable is that by Harvard Business School Professor Myles Mace. See
M. MACE, supra note 23. For a summary by Professor Mace of his findings, see Conard,
Mace, Blough, & Gibson, Functions of Directors Under The Existing System, 27 Bus.
LAw. 23, 32-37 (Special Issue Feb. 1972).
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became greater. 13 Subsequently, another student of bureaucracies,

Anthony Downs, formalized Tullock's perception into a general
law, the "Law of Diminishing Control," which states: "The larger
any organization becomes, the weaker is the control over its actions
exercised by those at the top." 13' Both Downs and Tullock found
one underlying cause of this progressive paralysis to be the ease
with which generalized orders and nonspecific policies imposed
at the top could be successively reinterpreted, distorted, or qualified as the commands filtered downward through the organization.
By analogy, a corporate code of ethics, adopted in general terms by
a board, would seem to be at least as subject to an increasingly
selective reception and reinterpretation as the organizational distance from the board increases as were the commands in the bureaucracies studied by Tullock and Downs. Interestingly, tentative
confirmation of this hypothesis already may have emerged from the
improper payments controversy. There is evidence suggesting that
those at the top of the corporate hierarchy have ceased their use of
40
"improper payments" while those at lower levels are persisting.1
On the reverse side of the coin to the problem of "authority
leakage" are the problems associated with the upward transmission
of adverse information within the corporate hierarchy.' 41 To the
extent that corporate communications are basically serial in nature, so that information is retransmitted from each hierarchical
level to the next, the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance suggests
one problem. That theory simply states the much-observed
phenomenon that recipients of information unconsciously focus
on and relay only the information that reinforces their preexisting
attitudes, while filtering out conflicting information.14' To the
138 G. TULLOCK, supra note I, at

142-93.

139 A. DOWNS, supra note 1, at 143. For a discussion of both theorists by Williamson, see
CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note I, at 26.
140 See N.Y. Times, supra note 6. Gulf's vice president in charge of internal auditing has
said that even when senior management is adamant, there may still be continuing instances
at lower levels: "It's like turning off a faucet. You still might get a drop or two." At Gulf
Oil Nowadays, A "Questionable" Deal Is One To Be Shunned, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1977,
at 1, col. 6. In the language of the organization theorist, this is "persistence behavior." See
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 1, at 121.
141 See CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 1, at 22, 25-26.

142 The premise of the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance and of several related theories
is that the human mind has an innate drive to maintain consistency between its preexisting attitudes and the information it receives. Hence it filters out much information
that is inconsistent with these prior attitudes. See L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE
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extent that adverse information conflicts with the recipient's basic
attitudes by showing failure, it is particularly subject to this unconscious filtering.
Even absent the distorting impact of preexisting attitudes on
information flow, experimental evidence suggests that serial relay
of information results in significant information loss. 14 3 Information theorists have formulated the rule that each additional relay
in a communications system halves the message while doubling
the "noise." 144 Significantly, some corporations have today between
twelve and fifteen hierarchical levels between the first-line supervisor and the company president, suggesting that much "noise" and
only a very diluted message will reach the top through regular lines
of communication. 14 5 The economist Kenneth Boulding has
phrased the problem the most pessimistically: "[T]he larger and
more authoritarian the organization, the better the chance that its
top decision-makers will be operating in purely imaginary
worlds." 14 There appears to be no easy solution to this problem.
Communication theorists agree that to enable all of the units of a
large corporation to communicate directly with senior decision(1957); C. HOVLAND, I. JANIS, & H. KELLY, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION
(1953); M. ROKEACH, THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND (1960); H. SCHRODER, M. DRIVER, & S.
STREUFERT, HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING (1967). But see I. JANIS & L. MANN, Supra
note 29, at 15-16, 82-85, 420-22, for recent revisions in this theory.
143 Particularly illustrative are F. C. Bartlett's studies, in which information was serially
communicated along a chain of individuals in order to study the cumulative loss. He
found that after such serial transmission:
[O]pinions and conclusions are reversed-nearly every possible variation seems as if
it can take place, even in a relatively short series. At the same time the subjects
may be very well satisfied with their efforts, believing themselves to have passed on
all important features with little or no change ....
F. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING 175-81 (1932), quoted in CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 1,
at 25. See also MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 1, at 122-24.
144 P. DRUCKER, supra note 1, at 546.
145 Id. at 546-47. Drucker adds that any "level" in an organization is equivalent to an
additional "relay" in a communications system.
146 Boulding, The Economics of Knowledge and the Knowledge of Economics, AM.
ECON. REV., May, 1966, at 1, 8, quoted in CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 1, at 22. Nobel
prize-winning economist Kenneth Arrow has defined the problem in slightly different
terms: information to deal with a problem may be available within the organization and
yet not become accessible to senior decisionmakers because of "the overload of the informamation and decisionmaking capacity of the authority" and the resulting tendency to filter
out information that is not "congruent with previous beliefs." K. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF
ORGANIZATION 73-75 (1974).
DISSONANCE
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makers would be to create an overload of information that would
1 47
be an even more serious problem.
The factors that we have considered so far-subgoal pursuit,
authority leakage, and the loss of message content during transmission across hierarchical levels-are related phenomena that show
the need to penetrate the "black box" perception of the corporation and to understand its internal functioning. Only recently,
however, have we seen any attempt to synthesize these factors into
a comprehensive model. That attempt, by Professor Oliver Williamson of the University of Pennsylvania, involves a rigorous
mathematical treatment that resists summarization.' 8 Starting
with the question long debated by economists of whether there is
an optimum size to the firm, Williamson examines what underlies
the frequently made observation that some giant firms are consistently outperformed by smaller firms in the same industry. His
answer is that the loss of internal control within these giants,
caused by their greater problems in securing compliance and
adequate internal communication, renders them relatively less
1 49
efficient.
But here Williamson parts company with the static organization
theorists, such as Downs and Tullock, who basically take an ahistorical view of the problem and see all bureaucracies as hobbled by
the same disabilities. In Williamson's view, the corporation has
evolved over time in response to the challenges posed by its internal environment 50 Relying largely on the work of the business
historian Alfred Chandler, 51' Williamson notes that about the
turn of the century the internal structure of the business corporation assumed a new configuration: decisionmaking began to be
decentralized along functional lines. Chief executives began dele52
gating specific functional authority to specialized subordinates.
147 See J. EMERY, supra note 1,at 24-28. This work emphasizes that senior management
must "decouple" itself from the majority of incoming lines of communication if it is to
avoid sensory overload. A respected computer scientist has reached a related conclusion,
arguing that management suffers not so much from the lack of relevant information as
from an "overabundance of irrelevant information." Ackoff, Management Misinformation
Systems, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN A DEMOCRACY 264, 265 (A. Westin ed. 1971). See
also I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 29, at 21-23.
148 See CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 1.
149 See id. at 14-35.
150 Id. ch. 5.
151 See A. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE (1966).
152 MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 1, at 133-36. For a fuller account of this
transition to "functionalism," see P. DRUCKER, supra note 1, at 520-23, 563.
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This change was in response to the increasing complexity of business and the overloading that had occurred in the channels of
communication leading to the chief executive. It did not, however,
truly resolve the overload problem. The chief executive still had
to resolve all operational issues that implicated the interests of
more than one functional unit. 153 Borrowing from earlier organization theorists, Williamson argues that the chief executive, and each
subordinate manager, has a limited "span of control," a limited
range of decisions and operations that he can effectively monitor
and control. 154 He argues that this turn-of-the-century restructuring of corporations along functional lines merely added a new tier,
the special function executive, to the corporate hierarchy, thereby
intensifying the problems of subgoal pursuit and communication
distortion. It was an ineffective reform because it did not reduce
to a feasible range the chief executive's "span of control." 155
Williamson's next step is critical. A series of internal crises
within the largest American corporations during the 1920's proved
to the management of these corporations that their organizational
structure was inadequate, because it placed excessive operational
demands upon the chief executive and his staff."0 Their size simply
had grown beyond the chief executive's "span of control." In response, these corporations-General Motors, Sears, DuPont, and
Standard Oil of New Jersey-each independently developed a new
management structure that reallocated the burden of operational
decisionmaking from senior to middle-level management by decentralization. 5 7 After World War II, most other American corporations followed suit."' At the heart of this transition was the creation of the autonomous centralized division. Self-contained and
headed by the divisional equivalent of a chief executive officer,
who possessed full operational authority and coordinated his own
subordinate functional specialists, the division became virtually an
See A. CHANDLER, supra note 151, at 382-83.
See note 36 supra.
155 MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 1, at 133-36, citing A. CHANDLER, supra note
151, at 382-83.
156 See MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 1, at 136-37.
157 Chandler terms the new corporate form that resulted "multidivisional." Under it,
operational decisions were entrusted to a divisional chief executive, so that the firm's chief
executive could focus on company-wide "strategic" decisions full time. A. CHANDLER, supra
note 151, at 382-83. See also P. DRUCKER, supra note 1, at 572-85.
158 CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 1, at 117-18 (noting that such firms as Goodyear,
General Electric, IBM, Ford, Chrysler, International Harvester, and ITT have imitated
153
154
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independent corporation unto itself. A diagram Williamson uses
to show this transition appears below: 159
THE TRADITIONAL UNITARY

Manufacturing

U

CORPORATION

C

R

Engineering

THE MULTIDIVISIONAL CORPORATION

this form). Probably the first academic to recognize the significance of this change was
Peter Drucker in his classic study of General Motors. See P. DRUCKER, THE CONCEPT OF
THE CORPORATION (1948). By the late 1950's, with the appearance of the conglomerate, the
multidivisional form had become virtually ubiquitous among large corporations. Indeed,
some undiversified companies (such as IBM) have found it expedient to simulate decentralization in order to improve decisionmaking, notwithstanding that their activities are
not inherently multidivisional. P. DRUCKER, supra note I, at 585-91.
159 CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 1, at 116.
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The competitive advantages of this structure in terms of the criteria outlined earlier are clear. First, responsibility for operational
decisions has been reassigned to a lower level in the corporate
hierarchy, thereby reducing both the responsible executive's "span
of control" and the potential for communication distortion or subgoal pursuit. Second, the central office at the apex of the corporation is now "decoupled" from unnecessary channels of communication and has solved its information overload problem by divorcing itself from operational decisionmaking. As a result, it now
can focus on both strategic planning and monitoring the performance of each division. It enforces compliance with its strategic
goals through auditing and by controlling such incentives as salary,
promotion, and allocation of capital among divisions; 160 in effect,
it performs the role of a miniature capital market, rewarding
efficient divisions and penalizing inefficient ones-but thereby also
encouraging lower echelons to avoid sanctions by withholding
adverse information from the top.
There is another consequence of this transition that, although
less emphasized by Williamson, is more directly relevant to our
concern with the reasons underlying the eclipse of the board. By
restricting their focus to planning, formulating policy, and monitoring, the chief executive and his staff assumed functions that
were traditionally the prerogative of the board. The consequence
of such decentralization was that the senior management group
became an " 'activated board of directors' whether or not they are
the legally constituted board." 11 In effect, the management group
preempted the legal board. To the extent that senior management
and the board performed the same functions, they were engaged in .
an unrecognized and unavoidable competition, one that normally
could only be won by senior management. Having a larger staff,
control over such vital incentives as the allocation of capital and
promotions, and a full-time commitment to its mission, senior
management necessarily would outperform a part-time board.
Most economists and business school academicians probably
tacitly share this view of the board as a vestigal appendix of the
corporation. But the legal profession, which has a unique interest
160 See MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 1, at 137-48, for a summary of the
competitive advantages of this form.
161 Heflebower, Observations on Decentralization in Large Enterprises, 9 J. INDUS.
ECON. 7, 18 (1960).
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in a normative description of the corporation, continues to attribute greater importance to the board. Still, unless norm and reality
are reasonably congruent, any effort to reduce corporate misconduct by subjecting the board to unrealistic standards risks being
ineffective generally, and punitive occasionally, in its isolated application to random scapegoats. This raises a serious problem about
the most popular remedy now being advocated by the SEC, Ralph
Nader, and a host of other reformers. They propose the reformation of the board to include either principally or exclusively independent "outside" directors.162 However, whether working alone
or with a special staff, the corporate board as presently constituted
seems incapable of having more than a marginal impact. The implications that flow from Professor Williamson's model are that
the board is in the position of the seventeenth century monarchholding absolute power in theory, but cut off from access to information and thereby manipulated by the ministers who are its
nominal servants. Occasionally, the board may erupt into forceful
action, but in the long run its domination by its ministers seems inevitable. Moreover, this analogy is incomplete, for it fails to convey
fully the organization theorist's emphasis on the centrifugal forces
within large organizations that result in subunits persisting in conduct disapproved by those at the organization's apex. Even the
ministers, it appears, are never in full control of their own bureaucracy.
Organization theory poses some other counter-intuitive implications for possible reforms. If the contemporary board is too passive, a logical reform would seem to be to institutionalize a more
adversarial relationship between the board and management. Such
a purpose seems to underlie the recent proposals of the Nader
group, under which each director would represent a specified
special interest constituency, such as environmentalists or consumers. 163 The board then would represent those groups whose
legitimate interests appear most likely to conflict with the corporate
162 There are, however, significant differences in the functions that the "outside" boards
proposed by these critics would perform. The Nader board, composed of "public interest"
representatives, would manage the corporation, while the board proposed by Professor
Eisenberg would seek only to "monitor" management. M. EISENBERG, supra note 12, at
164-72. Whether the board as presently structured can perform adequately even this more
modest monitoring function presents an issue on which I remain skeptical.
163 NADER REPORT, supra note 19.
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goal of profit maximization. But, if one of the basic problems
undercutting the effectiveness of the board is that of information
blockages, then the clear message from the theorists of bureaucracy
is that such blockages are most acute precisely when the lower
echelons perceive their relationship with the upper echelons to be
adversarial in character.'14 Similar observations have been made by
more empirically oriented observers as well.' 65
To deal effectively with the information blockage problem, it is
necessary to understand more about the preconditions for the free
flow of information within organizations. A leading motivational
expert, Rensis Likert, has summarized the empirical research on
information interchange within organizations between subordinates and superiors. Likert explains that to the extent the interaction between them is not "supportive" of the subordinate,' the
tendency to withhold information and restrict disclosures increases,
and all "communication upward will be highly filtered and correspondingly inaccurate." 167 He finds that sensitive information is
communicated only when the informant has trust and confidence
in the recipient and when the informant believes that he can
"exert influence upward." ""I Likert finds these preconditions
generally are satisfied only when the communication is on a "faceto-face" basis between individuals having prior shared experiences,
ideally from having participated in the same working groups."0 9
Can the law refocus its efforts in response to such theoretical input? It seems a fair characterization to say that to date most courts
164 R. LiRERT, supra note 1,at 49-51, 158-88. Professor Likert's emphasis is on the need
for cooperative interaction as a precondition for information sharing. For a briefer exposition of his views, see Likert, A Motivational Approach to a Modified Theory of Organization and Management, in MODERN ORGANIZATION THEORY, supra note 1, at 184
[hereinafter cited as A Motivational Approach]. Cf. R. LIRERT, NEW PATrERNS OF MANAGEMENT (1967) (an earlier, more general treatment of the types of interaction and successful
managerial theory).
165 Examples are Peter Drucker, Courtney Brown, and Roger Blough. For the comments
of these men, which have focused on the troubling issue of whether the board should be
equipped with a sizeable staff to investigate matters on its behalf, see notes 195-98 infra.
1,6 See A Motivational Approach, supra note 164, at 190-92, 201-02, 210-11.
167 Id. at 195-96.
168 Id. at 202.
169 Id. at 192-96. See also W. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 49-51. Within the work group,
these theorists agree, information flow is efficient and the tendency to bias or withhold
information is greatly reduced. Because interaction within such groups is "supportive,"
there is a "full and open flow of useful and relevant information," and "[t]here are no
blocks, no distortions, no filters." A Motivational Approach, supra note 164, at 210.
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and legal commentators largely have emulated King Canute, relying on fiduciary law principles and simply insisting that subordinates disclose information to their superiors. While this response is understandable, it is also myopic. It fails to ask how the
law can best encourage the freer and fuller flow of information
within the corporate hierarchy.
Professor Christopher Stone is one legal scholar who has addressed the question of encouraging information flow. However,
while he may well be the first corporate law commentator to view
this problem other than through the prism of "fiduciary ideology,"
his answers nonetheless seem potentially counterproductive when
analyzed from the standpoint of organization theory. Essentially,
he suggests mending the corporation's "information net" in three
respects: (1) a greater use of "public interest" directors, who will
be more sensitive to social and moral concerns; 170 (2) a requirement that the corporation gather more information internally
about the adverse social consequences of proposed actions; 171 and
(3) a greater protection for the "whistle blower" within the corporate hierarchy who provides notice of impending undesirable activities. 172 While this summary fails to convey the subtler nuances in
Stone's proposals, it is sufficient to point out the problems his suggestions raise from the perspective of the organization theorist.
First, reliance on "public interest" directors raises the problems
of an adversarial relationship between the board and management.
The result may be to aggravate, rather than to alleviate, the problem of information blockages. 73 Second, the information-gathering
requirements resurrect the dangers of information overload and
"stimuli saturation," which decades ago forced senior management to "decouple" itself from operational decisionmaking. 74 Not
only would the amount of data be voluminous, but data collection
alone does not overcome the tendency of lower-echelon personnel
supra note 22, at 152-73.
Id. at 217-27.
Id. at 213-16. See also R. NADER, P.

170 C. STONE,
171
172

PETAS,

8, K.

BLACKWELL, WHISTLE BLOWING

(1972).
173 This does not mean that the selection of directors should continue to be controlled
by the management they in theory are to supervise, but only that efforts at reform should
avoid needlessly creating the appearance of an atmosphere of antagonism or suspicion
between the board and the corporate infrastructure.
174 .See sources cited note 147 supra. See also Arrow, On the Agenda of Organizations,
in THE CORPORATE SociETY, supra note 1, at 214, 224-30.
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to unconsciously filter out adverse information. For example, to the
extent that environmental impact statements have been successful
information-gathering devices, much of their effectiveness comes
from the existence of judicial review (which would be lacking
here) and not from any demonstrated tendency on the part of
sponsors of governmental projects to reconsider them voluntarily
once all the evidence is in. Finally, dependence on the "whistle
blower" seems both unrealistic and counterproductive. As Stone
recognizes, legal sanctions are only one of the many forces impacting on the corporate executive. Where sanctions conflict with more
poiverful pressures, they will likely prove ineffective even if enforcement is punitive. Yet, near unanimity exists among observers
of the corporation that within its hierarchy no act is viewed more
disfavorably, indeed seen virtually as "treason," than disclosure of
adverse confidential information to outsiders.:"' Given this attitude
toward disclosure, reliance on a "whistle blower" strategy would
have little positive effect. Moreover, it would pose a real danger
that the near-paranoid sensitivity of corporate managers toward
internal spies would intensify the problem of information blockages by causing greater restrictions to be placed on the intra7 6
corporate flow of information .
On a more generalized level there is also reason to doubt that a
"whistle blower" strategy, depending as it does on seducing key
individuals within the corporate hierarchy, can be successful in
the long term. As sociologist Robert Dubin has said, "There is a
lengthy series of studies that comes to the same general point:
that smaller groups in organizations must be viewed analytically
175 See A. JAY, CORPORATION MAN 266 (1971); MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note
1, at 146-47 & n.12; Burns, supra note 135, at 174. Professor Burns argues that not only is

confidentiality "essential to the survival of the system," but "communication control . . .
[is] both the basis and the overt expression of power within the corporate system." Id.
176 Undoubtedly, there have been and will again be instances in which concerned
individuals within organizations will "blow the whistle." A recent noteworthy example is
the five nuclear engineers within General Electric who resigned to protest the dangers
inherent in nuclear energy. See Disclosing Misdeeds of Corporations Can Backfire on

Tattlers, Wall St. J., May 21, 1976, at 1, col. 1. However, efforts to promote such disclosures
may be counterproductive, cutting off the fl'ow of information to monitoring stations
within the corporation that are far more important than the isolated concerned
individual. If protecting the "whistle blower" reduces the total flow of sensitive information within the corporation, it also reduces the effectiveness of the hoard, once again substantiating Forrester's Law.
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and realistically as organic wholes whose cooperation in the organization must be sought as a unit." 177 To depend seriously on the
"whistle blower" is to rely on a strategy that seeks individual cooperation rather than group compliance, one that seeks to encourage an activity universally mistrusted within the corporate
social system. Such a strategy too greatly subordinates realism to
idealism.
F. A Proposed Model: The Mini-Board-Making
Structure Follow Strategy
By this point, the reader may have decided that we are dismissing
useful reforms because they do not fully solve the problem. In
fact, there are twin dangers here that any attempt at policy reform
must confront. On the one hand, there is a temptation to fall victim
to what might be termed the Herbert Spencer Syndrome: the
feeling that nothing can be done to change the system and that all
governmental action is futile." 8 If the Spencer Syndrome represents the conservative extreme, the countervailing danger tempting
liberals is the fallacy that "all good things go together." 17" Here,
this fallacy is best exemplified by the apparent belief of some recent
enthusiasts that a combination of all recent proposals for reform"special constituency" directors, audit committees, enlarged staffs
for the board, and more disclosure-would, if applied in large
enough doses, somehow solve the corporation's internal problems.
177 Dubin, supra note 28, at 242.
178 See generally H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS (1851). For a description of the "ultra-

conservative" impact of this work upon 19th century thinkers, see R. HOFSTADER, SOCIAL
(2d ed. 1955). Analogously, some of the
DARWINISM IN AMrAReCAN THOUGHT 31-50
organization theorists, most notably Gordon Tullock, have similarly taken a conservative
stance that little can be accomplished through governmental intervention to cure the
bureaucratic disabilities they describe. See, e.g., G. TULLOCK, supra note 1, at 157-60. In contrast, Williamson and others have argued that internal changes within the organization
have reduced these problems in the case of the business corporation. See, eg., CORPORATE
CONTROL,. supra note 1, at 117-19. There is, of course, no reason why legislatures or
agencies should be denied the opportunity to experiment with such reforms; the reply
of Justice Holmes to the Spencerians in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905),
seems equally applicable here: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics ...."
179 I borrow this phrase from Gordon Tullock. See Tullock, Does Punishment Deter
Crime?, 36 PuB. INTERST 103, 109 (19.74). For a critical review of recent reform proposals,
see Feis, supra note 23. In order to steer a course between these twin obstacles, my suggestion is that an intelligent policy approach should seek to maximize the efficiency of the
corporate superego by utilizing the same principles that have been found to maximize the
efficiency of the corporate ego (i.e., senior management).
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While such a prescription is pleasantly idealistic, it is based on
little more than intuition, since the blinders of fiduciary ideology
have prevented an in-depth diagnosis of the problem.
Once one views the problem of corporate control from the perspective of organization theory, prescription flows from diagnosis.
The literature of organization theory has given much attention to
the possibility of "flattening" organizational structures, i.e., reducing the number of hierarchical levels across which communications
must pass. 80 Shortening the line of communications to the top
might minimize distortion in the information transmitted upward
and maintain the clarity of the commands sent downward. While
some experimental evidence supports the utility of such "flattening," 181 only an incurable optimist would believe the possibility of
such a strategy on a large scale. "Flattening" would conflict with decentralization, which, as Williamson and others have shown, has
been a necessary and successful adaptation to the corporation's
changed internal environment.
But what possibilities exist for moving the board closer to the
locus of the problem? To explore the available alternatives, it is
useful to begin with the common metaphor that the board is the
corporation's "crow's nest." As such, it can spot impending problems on the horizon, but can hardly discover or correct trouble in
the ship's boiler room below. Communications from both crow's
nest and boiler room run to the bridge, where senior management
holds the helm. Thus, if our concern about the problem of corporate misconduct leads us to seek to make the board better able to
monitor the corporation's internal environment, then we must
consider a structural repositioning of the board, bringing it closer
to the locus- of the problems we want it to monitor. However, as
long as the board's manpower is limited, as in the present structure,
it cannot both engage in strategic planning and simultaneously
monitor internal and external problems with any real effectiveness.
This, however, is the same problem of limited management capacity that confronted the corporation earlier in this century, and
that was resolved successfully by decentralization. The unitary
corporate structure gave way to the multidivisional form discussed
180 See G. DALTON, L. BARNES, & A. ZALEZNIK, supra note 1, at 3; Dubin, supra note 28,
at 229 (summarizing the literature on this point).
181 See G. DALTON, L. BARNES, & A. ZALEZNIK, supra note 1, for an elaborate empirical
study on the effects of such a strategy within one division of a large corporation.
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earlier. In effect, to solve a problem of information overload analogous to that now faced by the board, the chief executive officer surrendered his day-to-day control over operational matters and allocated this authority to several mini-chief executives, positioned
at the apexes of their respective autonomous divisions.
If we wish to institutionalize a stronger corporate superego, a
similar strategy of decentralization seems in order: the board's
monitoring function might be decentralized by creating "miniboards" that would correspond with these same divisional chief
executives. Just as the corporation's "ego" was divisionalized
several decades ago, so might be its "superego" today. This suggested satellite board structure would involve the introduction of
a miniature board of directors at the apex of each division, chiefly
to serve as antennae for the central board. In theory, such a change
would produce the same reduction in organizational distance
between operational levels and the board superego as would "flattening" the entire structure. Moreover, it could do so without
creating an information overload on the central board. Such miniboards might be staffed by independent "outsiders" and chaired
by members of the central board, thus creating a direct link
between them and the central board. In contrast to a system under
which committees of the central board review activities in specialized areas, the mini-board approach would neither rely on "inside" corporate officials, who are subject to conflicting pressures,
nor further overwhelm the already heavily burdened "outside"
director. Rather, the board would be in effect replicating itself.
In so doing, the board would be reducing its own "span of control," thereby gaining a heightened monitoring capacity. It also
would be gaining a second information net, paralleling the formal
channels of communication already in existence, which would
provide the board with a potential means of checking the degree
of distortion in the information reaching it through the normal
channels. Additionally, such mini-boards might serve as an apprenticeship or proving ground for future outside directors. 2 Finally,
182 A testing ground is a useful idea in its own right. Peter Drucker in particular has
argued that contemporary boards are often staffed by competent executives of other
corporations who have no additional time to spare. P. DRUCKER, supra note 1, at 629. In
addition, mistakes are not corrected easily in this area, given the diplomatic problims inherent in firing a well-known business leader who has failed to perform.
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the additional expense created by such a system would not be too
183
costly for a large public corporation.
Several arguments in opposition to the mini-board proposal
appear inevitable: (1) what would such a mini-board do besides
"spy" on the divisional chief executive and his subordinates?;
(2) would it not create an undesirable adversarial relationship?;
and (3) why would it not be preferable just to rely on an expanded
staff at the central board level to accomplish these same purposes?
Answers to these questions dovetail. First, the mini-board clearly
would not exercise any veto authority other than of a temporary
nature, because such actions would hopelessly confuse the allocation of authority within the corporation and would conflict with
the belief, strongly held among businessmen, that ultimate operational power must be centralized in one executive. 84 Rather, while
providing a Distant Early Warning System of board monitoring
stations located throughout the corporation, the mini-board structure would also offer the divisional executive important positive
incentives to counteract his probable early suspicion of it. First,
the mini-board would perform at a lower level within the corporation the same function that is the principal activity of boards
today: serving as a management consulting team for the chief
183 Assume that a hypothetical corporation has four major divisions, thus requiring
four mini-boards. Assume further that each mini-board has five members, four of whom
would be new "mini-directors," and the fifth a member of the senior board. If each of these
16 new directors received a salary of $10,000 and the additional "staff" costs were $90,000,
the resulting figure of $250,000 (at an assumed 50% corporate tax rate) would reduce net
income to shareholders by $125,000. This amount is less than .5% of the net income of
the smallest corporation (in terms of revenues) in the "Fortune 500." See FORTUNE, May,
1977, at 384 (showing No. 500, Foxboro, to have had net income of $27,403,000).
184 Although the necessity of a strong chief executive officer is an article of faith among
American managers, it is not to their equally efficient Japanese counterparts, who stress
instead collegial decisionmaking and shared authority. Commenting upon the differences
between the American practice of individual decisionmaking by virtue of one's office, and
the Japanese policy of decisionmaking by consensus, one Japanese businessman has
observed:
In America, decisions can be reached quickly because there is always a guy who is
in charge of some affair. There is none in Japan. There is nobody in a Japanese
company who is really "in charge" of anything-not even the president. We do not
have any very clear concept of chief executive officer or chief operating officer.
Japanese Managers Tell How Their System Works, FORTUNE, November, 1977, at 126, 130
(comments of Yoshio Terasawa). For our purposes, the point here is that those who would
assert that approaches such as the mini-board would impact severely upon corporate
efficiency should bear the burden of proof in light of the Japanese experience.

1977]

Corporate Misconduct

1151

executive officer.'85 Because the divisional chief executive is apt to
be less experienced than his senior counterpart, such a consulting
team composed of businessmen with practical experience may be
a welcome resource to him. More importantly, the contemporary
board also serves as a "buffer" for the chief executive, providing
him with a "sheltered and supportive environment in which to
function." 181 When difficult decisions have to be made, there is
always a desire in any organization to share and diffuse responsibility. But this is especially true at middle echelons within the
corporate structure. When things go wrong, and senior management must inform the board where the blame lies, the most inviting scapegoat tends to be a distant divisional executive whom the
board does not know.
Despite the popular mythology that difficult decisions always
rise to the top, the best evidence is to the contrary: where uncertainty exists, the tendency is for difficult decisions to be delegated. 18 7 The significance of this point is two-fold. First, it suggests
that the middle-echelon corporate executive has perhaps the
greater need for the buffer function that an advisory mini-board
can perform. Second, if tough decisions frequently flow down,
not up, in the corporate hierarchy, the senior board needs outposts
within that structure if the corporate superego is to function on a
prospective basis. In short, the mini-board proposal exemplifies
the multiple functions that an effective auditing system could
perform if properly structured. To the divisional executive, the
mini-board would be a means by which he could both protect
himself and communicate directly to the board when decisions
made by him later seem incorrect. To the senior board, it would
185 For a concise summary of Mace's views in this regard, see Vagts, Directors:Myth and
Reality, 31 Bus. LAw. 1227, 1229-50 (1976).
186 Heineman, What Does and Doesn't Go On in the Boardroom, FORTUNE, February
1972, at 157, 159, quoted in M. EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 158.
187 Studying corporate decisionmaking, Professor Morris has summarized: "The greater
the uncertainty that characterizes a decision, the greater the tendency for it to be
delegated." W. MoPRis, supra note 1, at 53. This tendency toward decision avoidance is
also emphasized by others. See, e.g., I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 29, at 6. Decisions concerning social problems seem particularly apt to be ones that corporate decisionmakers
might wish to avoid and delegate to subordinates. If so, the utility of the mini-board comes
into focus as both a support system for the divisional executive, who may also wish to
avoid such social decisions, and as a fail-safe sytem of communications for the senior
board, who otherwise may never learn of such issues from management.
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provide a second network of communications that would be immune to the filtering efforts of senior management. To lowerechelon corporate personnel, it would provide a local corporate
superego to which they could resort for discreet counsel about
questionable corporate activities, without engaging in the high
treason of "whistle blowing." 188
But why could not an expanded staff achieve the same results?
The answer in part is that the mini-board's protection of the divisional chief executive is a function that staff cannot perform as
well. But the full answer goes deeper. A second cardinal rule of
communication theorists (the first being the tenet that the informant must trust the recipient for information flow to be efficient 189)
is that subordinates communicate sensitive information to superiors only when they perceive the supervisor to have the "capacity
to exert influence upward." 190 Both of these tests-the "trust"
criterion and the "clout" criterion-distinguish the mini-board
from the junior officer likely to be assigned to staff duty. It is
unrealistic to believe that a divisional chief executive would
tolerate the same level of persistent inquiry from an employee
who is far inferior to him in status, age, pay, and seniority that he
would from a mini-board, populated by men who are at least his
peers and chaired by a director of the senior board.
The linkage of the mini-board to the senior board through the
interlocking presence of its chairman on both boards has a special
theoretical significance. Considerable work has focused on comparative evaluations of different organizational configurations in
terms of their effects on communication within the organization.
Based on this work, Rensis Likert, Chairman of the Institute on
188 Consider again the position of Gulf's isolated bagman, Viglia. See notes 120-22 supra.
189 A Motivational Approach, supra note 164, at 190-92, 210-11.
190 Id. at 202. See also D. KArZ, M. MACCOBY, & N. MORSE, PRODUCTIVITY, SUPERVISION AND
MORALE IN AN OFFICE SITUATION, pt. I (1950). Clearly, a mini-board on which a "senior"
director serves has "clout."
This view, that effective monitoring requires the auditor to have "clout" or at least the
capacity to pursue an in-depth investigation, has independent empirical support. The key,
according to one such study, is that the auditor must be "perceived as having the power
to go beneath the apparent evidence to determine what in fact happened." Churchill,
Cooper, & Sansbury, Laboratory and Field Studies on the Behavorial Effects of Audits,
in MANAGEMENT CONTROLS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN BASIC RESEARCH 258 (C. Bonini, R. Jaedicke,
H. Wagner eds. 1964). If so, monitoring is an activity that seems best performed by corporate officials of some seniority, not junior staff personnel temporarily attached to the
board.
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Social Relations at the University of Michigan, has concluded that
information blockages are least likely to occur when the supervision function is structured into the system through the use of
"overlapping groups" linked by common members. 91' Others have
concurred with Likert's empirical findings, noting that communication within a working unit is fuller, faster and, most importantly,
less vulnerable to the "motivation to deliberately bias information." 112 Likert suggests that this improvement in the flow of
information arises from two sources. One is the greater trust, that
members of face-to-face groups have in one another. The other
is the reduced communication distortion caused by the absence of
serial transmission of information across hierarchical levels because the overlapping groups are connected by their common
"linking pin" member. The mini-board would be so linked both
to the senior board and to the divisional chief executive.
As noted earlier, the reverse side of the coin to the problem of
information flow upward, is the problem of enforcing compliance
downward ("authority leakage"). Here again, there are reasons for
believing that a mini-board could outperform an expanded staff.
Unlike a staff, the mini-board could do more than gather information. To a degree, it could bargain for compliance as the board's
proxy, and, where necessary, credibly threaten sanctions. Conversely, proposals for expanding the board's staff in order to give
it an auditing arm 193 have been greeted with considerable skepticism, not only by businessmen, but also by some of the leading
191 A Motivational Approach, supra note 164, at 200-08. The critical element, according
to Likert's research, is that there be a common member in both groups, a linking pin who
as a recognized full member of each group will receive a fuller disclosure of sensitive information. At the same time, one "relay" in the sequential transmission of the information will be eliminated, thereby reducing "noise" in the terminology of the communications theorist. For a similar view expressed in terms of the economics of information
sharing, see Arrow, supra note 174, at 216-20, 224-31.
192 W. MoRiIs, supra note 1, at 50.
193 The best known of these proposals was that made by Arthur J. Goldberg at the
time of his resignation from the TWA board. Pointing out that the typical outside director
could not "acquire more than a smattering of knowledge about any large and far flung
company," he resigned because it was impossible for him to fulfill the policy making
function he felt that corporate law imposed upon him. Goldberg, Debate on Outside
Directors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1972, § 3, at 1, col. 2. The importance of this debate
is underscored by Professor Burns' observation that those who control communications
within the corporation hold the "basis .. . of power within the corporate system." Bums,
supra note 135, at 174. Approaches such as a staff system or a mini-board are thus attempts to break the monopoly over corporate communications held today by senior
management.
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proponents of corporate reform. For example, Professor Eisenberg
has criticized the best known of these proposals, that made by
former Justice Goldberg, as "unsound and unworkable." "' He
feels that any such "shadow staff" would have an "institutionalized
obligation to second-guess the management, but very limited responsibility for results." 1'5 Peter Drucker has sounded a similar
theme. He feels that service staffs tend to be elitist and to have
"contempt" for operating personnel, 196 and that their advice is
frequently tailored to "placate" the "powerful . . . barons" they
serve. 97 As a result, they tend not to cure, but rather to compound
management weakness. 198 Whatever the cogency of these criticisms,
the point here is that the mini-board approach minimizes these
dangers. By design, the mini-board would be positioned not to
second-guess, but to participate prospectively, and so it would
share some degree of responsibility for failure. Because it would
have other functions besides information gathering, and because it
would be composed of professional managers, its orientation towards management likely would be less elitist and more empathetic; in turn, the danger of resentment by management would be
reduced as a result. Equally important, by creating mini-boards the
board would create allies for itself and thus be able to play the
power politics games that seem to characterize large organizations. 99
M. EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 155.
195 Id. In part, Eisenberg is agreeing here with the position taken by Roger Blough, the
former Chairman of U.S. Steel, in rebuttal to Goldberg. See Blough, The Outside Director
at Work on the Board, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 467 (1973). Should a conflict arise between the
board's staff and management, the directors are more likely to be exposed to liability for
wrongly supporting management than if there were no staff, because they would to a
degree be put on notice. Yet, in the long run, Blough argues they still generally will have
to agree with the judgments of senior management, which is more experienced, and probably more talented, than those on the staff.
196 P. DRUCKER, supra note 1, at 538.
197 Id. at 583.
198 Id. at 582, 625-26. Also skeptical of the Goldberg proposals is Courtney Brown, Dean
Emeritus of the Columbia Business School, who warns that such board intervention as the
Goldberg proposals contemplate can have a "debilitating" effect on management. C.
BROWN, supra note 9, at 32. In its recently issued Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32 Bus.
LAW. 5, 37 (1976), the Subcommittee on Functions and Responsibilities of Directors of the
ABA's Committee on Corporate Laws also has rejected the idea that the board should
be equipped with any "regular outside staff."
199 Relying on earlier work of political scientist Richard Neustadt that focused on the
"alliance politics" characterizing decisionmaking in bureaucracies, Professor Joseph Bower
of the Harvard Business School has argued that the "process of planning in the large
194
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Finally, comparison is necessary with recent proposals for the
adoption of the European system of a two-tier board structure.
Under that system, a "senior" board of "outside" directors monitors the decisions of a "junior" board of inside directors.2" If our
diagnosis is correct in emphasizing the problems of organizational
distance and information flow, the deficiency of the two-tier
approach is that it increases the organizational distance between
the monitoring agency and the corporate infrastructure by superimposing a second "crow's nest" on top of the existing one. Essentially, the mini-board proposal is the mirror image of such a
two-tier idea. Its central aim is to place the outsiders not in a
higher "crow's nest," but closer to the locus of problems within
the corporate structure.
In summary, a basic rule of management theory is that "structure follows strategy." 201 At various times in the recent history of
the business corporation, it has been a sound strategy either to
centralize or to decentralize corporate structure, or to establish
some mixed system, depending on the set of opportunities and
hazards then confronting the corporation. Today, as the era of dynamic business growth may have faded, and a new era has dawned
organization is tied closely to its social and political life." Corporate officials respond to
plans and policies depending on the potential impact on their careers. Within this context,
corporate planning "is an argument for something a network of managers wants to do
because it will be in their interest to do so." Bower, supra note 13, at 195-96. To the
extent that subordinates find their self-interest "aligned" with that of the board of
directors through mediating devices such as the mini-board, the senior board acquires
allies and participates more effectively in planning. To give a practical example suggested
by Bower, clean air is a worthy corporate objective, but it will not be pursued by middlelevel managers unless they are forgiven the high costs and lower profit margins that
result. Id. at 197. The process of changing the standards of measurement by which such
managers are judged, so that they will see their self-interest aligned with the board's
perception of the best overall corporate policy, is one in which the senior board as the
corporate superego needs allies such as the mini-board. Otherwise, although senior
management often will espouse worthy goals in public utterances, it still may hold the
middle-level corporate manager accountable for his lower profit margin incurred in pursuit of the board's non-profit-maximizing goals. Top management long ago "learned to
shape the game of careers so that its stakes correspond to the economic goals of the firm."
Id. at 210. I would add that it is therefore necessary for those who would represent the
conscience of the firm to learn the rules of this game also.
200 See M. EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 177-85 for a critical summary of these proposals.
Under the German model, the managing board, or "Vorstand," is composed solely of the
corporation's inside top executives. It is overseen by a supervisory board, or "Aufsichtsrat,"
which does not include any members of the managing board. See also Vagts, Reforming the
"Modern" Corporation:Perspectives from the German, 80 HARV. L. REv. 23 (1966).
201 P. DRucKER, supra note 1, at 523.
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in which major business opportunities increasingly are surrounded
by hidden costs and risks, it may be a sound strategy to enhance
the capabilities of the corporate superego to make the corporation,
if not more risk averse, at least more risk conscious. Such a strategy
requires changes in corporate structure. Unfortunately, however,
because most commentators on corporate law have focused on the
normative aspects of corporate behavior rather than on the empirical, the remedies currently suggested seem inadequate at best.
The most common suggestions, involving reliance on a true "outside" board or an expanded staff, do not address the central problem of information blockages.
To be sure, the suggested mini-board approach is untested, unorthodox, and, given the glacial pace of corporate reform, unlikely
to be adopted early. Its chief utility in the short run is not as an
answer in itself, but as a paradigm by which to illustrate a different way of approaching corporate law problems. 20 2 Rather than
pursue its specifics further, it seems better to examine next what
resources the law now possesses to encourage a redesign of corporate structure and information flow in order to achieve at least
marginally improved results.
II.

TOWARD A LEGAL VIEW: SURVEYING THE
CONTEMPORARY

LEGAL TERRAIN

Reform, of course, must begin with the materials at hand. New
legal principles evolve from old ones. But, because legal doctrines
are not infinitely malleable, it is important to determine exactly
the limits of the courts' discretion. Once we have scouted the perimeters of judicial flexibility in the area of improper corporate
activity, we can return to the linked questions of (a) what considerations should guide courts in exercising their discretion, and
(b) what results can such a common-law approach obtain? Using
the "improper payments" controversy as a microcosm in which to
approach more general issues of corporate reform, this section will
assess the substantive positions of a plaintiff and a defendant in a
typical derivative suit commenced to challenge improper payments. The "improper payments" controversy is used because one
of its most useful and representative features is the degree to which
202 For an earlier attempt to approach some corporate law problems from a behavioral
standpoint, see Conard, supra note 1.
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it demonstrates that "misconduct" and "illegality" are not synony20 3
mous terms.
A.

A Cook's Tour of Commercial Bribery

Four types of existing statutory provisions arguably apply to improper payments: (1) criminal statutes, (2) antitrust statutes, (3)
tax laws, and (4) securities laws.20 4 Although criminal statutes
clearly proscribe bribery of governmental agents, as a general
rule they only tangentially and indirectly prohibit commercial
bribery. Only half of the states have enacted statutes broadly aimed
at commercial bribery, 2 5 and still fewer enforce them.2 00 Even
when enforcing such laws, courts have restrictively read them not
to cover "defensive" payments. 20 7 On the federal level, several
criminal statutes arguably could be stretched to cover commercial
bribery,0 8 potentially including even extraterritorial acts and un203 The time has come to abandon the luxury of vaguely referring to "improper
payments" as if that term had recognized legal connotations. It does not. The penetration
of criminal statutes into this area has been uneven, uncertain, and limited. See notes 205-45
infra and accompanying text. It is submitted that this is characteristic of many types of
business behavior that today fall under the heading of "corporate misconduct."
204 In addition, when the corporation making the payments is within a regulated
industry, the federal agency supervising that industry probably also has jurisdiction
(particularly if the payment in effect was passed on to the public or the government).
For a summary of the responses of some regulatory agencies in this area, see Herlihy &
Levine, supra note 2, at 599-611. See also Federal Alcohol Administration Act § 205(c),
27 U.S.C. § 202 (1970); Shipping Act, 1916 §§ 16-18, 46 U.S.C. §§ 815-817 (1970); Interstate Commerce Act § l(17)(b), 49 U.S.C. § l(17)(b) (1970).
205 A survey made in connection with an ALI-ABA conference on this subject in May,
1977 shows that 25 states have statutes covering commercial bribery. See Ferrara & Williams, Saints and Sinners Revisited, supra note 65, at 139-47. More common are statutes
aimed at bribery of labor officials, bribery in connection with athletic contests, and other
narrowly focused targets.
206 In Conway Import Co. v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), Judge Orrin
Judd described Pennsylvania's statute against commercial bribery as "in a state of innocent desuetude ... with no record of any conviction for violation of the law." Id. at 16.
207 For decisions limiting the reach of such statutes, see Savoy Laundry & Linen Supply,
Inc. v. Morgan Linen Serv., Inc., 16 Conn. Supp. 408 (Super. Ct. 1949); Shemin v. A. Black
9- Co., 19 App. Div. 2d 596, 240 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1963) (statute must be strictly construed).
Cf. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952) (deduction for kickbacks allowed). The
theory for the restrictive reading is that the legislature did not intend to require the
potential victim of extortion to resist heroically. See Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
22 Misc. 2d 996, 37 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1942), af'd mem., 266 App. Div. 659, 41
N.Y.S.2d 210, afrd per curiam, 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E. 740 (1944) (discussed at note 374
infra).
208 The federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970), and the federal wire
fraud statute, 18 US.C. § 1343 (1970), are the two most likely candidates, and their
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consummated conspiracies. 09 Because these laws require a "scheme
or artifice to defraud," 210 however, they probably fall short of
reaching most "defensive" or "grease" payments. Additionally,
there is some indication that courts will tend to read these statutes
narrowly as not applying to the "regulatory" crime of commercial
bribery.2 1'
The antitrust laws also may bar some improper corporate payments.2 12 The most likely violations are of section 5 of the Federal
reach can be extended by the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970), if there
exists a conspiracy to violate either statute. A wealth of case law indicates that these
statutes use a broad, "nontechnical" definition of fraud. See United States v. George, 477
F.2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973); Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d
665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967) ("Law puts its imprimatur on the accepted moral standards and
condemns conduct which fails to match the reflection of moral uprightness of fundamental
honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general and business life of members of
society."); United States v. Groves, 122 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 670 (1941)
(a fiduciary who withholds relevant information from his principal may be so prosecuted);
Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941). If
certain governmental contracts are involved, the Anti-Kickback Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 51-54
(1970), may also be violated. Finally, there is divided authority as to whether the Interstate
and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Enterprises Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952 (1970), reaches such conduct. See note 211 infra. While no current federal statute
specifically prohibits commercial bribery, the pending recodification of the federal penal
code would do so. See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1751 (1977).
209 Because the federal wire fraud statute expressly refers to "foreign commerce" and
the federal mail fraud statute in theory creates a crime against the mails, the usual rules
against extraterritorial application of penal statutes should not apply if the bribery scheme
is effected through methods over which there is the requisite jurisdiction. See Pereira v.
United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954) (interbank transfer by mail of fraudulently obtained check
held sufficient for jurisdictional purposes).
210 Such language is present in both the federal mail and wire fraud statutes. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1970). It suggests that a line will have to be drawn between active
bribery and passive acquiescence to extortion.
211 At present, the Second and the Fourth Circuits disagree over whether commercial
bribery in violation of state law can also fall within the coverage of 18 U.S.C. § 1952
(1970), which prohibits interstate travel to promote bribery. Compare United States v.
Pomponio, 511 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that the statute applies), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 874 (1976), with United States v. Brecht, 540 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1123 (1977), and United States v. Niedelman, 356 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (both
holding that the statute does not apply). In concluding that the federal statute had not
been violated, the Second Circuit in Brecht distinguished between the "traditional" crime
of bribery and the "modern crime of commercial bribery," and expressed doubt that
Congress had intended to reach the latter. 540 F.2d at 48-50. Despite these and other
technical problems, a federal task force is currently presenting criminal cases to grand
juries around the country with respect to corporate payoffs, both foreign and domestic.
See Berry, Payoff Charges Pushed, Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1977, at C9, col. 6.
212 For a thorough examination of how the antitrust laws may apply to improper
corporate payments abroad, see McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad: An
Antitrust Approach, 86 YALE L.J. 215 (1976).
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Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair methods of
competition," 213 and, even more promising, section 2(c) of the
Robinson-Patman Act,214 which prohibits any person engaged in

commerce from paying any "commission, brokerage or other compensation" to the "other party" to a transaction or to its agent. 215
Although the legislative intent of this latter section clearly aimed
at a different evil (price discrimination via the practice of large
buyers exacting price concessions unavailable to smaller buyers),
existing precedent suggests a broad, if untested, theory under
which section 2(c) might apply at least to "aggressive" payments.
If so, the Act's scope would be far-reaching, because the section (1)
requires no proof of anticompetitive effect, 210 (2) has sufficient

extraterritorial application to cover export sales,21T (3) is not subject to the principal Robinson-Patman defense that the payor firm
was only seeking to meet the competition, 218 and (4) apparently

applies even when the agent receiving the side payment in effect is
defrauding his own principal rather than passing the payment on
as an illicit price concession.2 19 However, once again there are
significant qualifications to the statute's comprehensiveness.220
The Internal Revenue Code in particular represents a congressional attempt to draw fine lines in the area of improper corpo213 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970). In theory, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970),
may also apply, but practical problems may inhibit such an approach. Herlihy & Levine,
supra note 2, at 604-05.
214 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1970).
215 Id.

216 See FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1961); Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d
763 (4th Cir. 1939).
217 See Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & Sons, 227 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio
1964); Baysoy v. Jessop Steel Co., 90 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
218 This "meeting the competition" defense, which appears in the proviso in section 2(b)
of the Act, applies only to the section 2(a) offense of price discrimination and not to the
section 2(c) offense. See FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 282 F.2d 595 (9th Cir.
1960); 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)-(c) (1970).
219 See Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light &. Power Co., 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943).
220 Besides the formidable problems of proof that exist where the payment is made
indirectly, and allegedly without the corporation's knowledge or permission (as through
a middleman such as a Khashoggi), there are also cases holding that the statute is not
applicable to sales to governmental units. See General Shale Prods, Corp. v. Struck Constr.
Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-03 (W.D. Ky. 1941), aff'd, 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943). But see Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851,
858-59 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966). In addition, the Robinson-Patman
Act applies only to sales of "commodities," so section 2(c) may not apply to service or consulting contracts. E.g., Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 369 F.2d 268
(5th Cir. 1966).
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rate payments. Section 162(c) denies business expense deductions
for bribes to foreign and domestic government officials, and for
domestic bribes that are illegal under a generally enforced local
law.221 However, as with Sherlock Holmes's dog that did not bark
in the night, the most striking feature of the Code is what Congress did not do. Even in the Tax Reform Act of 1976,222 it declined to deny deductions for all overseas commercial bribes, as it
did for similar domestic payments. Rather, by their deliberately
piecemeal approach to the area, the tax laws seem in several respects to reveal a degree of tacit acceptance by Congress of such
practices.2 23
This hesitant caution on the part of the legislature sharply contrasts with the bolder moralism of the SEC. Although the SEC has
obtained a host of recent consent orders enjoining companies from
221 The Technical Amendments Act of 1958 added subsection (c) to section 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which denied deductions for payments otherwise qualifying
as ordinary and necessary if such payments were made to an official or employee of a
foreign government and would have violated United States law if it had applied. Technical
Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, tit. 1, § 5, 72 Stat. 1606 (1958). The Tax
Reform Act of 1969 then split the subsection into two parts: § 162(c)(1), covering payments
to governmental officials, and § 162(c)(2), covering bribes and kickbacks to nongovernmental employees if the taxpayer has been convicted of making such an illegal payment.
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, tit. IX, §§ 902(c)(1), 902(c)(2), 83 Stat. 487
(1969). In 1971, Congress deleted this conviction requirement in subsection (c)(2), and
substituted a requirement that the payment be unlawful under a generally enforced local
law providing for criminal penalties or certain civil forfeitures. I.R.C. § 162(c). In addition,
the IRS has denied deductions for payments that violate public policy. See Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). But on more than one occasion,
courts have refused to find that commercial bribes violate any federal public policy. See
Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952); Conway Imports Co. v. United States, 311 F.
Supp. 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
222 The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976), added highly
technical provisions revising the definition of Subpart F income of controlled foreign
corporations, I.R.C. § 952(a)(4), and deeming certain payments by Domestic International
Sales Corporations as taxable dividends to their parents, I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(F)(iii). While
these provisions will further inhibit questionable payments somewhat, Congress failed
in 1976, at the height of the improper payments controversy, to tighten section 162(c) to
comprehensively deny deductions to all such payments. Rather, that section continues to
make narrow distinctions between categories of payments.
223 This hairsplitting approach is evidenced in two distinct ways. First, the deductibility
of foreign payments to nongovernment officials and employees (i.e. commercial bribes)
is not conditioned on their vicarious status under United States law, as is section 162(c)(1)
with respect to governmental bribes. Second, the status of domestic commercial
bribes is made to depend on whether the local statute is generally enforced. For a
general overview, see Alfred, Corporate Slush Funds: The Deductibility of "Sensitive"
Payments, 4 J. CORP. TAx. 130 (1977).
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making payments for "unlawful purposes," 214 the narrowness of
the legislative proscriptions in this area calls into question whether
these consent orders actually reach the "defensive" or "grease"
payments that led up to these settlements. -5 Ironical as this may
be, there is also a larger significance here: from a traditional civil
libertarian point of view, is it desirable to subject corporate officials
to the in terrorem threat of criminal contempt where the legal
standards that actually govern remain ambiguous and the negotiated injunction seems almost deliberately vague at its margins?
Given also the axiomatic reluctance of courts to expand penal
statutes by inference, it then becomes important to inquire
whether there are superior options available to courts on the level
of civil liability, particularly in those troubling cases where we
are willing to describe the behavior involved as "corporate misconduct" but nonetheless recognize that it only partially overlaps
with conduct that the legislature has clearly proscribed.
B.

The Plaintiff's Case: Taking Inventory of the
Theories Available

The theories that a plaintiff might assert in a derivative suit
attacking improper payments can be grouped under three basic
headings: (1) strict liability theories, (2) negligence-based theories
of liability, and (3) the somewhat nebulous but not unprecedented
theory that the corporation and its officials may not act in violation
of public policy.
224 For a synopsis of many of the major recent consent orders, see Ferrara & Brandon,
supra note 39, at 693-794 (summarizing the terms of 19 recent settlements). A prohibition
against use of corporate funds for "unlawful purposes" appears to have become a standard
part of the final Judgment of Permanent Injunction. It is possible that defense attorneys
agree to this language because they believe that it prohibits less than a detailed description
of activities would.
225 This analysis of the legality of improper payments omits any discussion of the
federal securities laws. To the extent applicable, the securities laws would penalize not
the payments themselves, but their nondisclosure. This topic deliberately has been postponed until the end of the article. Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
passed by Congress in December 1977 will hereafter require most public corporations to
maintain "accurate and fair books and records," thus preventing the use of off-book
slush funds established to pay bribes. See note 65 supra, note 595 infra. Again, however,
legislative caution appears evident in the careful exemption of grease and nongovernmental
payments, see note 65 supra, and in the exemption requested by the State Department of
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations from the Act's coverage. See Corporate Bribery
Bill Is Approved, Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 1977, at Dl, col 6. For a description of the obstacles
facing a private litigant seeking to attack such payments under these laws, see note 581
infra.
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Theories of Strict Liability

1.

By "strict liability," I mean a theory of liability that permits no
affirmative defense (with the result that claims of due diligence,
good faith, or the lack of a net loss, even if provable, would not
avoid liability). Three such theories find some support in the
case law: (1) the doctrine of negligence per se, (2) the ultra vires
doctrine, and (3) the apparent rule that an actor is strictly liable
for a "knowing" violation of law.
a.

Negligence Per Se

In tort law, the defendant motorist who fails to stop at the stop
sign generally receives no opportunity to show that his conduct
was reasonable under the circumstances. Violation of the governing ordinance itself is negligence, because courts presume that the
legislature intended to replace the normal "prudent man" test of
negligence with a more specific, "bright line" standard of liability. 226 However, the notion that the specific content of applicable
statutes and regulations invariably supersedes the more generalized
standard of reasonable care has become increasingly disfavored. At
least three major limitations now appear to limit the negligence
per se doctrine: (1) the requirement that the plaintiff show that
he is within the class intended to be protected by the statute,22 7
(2) the emerging tort doctrine that some statutory violations may
be excused or justified, 228 and (3) the conflict of laws limitations
that potentially arise in the context of multi-jurisdictional transactions. 229 Each of these may have significant exculpatory effect in
the context of corporate misconduct.
TORTS § 17.6, at 997-98 (2d ed. 1970).
Id. § 17.5, at 989-91, § 17.6, at 1003-05. Section 286 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts now states that the court "may" adopt a legislative enactment as the standard of
conduct of a reasonable man, if the purpose of such enactment includes the protection
of "a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded .... " RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). See also id. § 288.
228 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 226, § 17.6, at 1008-11. The authors summarize: "In
most jurisdictions, however, the negligence per se rule is administered so as to permit consideration of some factors of excuse." Id. at 1008. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 288A (1965).
229 In part, these limitations grow out of the conflicts of law principle that one jurisdiction will not "enforce" the penal laws of another. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFCr
OF LAws § 89 (1971). This principle has led some courts to refuse to enforce foreign
corporate statutes expressly imposing civil liability on directors for specified acts, where
the court's enforcement of the statute would be tantamount to imposing a foreign penal
226 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
227
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In the context of derivative suit litigation, courts have only
infrequently analyzed the first precondition, that the plaintiff be
within the statute's protected class. However, where they have
analyzed it, they have accepted it. In the Second Circuit, Judge
Lumbard, in a concurring opinion in Spirt v. Bechtel 230 that constituted one-half of the majority in a 2-1 decision, found no intent
to protect shareholders in a statute restricting the amount of compensation payable to executives of a regulated shipping corporation, although clearly any statute limiting executive compensation
will have at least the incidental effect of increasing the income
available for dividends. Rather, the main purpose of the statute,
as he saw it, was to prevent misapplication of a governmental subsidy that the corporation was receiving. Because of this, Judge
Lumbard concluded that the statute was not "meant to be a
measure of the obligation of the defendants to the company," 231
and thus its violation did not make the defendants strictly liable to
the company. A more recent case, Miller v. A T&T,232 can be read
to conform with this approach, although it seems at first glance to
impose strict liability in sweeping terms. In Miller, the defendant
sanction. See, e.g., Arcouet v. Papp, 21 Misc. 2d 294, 190 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Paper Prods. Co. v. Doggrell, 195 Tenn. 581, 261 S.W.2d 127 (1953). See also REsTATENMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICt OF LAWS § 89, Reporter's Note c (1971).
Moreover, the underlying premise of the negligence per se doctrine, that a court must
defer to the legislature's attempt at defining the standard of conduct of the reasonable
man, seems weaker when the court and the statute violated are from different jurisdictions. In such circumstances, although the violation will probably be seen as "evidence
of negligence," a state court understandably may apply its own common-law standards.
230 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956).
231 Id. at 248. Citing section 286 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Judge Lumbard
concluded that the statute was not intended to protect the plaintiff. Id. at 250. But see
232 F.2d at 252-53 (Frank, J., dissenting). A more recent case, Schwartz v. Romnes, 495
F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974) also has raised this issue, hinting that it could bar a plaintiff
stockholder. There, the state statute prohibited corporate contributions "for political
purposes." Applying an exceedingly narrow construction to find that the statute had not
been violated, the Second Circuit noted that it therefore became "unnecessary to decide
whether, assuming a violation, a private derivative action may be implied in favor of
plaintiff." 495 F.2d at 854.
Earlier cases have held that sections of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 93, 503
(1970), that prohibit loans when the lending institution's capital is impaired are intended
only to protect the Federal Reserve System and not the stockholders. See Holman v. Cross,
75 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1935); Allen v, Luke, 163 F. 1018 (D. Mass. 1908). If this strained
statutory construction is accepted, the basic logic of the cases thereafter seems consistent
with section 286 of the Restatement. See note 227 supra.
232 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
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directors were alleged to have violated a statute prohibiting corporate political contributions. The Supreme Court previously had
concluded that Congress intended the statute's predecessor to protect shareholders from unauthorized use of corporate funds for the
benefit of political parties.3 3 Against this backdrop, the Third
Circuit's finding that the plaintiff shareholder was within the
"class for whose protection the statute was enacted" 231 can thus be
seen as a logical and necessary precondition to its statement in the
same paragraph of the decision that it would not accept any "business judgment" defense from the defendant directors that the
alleged payment was in the corporation's best interests. 35 Viewed
in this light, the Miller decision comes into focus as a classic application of the negligence per se doctrine.
Additional evidence that the protected class requirement is a
necessary precondition to the imposition of strict liability is discernible in a common denominator underlying those cases holding
directors strictly liable for violation of a statute: almost uniformly,
they have involved statutes clearly intended to protect shareholders.
In general, the statutes involved have been those limiting either
the corporation's lending or borrowing capacity or the directors'
ability to alter the capital structure of the corporation (such as by
paying dividends or causing a corporate liquidation or stock redemption).2 36 Although many of these decisions do not discuss the
233 United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948). See also Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759,
763 (3d Cir. 1974).
234 507 F.2d at 763.
235 Id. In the same paragraph as its conclusion that the statute was intended to protect
shareholders, the Third Circuit added: "Under such circumstances, the directors cannot be
insulated from liability on the ground that the contribution was made in the exercise of
sound business judgment." Id. (emphasis added).
236 Several New York cases have held directors strictly liable for losses sustained
by their corporations as a result of violations that the courts treated as "knowing" transgressions. Typically, the statutes violated directly regulated the financial institutions
that the director served, such as by establishing lending or borrowing limits for banks or
insurance companies. See Van Schaick v. Carr, 170 Misc. 539, 10 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Sup. Ct.
1938); Broderick v. Marcus, 152 Misc. 413, 272 N.Y.S. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1934). Despite these
decisions' strong language that directors are strictly liable for statutory violations that they
should have recognized, the cases seem consistent on their facts with the limitations on
the negligence per se doctrine discussed in the text, because the legislature presumably
intended to protect both depositors and stockholders of such institutions from assumption
of unreasonable risks by management. Cf. Thompson v. Greeley, 167 Mo. 577, 117 S.W.
962 (1891) (bank directors liable to bank or its receiver for loss due to loan given in violation of statute). It should be emphasized at this point that we are not discussing the
director's liability for negligence, but only the question of whether he is per se liable.
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protected class requirement, it is still implicit in the context of the
cases.
Given the protected class requirement, which of those statutes
mentioned earlier as applicable to improper payments include
shareholders within their protected class? The answer appears to
be relatively few. For example, a general consensus seems to exist
that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect a competitive
economy.237 Thus, courts have denied relief to stockholders of the
corporation injured by an antitrust violation on the grounds that
they were not within the "target area" protected by the antitrust
laws.23 8 The intended scope of protection of criminal bribery
statutes would only rarely encompass shareholders of the corporate
perpetrator. But, two types of relevant criminal statutes do seem
intended to protect shareholders: (1) statutes against political contributions (although the legislative gloss given by Miller has since
been clouded by a subsequent Supreme Court case),2 39 and (2) disclosure statutes, a class that includes several recurring forms of
state legislation 240 as well as the federal securities laws.
A second limitation on the negligence per se doctrine is the concept of "excusable" violations. Although the only legally sufficient
excuse recognized by early cases was impossibility, more modern
cases have expanded the doctrine to provide a variety of excuses.2 4'
Those having obvious relevance to the improper payments area
include the prevalence of official nonenforcement, the fact of
customary breach, the existence of a sudden emergency, and the
reasonableness of the per se standard as applied to the particular
case. Courts on occasion have recognized each of these as excusing
237 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
23s Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958). But see Karseal
Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955). See also Comment, Federal
Antitrust Law-Stockholders' Remedies for Corporate Injury Resulting from Antitrust

Violations: Derivative Antitrust Suit and Fiduciary Duty Action, 59 MicH. L. R . 904,
912-29 (1961).
239 See Cort. v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975) (noting that the statute was not "directly"
concerned with "the internal relations between the corporation and their stockholders").
240 State penal laws often forbid falsifying corporate books and records and issuing
false financial statements. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 175.00, .05, .10, .45 (McKinney
1975).
241 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 226, § 17.6, at 1009-11 (noting a "perceptible
trend" in a number of states toward "an expansion of the 'justifiable violation' doctrine
under the negligence per se rule").
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tort liability for violations of penal statutes. 4 2 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts now provides that violations may be excused
when, inter alia, (1) the actor "is confronted by an emergency not
due to his own misconduct," 243 or (2) "compliance would involve
a greater risk of harm to the actor or to others." 24 Returning to
the case of the Gulf Oil executive confronted by a demand from
South Korean officials for an immediate multimillion dollar "contribution," it appears then that, if refusal will jeopardize the corporation's far greater investment in that country, both the "alternative hazard" and "emergency" excuses have at least plausible rele24 5
vance.
b.

Ultra Vires

The ultra vires doctrine provides the basis for a two-pronged
attack by a plaintiff. First, officers and directors may be accountable
for losses resulting from actions that exceed the powers of the
corporation. 46 Second, they may be held liable for losses resulting from actions within the corporation's authority, but beyond the scope of the powers delegated to them as agents. 47 Because both approaches shift the inquiry away from the tort issues
242 Id. See also Jenkins v. City of Ft. Wayne, 139 Ind. App. 1, 7, 210 N.E.2d 390, 394
(1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965).
243 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A(2)(d) (1965).
244 Id. § 288A(2)(e).
245 To be sure, it is unlikely that the draftsmen of section 288A contemplated either
the specific context of the liability of corporate officials or the assertion of economic
"harm" as a justification. Nevertheless, long before this revision of the Restatement, the
case law dealing with directors' duties contained suggestions that some emergency circumstances could excuse conduct by corporate officials that would otherwise be tortious and
illegal. See, e.g., Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 22 Misc. 2d 996, 37 N.Y.S.2d 404
(Sup. Ct. 1942), affd nem., 266 App. Div. 659, 41 N.Y.S.2d 210, aff'd per curiam, 292 N.Y.
468, 55 N.E. 740 (1944).
246 See W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1021-1028
(rev. perm. ed. 1974); H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BustNESS ENTERPRISES § 233, at 453 (2d ed. 1970). Commentators dispute whether corporate acts
violating a statute should be classified as ultra vires or considered as a separate special
category. Compare XV. CARY, CASFS AND MAT)ERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 52-53 (4th ed. 1969),
with W. FLETCHER, supra, § 1024, at 580-81, and H. HENN, supra, § 233, at 453. The next
section of this article considers those cases that seem to have considered statutory violations
as a separate category.
247 One commentator has attempted to apply the distinction between the corporation's
inherent lack of authority ("ultra vires authority") and its officers' lack of authorization
("ultra vires agency") to one area of "corporate misconduct." Note, Corporate Democracy
and the CorporatePolitical Contribution, 61 IOWA L. REV. 545, 568-76 (1975).
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of causation and breach of a standard of care, and toward the
agency law issue of authority, they offer the prospective plaintiff
distinct doctrinal advantages. Perhaps most important, the "protected class" limitation is inapplicable. Further, some cases suggest
that the agent has no defense based on his use of reasonable care
in engaging in the unauthorized acts. 248 Finally, the doctrine may
enable the plaintiff to hold corporate officials liable for acts that,
although not in violation of any statute, nonetheless strike the
court as improper.
Early corporate cases applied the ultra vires doctrine aggressively, holding, for example, corporate officials strictly liable for
political contributions not prohibited by any statute. 249 The classic
example of such an application to "improper conduct" is Roth
v. Robertson,5 ° a 1909 New York decision with obvious relevance
to the current payments controversy. In Roth, the manager of an
amusement park, which operated in violation of a Sunday closing
law, paid "hush money" to protect the corporation's illicit Sunday
operations. The court held him strictly liable to the corporation
because the illicit payments were ultra vires, notwithstanding the
absence of self-dealing and the likelihood that the payments increased the corporation's profits. Any other result, the court said
emphatically, would sanction clear violations of public policy. 25 '
Roth, however, may represent a high-water mark of judicial
activism, from which the tide of judicial opinion since has receded.
A combination of two trends in the case law appears to have
eclipsed its significance. First, the rule of strict liability for ultra
vires acts increasingly has given way to a standard that holds the
agent liable only when he negligently has exceeded his powers.2 52
More importantly, courts have developed and expanded an antithetical doctrine-that of implied powers-so that today it is axiomatic that corporations possess sufficient powers to "do all things
reasonably necessary to enable the corporation to carry out its
248 See H. HENN, supra note 246, § 233, at 453 & n.3. The modem approach, however,
appears to hold the agent liable only when he is negligent as to the scope of his powers.
249 McConnell v. Combination Mining & Milling Co., 30 Mont. 239, 254-55, 76 P. 194, 199
(1904), affd on rehearing,31 Mont. 563, 79 P. 248 (1905).
250 64 Misc. 343, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
251 Id. at 346, 118 N.Y.S. at 353 (discussed in text accompanying note 352 infra).
252 Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940); see Sutton v. Reagan & Gee,
405 S.W.2d 828, 836 (Tex. 1966).
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purposes ....
,, 253 With the advent of liberal construction of
corporate charters, the modern test (at least for commercially motivated transactions) turns on the concept of "direct benefit." 254
In general, an act is not ultra vires if reasonably related to some
expected benefit to the corporation.
Nonetheless, the Roth doctrine retained some viability over the
years, and even into this decade uncertainty surrounded the
issue of corporate authority to make political contributions where
not prohibited by statute. 5 However, several recent cases indicate
that courts will follow roughly the same "direct benefit" guidelines
in dealing with political contributions as with more traditional
commercial transactions. In Schwartz v. Romnes,256 the Second
Circuit considered the contribution by a telephone company to a
committee supporting a statewide transportation bond referendum.
After finding that the contribution did not violate New York
statutes, the court turned to the plaintiff's ultra vires attack, which
was based on a New York precedent of the same vintage as Roth.25 7
Pointing out that corporate law had changed since 1907, the court
concluded that the contribution was not ultra vires, because it
directly related to the business benefit that the company would
derive from improved roads.2 5' An even stronger rejection of
Roth's public policy approach is evident in Marsili v. Pacific Gas
& Electric Co. 259 That case involved corporate contributions in
opposition to a referendum that would have placed a limit on the
height of all new construction in San Francisco without prior voter
approval, a restriction that would have had clearly adverse effects
on construction planned by the defendant utility. In rejecting the
plaintiffs' ultra vires contention, the California appellate court
elaborately restated the implied powers doctrine, and appeared to
place the issue of whether a "direct benefit" would result from the
253 H. HENN, supra note 246, § 122, at 203.
254 For the evolution of this "direct benefit" test, see Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U. L. Rav. 157, 167 (1970). See also W. CARY, supra note
246, at 58-62.
255 See Note, supra note 247, at 568-76; Comment, Civil Responsibility
Political Expenditures, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1327

(1973).

256 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974).
257 People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 187 N.Y. 410, 80 N.E. 383 (1907).
258 495 F.2d at 854.
259 51 Cal. App. 3d 313, 124 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1975).
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challenged activity within the protective ambit of the business
2 0°
judgment rule.
Even if the "direct benefit" test governs "improper" payments
that do not violate any statute, decisions such as Schwartz and
Marsili do not fully resolve the ultra vires issue. Despite broad
language in Marsili, both cases dealt with bond referenda on local
issues having an immediate effect on the corporation, in a context
where the anticipated benefit was specific, tangible, and directly
related to the challenged payment. In contrast, most corporate
political contributions, both domestic and foreign, have more indirect and ill-defined goals, such as securing an "attentive ear" for
possible future resort or warding off potential retaliation.2 61 In
such situations, the ultimate benefit is more uncertain, and in
many cases the linkage between the payment and that benefit may
be beyond the range of proximity that the "direct benefit" test
seems to contemplate.
While the prong of the ultra vires doctrine relating to the corporation's authority has been largely eroded, the "agency" prong
recently has been sharpened. Here, the issue is whether the corporation has authorized the agent to engage in the challenged conduct. The Restatement of Agency compromises in this area. It
states first that "[a]uthority to do illegal or tortious acts, whether
or not criminal, is not readily inferred." 262 Then, it qualifies
this rule significantly by providing that "[ilf . . the agent knows
that action of this sort has been customary in his principal's business, he has reason to infer his principal's consent thereto, and
hence he incurs no liability . .. ." " This qualification closely fits
260 Id. at 324, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 320. Marsili probably is consistent with earlier cases
upholding the corporation's authority to make charitable contributions. Those cases
similarly accorded a presumption of validity to a management determination that the
charitable contribution would benefit the corporation in the long run. See, e.g., A.P. Smith
Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 154, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (1953); cf. Prunty, Love and the
Business Corporation, 46 VA. L. REV. 467, 474 (1960) (discussing protected areas for
managerial discretion in making contributions).
201 Although few modem cases actually have held corporate officials liable for ultra
vires acts, some cases have granted injunctions to shareholders to restrain contemplated
ultra vires acts by the corporation. See Aiple v. Twin City Barge & Towing Co., 274 Minn.
38, 143 N.W.2d 374 (1966); Abrams v. Textile Realty Corp., 97 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
Both of these cases enjoined threatened ultra vires acts without a showing that they
would have financially injured the corporation in any way. See also W. FLETCHER, supra
note 246, § 5823.
262 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 34, Comment g (1958).
263 Id.
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the recurring pattern of long-established foreign payoffs and grease
payments. The Restatement, however, does not specifically address
the corporate context, and, within that context, the prevalent rule
that stockholders lack the power to ratify illegal acts 24 seems inconsistent with the Restatement position. It follows from the majority
rule that the corporate official as agent could not be authorized to
engage in an illegal act. On the other hand, these ratification cases
are distinguishable from potential improper payments suits in
that they deal almost invariably with situations in which those in
control of the corporation have allegedly overreached minority
shareholders. 6 5
Two considerations seem likely to make the agency prong of the
ultra vires doctrine particularly attractive to a plaintiff. First, no
matter how disposed a court may be to find implied powers, it cannot do so in the face of express corporate disclaimers of authority.
Thus, the increasingly common adoption of formal codes of ethics
limiting improper payments may have the unintended consequence
of subjecting corporate officials to strict liability for losses resulting
from violations of these codes. Second, an important line of cases
has emerged that amplifies the corporate official's duty of obedience.
Several recent decisions hold that, at least where a conflict of
264 See H. HENN, supra note 246, § 194, at 380. But see Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio
St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955); Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 200 A.2d 398 (1964).
For a decision holding that a longstanding practice that was both ultra vires at common
law and in violation of a statute would not support a derivative suit where the stockholders had knowledge and had seemingly acquiesced, see Alderman v. Alderman, 178
S.C. 9, 41, 181 S.E. 897, 910 (1935) (discussed at notes 279-85 infra and accompanying text).
265 Almost all of these cases have involved alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty
by corporate officials, rather than allegations that corporate officials took excessive or
impermissible risks by involving the corporation in some form of misconduct. See H.
HENN, supra note 246, § 194, at 380 n.11.
Many of the recent cases stating this rule actually deal only with the necessity of demand
upon shareholders as a prerequisite to the commencement of a derivative suit, a procedural
step that most courts now regard as an onerous burden. See Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch.
298, 141 A.2d 458 (1958), dismissed on other grounds, 40 Del. Ch. 94, 174 A.2d 313 (1961);
Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 18, 99 N.E. 138, 142 (1912). To this extent,
these cases have an ulterior motive that partially explains their unqualified statements
that a disinterested majority cannot ratify illegality. See Note, Demand on Directors and
Shareholders As a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REv. 746, 757 (1960). But
see Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962). Few recent cases have focused
on shareholder ratification, because the modem course for a corporation advised by
sophisticated counsel is not to "ratify" the transaction, but to make a "business judgment"
not to sue the wrongdoer. See Gall v. Exxon, 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (discussed at
text accompanying note 462 infra).
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interest exists, the corporate officer as an agent must pass important policy questions on to his principal, the board of directors.
In Moses v. Burgin, 6 the First Circuit employed a novel presumption that amounts to a modern reinterpretation of the ultra vires
doctrine. Finding first that the defendant officers of a mutual fund
had failed to "communicate effectively" the full circumstances
surrounding the possible courses of action open to the board, the
court ruled that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duties
because such nondisclosure "made impossible the effective functioning of the mechanism protecting the Fund." 267 There remained the troubling issue of whether the breach had caused injury to the fund. Whether the nondisclosure by the officers to the
board caused injury seemingly depended upon whether the board
would have taken the undisclosed course of action favored by the
plaintiffs, a course that was novel and potentially risky. On the
facts of the case, it seemed unlikely. Nevertheless, the court turned
to its presumption. Conceding that the undisclosed option represented an "experiment," it still held that for prophylactic reasons
it must presume the board would have undertaken the action that
nondisclosure denied it the opportunity to consider. 268 Translated
to the broader context of corporate misconduct, the Moses rule
might mean that when the officer fails to disclose fully in a conflict
situation, the presumption will be that the board would have
denied him authority to act as he did.
While Moses v. Burgin is unique because of implicit federal
fiduciary principles derived from the Investment Company Act of
1940,269 state cases relying on traditional common-law grounds
also have held that the officer's duty of obedience entails a duty of
full disclosure to the board.270 Therefore, it might be possible to
266 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).

Id. at 384.
Id. at 383-85.
269 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see note 362 infra.
270 See Heit v. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (holding that director who became aware of misconduct by other directors and made no protest was "liable as a
collaborator in the breaches of trust"); Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers
Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 74, 93-94, 105, 242 A.2d 512, 539-40, 550-51, 557 (1968), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 940 (1971); cf. Walker v. Man, 142 Misc. 277, 281-82, 253 N.Y.S. 458, 465 (Sup.
Ct. 1931) (holding that one becoming a director after an illegal transaction, and who becomes aware of but takes no steps to protest or to rectify that transaction, can be held
liable for negligence, because acquiescence in wrongful conduct can amount to ratification
of it). Not surprisingly, business theorists more than lawyers have focused on the require267

268
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generalize this presumption that a corporate official's action in excess of his authority and undertaken without full disclosure would
have been rejected by the board. For the moment, however, it is
best to defer our exploration of the theories by which a court could
support such a generalized presumption and to focus instead on the
attractions of the result the presumption would yield. In this postWatergate era, making participation in a "cover-up" itself a breach
of fiduciary duties may be a legal theory whose time has come.
More importantly, if we believe that the underlying problems in
the area of corporate misconduct center around the problem of
information blockages and the imbalance between senior management and the board, it is obvious that this "duty to disclose" approach is a remedy directly addressed to these ills.
c.

The "Knowing" Violation

Assume that the directors of a small construction corporation
are aware that corporate officials are making grease payments in
order to facilitate progress on various construction projects (i.e.,
payments to local police not to enforce traffic and parking regulations that, if enforced, would effectively prevent the use of cranes
and similar construction equipment in urban areas, payments to
building inspectors who otherwise might delay perfunctory approvals interminably, etc.). The directors believe that the amounts
so paid are small in proportion to the losses that would result if
the payments were refused; nonetheless, while the payments are
individually small, they are large enough in the aggregate to present an attractive case to a plaintiff's lawyer willing to handle the
matter on a contingent fee basis. What is the legal exposure of
these directors?
Assuming that the foregoing example presents a case in which the
violation is a knowing one, it is not difficult to find commentators2 7 '
ment that management be forced to reveal its own involvement in corporate decisions.
See Austin, Code of Conduct for Executives, HARV. Bus. REv., September-October, 1961, at
53 (arguing that disclosure of such involvement is a more meaningful normative injunction
than vague concepts such as "business morality").
271 Probably the best summary of the surprisingly undeveloped state of the law regarding "knowing" violations is in Forte, Liabilities of Corporate Officers for Violations of
Fiduciary Duties Concerning the Antitrust Laws, 40 IND. L.J. 313, 319-25 (1965). Focusing
chiefly on dicta in New York cases, Forte tentatively concIltles that these dicta "would
lead one to believe that in New York at least the business judgment rule would not
relieve [corporate officials) from personal liability for a deliberate violation of the
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and dicta 272 suggesting that our defendant directors are subject to
strict liability, regardless of whether they exercised due care in
engaging in the prohibited conduct.17 Despite this apparent consensus that it is a per se breach of the duty of due care to place the
corporation in violation of the law knowingly, there do not appear
to be any modern cases which impose liability on facts even remotely similar to our hypothetical. 7 4 Indeed, when examined
closely, virtually every modern case imposing liability for intentional violations of law falls into one of the three following categories: (1) violations of statutes expressly and unambiguously
governing the internal conduct of corporate affairs (so that the
shareholder is within the protected class and a negligence per se
theory applies); 275 (2) violations of law in which self-dealing or a
conflict of interests is present (so that it is actually the duty of
antitrust laws even if [they] intended [the] violation to benefit the corporation." Id. at
320. A similarly tentative tone characterizes the conclusions of a student note in the Stanford Law Review:
There are suggestions in the law of corporations that directors are guilty of a
breach of trust whenever they cause the corporation to engage in illegal activity.
At least this is so when they bring about the illegal activity willfully or knowingly,
or for the benefit of other than the corporation.
Note, Stockholders' Suits and the Sherman Act, 5 STAN. L. REv. 480, 490-91 (1953). Whiting
also has noted that "direct precedent is lacking" in this area and the theory of liability
must be based on "analogies" and dicta. Whiting, supra note Ill, at 48 VA. L. REv. 44-45.
For a strong statement of the view that directors should be liable (with some exceptions)
even though they intend to benefit the corporation, see Blake, The Shareholders,Role In
Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 143, 170-78 (1961).
272 For representative dicta, see Cowin v. Jonas, 43 N.Y.S.2d 468, 469 (Sup. Ct. 1943),
aff'd nem., 293 N.Y. 838, 48 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1944). Cowin held, in the context of an illegal
dividend, that good faith could not be a defense to a statutory violation. Such cases
involving illegal dividends or other statutes designed to safeguard creditors clearly deal
with members of the "protected class" of the statute, and so are distinguishable. See also
Abrams v. Textile Realty Corp., 97 N.Y.S.2d 492, 495 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (discussed at note 301
infra); cases cited at note 236 supra.
273 Recall that "strict liability" here refers to the imposition of liability without the
possibility of affirmative defenses. See p. 1162 supra. The only defense under the instant
theory, given that the violation was a "knowing" one, might be the claim that it produced
no net loss, since it averted greater economic injury to the corporation.
274 The cases surveyed in making this statement include those cited in W. FLETCHER,
supra note 246, §§ 1021-1024; Blake, supra note 271; and Forte, supra note 271. The only
exception appears to be Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
275 As Professor Blake has noted, these cases typically involve (a) laws regulating the
lending capacities of financial institutions and (b) illegal dividends. Blake, supra note
271, at 160-61, nn. 77, 78, 80, & 81. As discussed earlier, Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d
Cir. 1974), also falls into this category. See also W. FLETCHER, supra note 246, § 1024; note
278 infra.
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loyalty that the court is enforcing); 276 or (3) violations of law by
subordinate officials acting beyond the scope of their delegated
authority (so that the ultra vires doctrine underlies the result).2
The absence of a modern case holding defendants strictly liable
for intentional illegality supplies at best a negative inference.
This, standing alone, provides less than complete assurance for our
hypothetical defendant directors when measured against the confident statements in dicta. Yet, when one examines the cases most
often cited by commentators for the proposition that directors are
liable when they "knowingly" exceed their authority "without regard to the exercise of reasonable care," 278 it becomes evident that
these decisions-in particular Alderman v. Alderman 279 and Simon
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 2 8 0-suggest the existence of other defenses besides that of good faith.
Several aspects of Alderman, a 1935 South Carolina case, show
the flexibility with which a court sympathetic to defendant directors can manipulate legal doctrines to achieve a desired result. In
Alderman, the directors had caused the corporation to invest in
several major banks, despite a statute that prohibited corporate investments in banks and a common-law rule that made such investments ultra vires. During the Depression, the value of these seemingly prudent investments declined drastically, and several stockholders sued to force the directors to indemnify the corporation
276 Sellers v. Head, 261 Ala. 212, 73 So. 2d 747 (1954) (corporate president intentionally
filed false tax returns to hide his own fraudulent conversions from the corporation);
Hill v. Murphy, 212 Mass. 1, 98 N.E. 781 (1912) (directors intentionally circulated a libel for
their own personal ends); DiTomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N.Y.S. 912, aff'd
mem., 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 570 (1937) (antitrust violation alleged to have been engaged
in to benefit other corporation in which defendant directors were interested); Clayton v.
Farish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (entry into cartel agreement in
violation of the antitrust laws recognized as a potential breach of the directors' duty of
loyalty where entry motivation was to benefit another corporation).
277 Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 1969) (citing corporation's
"traditional common law right to recover for injuries occasioned by errant employees").
See also cases cited by Blake, supra note 271, at 161 n.82.
278 See IV. FLETCHER, supra note 246, § 1023 (discussing cases cited at notes 279-80 infra).
This treatise adds, however, that where neither a statute nor the charter imposes express
liability on corporate officials for violation of a statute, courts would not impose liability
"merely because the act is a violation of the charter or a statute." Id. § 1024. Fletcher
suggests that the test might be whether the statute imposes "restriction on the power of the
corporation or the powers or duties of the directors themselves." Id.
279 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897 (1935).
280 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47
N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944).
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for its losses on these illegal investments. The court absolved the
directors, based in part on an expansive view of the good faith
defense. The fact that they "may well have believed" 281 the investments to be permissible satisfied the Alderman court, although
courts usually have required reliance upon counsel or statutory
ambiguity for the good faith defense. 2 But the decision emphasized even more that the illegal investments had been a "longstanding" practice of the corporation, in which stockholders had
acquiesced.2 8 3 Finally, the court declared that a derivative suit,
being a suit in equity, was "a matter peculiarly of equitable cognizance which cannot be determined by legal considerations
alone." 284 The scope of the applicable equitable defenses is far
from clear, but the opinion contains at least a suggestion that when
the directors did not explicitly recognize their conduct to be illegal, an intent to benefit the corporation would receive consider2 85
able weight.
The second case, Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., was a 1942
New York decision that absolved directors from tort liability for
antitrust violations when the directors, acting with reasonable
care, did not believe their acts were illegal. More importantly for
present purposes, the court framed a formula for strict liability that
distinguished between classes of illegal acts:
Whether directors are personally liable for committing acts prohibited by statute depends upon the nature of the prohibited act;
178 S.C. at 40, 181 S.E. at 910.
See cases cited at note 236 supra; Blake, supra note 271, at 160-61. For a discussion
of the effect of reliance upon counsel, see text accompanying note 361-66 infra.
283 178 S.C. at 41, 181 S.E. at 910. The court quoted with approval the following statement of the special referee:
It is' hard, therefore, for me to see how the corporation in view of its action for
more than thirty years could now undertake to hold its directors personally accountable for continuing these long-standing practices, and how the individual
stockholders can object, when they have heretofore acquiesced in and have actively
participated in [the illegal investments].
Id. Whether the approach of the Alderman court in this regard would be extended
beyond the context of the close corporation is open to question. However, some public
corporations have disclosed an intention to continue making small grease payments. See
notes 67-68 supra. There, Alderman would have considerable relevance.
284 178 S.C. at 42, 181 S.E. at 910 (adopting lower court opinion). The court emphasized
that the directors acted with "honesty of purpose" in seeking to benefit the corporation
and that they exercised considerable diligence. Id., 181 S.E. at 911.
285 Id.
281

282
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whether the statute is plain and unambiguous, and whether it
contains a limitation or restriction on the powers of the corporation
28 6
or the powers or duties of the directors themselves.

Because the decision emphasized that prior New York cases holding directors strictly liable involved violations of statutes specifically focused at directors, such as statutes limiting their power to
declare dividends or to make loans or investments, Simon seems to
suggest that some penal statutes are incorporated by reference into

the corporation's charter, becoming substantive limitations on the

25 7
directors' power, while others are not.
Analytically, the Simon test has much in common with both the

ultra vires and the negligence per se approaches. Under the ultra
vires theory, a penal statute that does impose a "limitation or
restriction" (to use the Simon phrase) seems to have the same effect
as a charter restriction curtailing the directors' discretion. Under a

negligence per se approach, any statute found to contain such a
"limitation or restriction" also likely would be found to include
shareholders within its "protected class." 288 Thus, there is a basic

congruence among the triggering concepts of these three doctrines,
and a likelihood that they would produce identical results in a
given fact situation.
The most important question that Simon raises (but does not

answer) is where the watershed would lie between statutes that do
impose restrictions on the corporation's power and those that do
not. Read literally, very few statutes would seem to impose such
179 Misc. at 204, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 274 (emphasis added).
287 The distinction among statutes in Simon finds support in other cases. Judge Lumbard's concurring opinion in Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956) (discussed
at note 231 supra), concluded that the statute there at issue was in no way "a measure of
the obligation" of the defendant directors, although it did seemingly protect shareholders.
Id. at 248. In Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit, after
determining that the state statute against corporate political contributions had not been
violated, implied in dicta that even if there had been a violation, the court would still have
had to determine whether "a private derivative right of action may be implied in favor
of plaintiff." Id. at 854.
288 It can be argued that some statutes clearly intended to impose restrictions on
corporate power, such as the typical statutory restrictions on the lending, borrowing, and
investment powers of financial institutions, are not intended to protect shareholders; but
only creditors, depositors, and the Federal Reserve System. See Holman v. Cross, 75 F.2d
909 (6th Cir. 1935). I think the better view, however, would be to view such statutes
as intended to protect shareholders from excessive management risks. An analysis of these
conflicting interpretations appears in Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1943),
particularly the opinion of Judge Augustus Hand, id. at 435-37.
286
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limitations under the standard that Simon seems to employ.2 89
Even if we broaden that category to include statutes aimed principally at corporations, it would still require conceptual acrobatics
in our earlier construction company hypothetical to treat municipal regulations or laws proscribing petty graft as similarly incorporated into the corporation's charter.
If Simon suggests that courts, at least in the past, have approached the problem of knowing illegality by the rather formalistic route of asking what powers were delegated to corporate
officials, the conceptual limitations of this approach become clearest in the multi-jurisdictional context. For example, do the officers
of a corporation incorporated in a state that prohibits neither commercial bribery nor political contributions exceed their delegated
powers by engaging in these acts in another jurisdiction, which does
prohibit such conduct? If the jurisdiction of incorporation both
lacks a similar prohibition and follows the Simon approach of considering only some statutes as imposing restrictions on corporate
power, then it is possible for a court in that jurisdiction, or in a
jurisdiction following the traditional conflicts rule, 9 0 to treat the

statutory violation, even if "knowing," as only "evidence of negligence" or less.
One of the few cases that has even skirted this issue of statutory
violations in a multi-jurisdictional context is Polon v. Huffines,2 9"
which adopted an "evidence of negligence" approach. In Polon,
plaintiffs were stockholders of an Ohio corporation that had been
convicted of violating an Illinois regulatory statute. They sought
to hold the former majority shareholder, who had dominated the
corporation, liable for the fines imposed. The Seventh Circuit
289 The cases relied upon by Simon seem basically to have involved statutes that include
shareholders within their protected class. See 179 Misc. at 204-05, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 274. If
this were the watershed between statutes that impose liability and those that do not,
relatively few criminal statutes would be included.
290 Under section 309 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the law of the
state of incorporation is to apply with respect to "internal affairs" of the corporation,
including issues involving the liability of corporate officials to the corporation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 309 (1971). The one recognized limitation on this
rule is that where the sole contact between the corporation and its state of incorporation
is that it is incorporated there, the laws of another jurisdiction having a closer relationship
to the corporation may be applied. See Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268
F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959). For citations to cases following
the Restatement, see Forte, supra note 271, at 318 n.33.
291 446 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1971).
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rejected this claim, stating that it could find "no authority which
imposes strict liability for errors of business judgment in the absence of a conflict of interest or applicable statute of the state of
incorporation."292 The court concluded that therefore the appropriate standard was to be derived "by reference to traditional notions of negligence." 293 The court held the claim inadequate under
this standard, stating: "While the fact that criminal liability was
imposed is evidence of the erroneous nature of defendant's judgment, neither the plaintiff nor the corporation has argued or introduced evidence under a negligence theory." 294 But what additional elements did the plaintiff's case here need to create at least
a prima facie showing of negligence, which the defendant might be
able to rebut by raising an affirmative defense? Apparently, the
Polon court found the criminal conviction insufficient to constitute
such a showing. Thus, at a minimum, it seems to place the burden
of showing negligence on the plaintiff even after a statutory violation has been demonstrated. But what constitutes negligence in this
context? Must the plaintiff also prove that violation was knowing,
reckless, or not "excusable"?
Where there has not been any prior conviction, unlike Polon or
Simon, the problem for a court in a jurisdiction different from
that in which the statutory violation occurred is even more complex. In general, courts have been highly reluctant to make determinations involving the criminal laws of another jurisdiction.
For example, suppose a plaintiff wished to bring suit in a state
court alleging improper payments in violation of the RobinsonPatman Act. Although the foreign statute here is federal, and
governs under the Supremacy Clause, a series of New York cases
have dismissed even these attacks on either of two grounds. First,
they have held that a lack of jurisdiction over the statute prevented
them from adjudicating the dispute, unless the conduct also
amounted to a breach of the duty of loyalty.2 95 This much-criticized
approach essentially says that although courts can examine conduct
alleged to have violated foreign law to determine if there has been
292

Id. at 386 (emphasis added).

293

Id.

Id.
See, e.g., Clayton v. Farish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947); cf.
Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (dismissed complaint because
plaintiffs failed to prove personal advantage to directors, as required by Delaware law).
294
295
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an underlying breach of the duty of loyalty, they cannot find a
breach of the duty of due care based simply on the violation of
the foreign statute. 296 Second, several cases have concluded that
because the most reasonable inference to be drawn from illegal behavior is that it was undertaken for corporate profit, plaintiffs
should bear the burden of proving that the corporation suffered a
net loss-in short, that the crime did not pay.29 7
We will return to the New York "net loss" rule in our survey of
affirmative defenses.2 98 Obviously, there are powerful policy reasons
operating against the adoption of a test that focuses on such pragmatic questions as whether the costs of compliance outweigh the
costs of violation or whether it is a reasonable business risk to
violate a statute. Such an approach would introduce exactly the
opposite of the considerations that we would want from a public
policy perspective to influence the judicial balancing process (e.g.,
how likely am I to get caught?, how much will it cost me?). But
how does a court avoid such a descent into cynicism other than by
use of a strict liability theory? One way is the net loss rule's approach: assign such an onerous burden of proof to the plaintiff that
the case cannot come to trial. 299 An alternative might be the reverse
approach: a conclusive presumption that obedience to the law is
beneficial, and thus all knowing violations become per se reckless
ones.
In support of such a presumption, there is evidence from the
improper payments experience that such payments (and by analogy other forms of corporate misconduct) are ultimately inconsistent with profit maximization, even if profitable in the short run.
Still, while an honorable sentiment, there is a glib profundity to
this argument that illegal conduct is as a matter of law always
counterproductive in the long run. "In the long run," said Keynes,
"'we are all dead." To the directors of a corporation teetering on
the brink of insolvency, or facing a confiscatory nationalization,
there is a telling force to Keynes's observation that cannot be
countered by a focus on the long term. Circumstances objectively
296 See Blake, supra note 271, at 166-68; Forte, supra note 271, at 317-18, 319 n.35;
Comment, supra note 238, at 904. Some New York cases have reached an opposite result,
but have not explained their reasoning. See, e.g., Knopfler v. Bohen, 15 App. Div. 2d 922,
225 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1962) (allowing claim under federal antitrust laws).
297 See cases cited at note 417 infra.
298 See text accompanying notes 417-25 infra.
299 See text accompanying notes 417-22 infra.
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can arise in which the gain or loss of a profitable contract or the
prevention of hostile governmental action could mean the difference between solvency and insolvency. Undeniably too, the risk of
enforcement, the severity of the penalty, and the potential profitability of the prohibited conduct are all relevant considerations
that the rational man would weigh when deciding whether or not
to breach a statute-or if not, then theories about general deterrence that have shaped the criminal law at least since the day of
Bentham and Beccaria are profoundly misguided. A partial answer
to these arguments might be that there is a difference between
predicting what factors the rationalman will consider in evaluating
a risk and determining the standard for the prudent man serving
as a director. Traditionally, the determination of whether conduct
was negligent under a "reasonable man" standard always has involved some element of moral evaluation. 0 Thus, it is not surprising to find that other New York cases in a related context have
adopted what amounts to a conclusive presumption that obedience
to law always benefits both the corporation and its shareholders.3 0 1
The coexistence in the same jurisdiction of this line of cases and
the "net loss" rule demonstrates the difficulties inherent in the
problem. Although corporate misconduct clearly is not always
contrary to the corporation's own interests, one could argue that
a presumption of harm to the corporation may be at least a useful
legal fiction to increase the level of deterrence. However, the
Supreme Court recently rejected exactly such a use of deterrence
as a justification for liability when a plaintiff stockholder had
suffered no economic loss. 302 Still, because the Supreme Court has
300 See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 226, § 16.4, at 906. Balancing this observation,
however, is the dictum of Professor Seavey, one of the original draftsmen of the Restatement, that "[e]xcessive altruism is as much a departure from the standard morality as
excessive selfishness." Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 11
(1927).
301 In Abrams v. Textile Realty Corp., 97 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1949), the courtappointed referee observed: "The law cannot refuse to recognize as beneficial full observance of the law. The law cannot hold that corporate interests are better served by
action outside rather than within the law." Id. at 496. Although this statement has been
much quoted, the specific issue in dispute was not illegality nor even any issue involving
the liability of individual corporate officials. Instead, the case involved only whether the
plaintiff was entitled to have his legal expenses for securing an injunction against an
ultra vires act paid by the defendant corporation.
302 In Bangor Punta Operations v. Bangor & A.R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 717 (1974),
the Court rejected the First Circuit's argument that liability had to be imposed against a
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expressly disclaimed the power to federalize questions of state corporation law, 0 3 its skepticism towards such a presumption is not an
insurmountable barrier.
More important is the possibility that such a presumption
actually might be counterproductive in its effect on corporate misconduct. From our organization theory perspective, the key problem with such a conclusive presumption is that it eliminates any
positive incentive for subordinate corporate officials to disclose
questionable practices to their superiors. Effectively ensuring that
the board has no discretion to enter a gray area would intensify the
problem of information blockages. Once strict liability becomes
the governing standard, and the board may not legitimize questionable payments, there is no reason for lower-echelon officials to inform their superiors when they make or contemplate making such
payments. By doing so, they would only implicate their superiors
as well without gaining any corresponding advantage. Indeed,
prior disclosure might well jeopardize the board's ability to make
a business judgment determination not to sue them if a derivative
suit ever were commenced. 0 In contrast, if the board-and only
the board-could legitimize certain questionable practices (particularly in a "duress" situation such as our earlier Gulf Oil paradigm), the resultant safe harbor could create a positive incentive
that induces a flow of adverse information to higher levels within
the corporation. For maximum effect, this safe harbor could
be coupled with appropriate negative incentives for those who fail
to disclose (possibly by expanding the presumption of Moses v.
former majority stockholder of a railroad who allegedly had looted it, in order to "provide
a needed deterrent to mismanagement of railroads." The Court stated:
Our difficulty with this argument is that it proves too much. If deterrence were the
only objective, then in logic any plaintiff willing to file a complaint would suffice.
No injury or violation of a legal duty to the particular plaintiff would have to be
alleged. The only prerequisite would be that the plaintiff agree to accept the recovery, lest the supposed wrongdoer be allowed to escape a reckoning. Suffice it to
say that we have been referred to no authority which would support so novel a
result, and we decline to adopt it.
To the extent that this case reflects the Court's current attitude toward theories of corporate misconduct, it suggests that the Court will not dispense with formal requirements nor
ignore traditional legal distinctions.
303 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,
84 (1975).
304 For a discussion of the problems such prior board involvement might create in the
context of the board's power to decide not to sue, see text accompanying notes 473-79
infra.
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Burgin, discussed earlier 305). These alternative approaches present
again the conflict between a moralistic approach of imposing
sterner penalties and a pragmatic approach of improving the ability
of the corporation's own self-regulatory devices to supervise questionable activities. If our ultimate end is prevention and if the
most effective means to that end involves increasing the flow of
information within the corporation, then the wisest strategy may
not be the most punitive, but rather the one that best combines
positive and negative incentives.
On the operational level of legal doctrine, there is a possible intermediate position between the presumption that obedience to
the law is always beneficial to the corporation and the net loss rule
followed by some New York courts that might allow us to implement such a policy of mixing incentives. Given the likelihood
that the defense of justification or duress will legitimately arise
only in a minority of cases, a wiser course might be to establish a
rebuttable presumption that intentional violations of law violate
the duty of due care. Then, having permitted the plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case by virtue of the presumption, the
defendants could assert their justifications as an affirmative defense.
One recent case has taken this approach, holding that it is defendants' responsibility to show that the violation should be excused 05
For the moment, let us postpone the issue of what defenses might
meet the defendants' burden and simply note that such a compromise would facilitate a strategy consistent with our earlier diagnosis without by any means granting immunity to those guilty of
30 7
active misconduct.
305 See text accompanying notes 266-68 supra.
306 See Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 80-81, 242 A.2d 512,
543-44 (1968) (holding that a violation of the antitrust laws would not, "per se, result in a
finding of gross negligence or culpable mismanagement," but that the allegations did
establish such conduct prima facie so that the defendants would be required to rebut such
a presumption at trial).
307 Such individuals would remain exposed to criminal liability if the acts were illegal
in the jurisdiction in which committed, regardless of the law of the state of incorporation
or the governing conflicts rule. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.25 (McKinney 1975) (holding responsible officials criminally liable for criminal corporate conduct). Some recent case
law suggests that the responsible officials could also be held liable by injured third
parties if the conduct amounts to an intentional tort. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreational Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding directors of a nonprofit
corporation personally liable for discriminatory corporate action in which they participated
despite reliance on the advice of counsel).
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Negligence Theories

Consideration of "knowing" violations must be kept in perspective. Even a combination of knowing and "reckless" violations
probably represents only a minority of the total number of corporate transgressions of statutory or regulatory standards. In the
typical situation, the defendant directors are alleged to have acted
negligently by failing to discover illegal actions that in the exercise
of reasonable care they should have uncovered.
Although the case law supports the abstract proposition that a
director has a duty to exercise reasonable supervision over the
corporation's officers, 308 any attempt by a plaintiff to prove a breach
of this duty faces the formidable obstacle of Graham v. AllisChalmers Manufacturing Co.30 9 That case absolved directors from
liability for antitrust price-fixing violations by subordinate management, because the directors had neither actual knowledge nor
grounds for suspecting the conspiracy. More importantly, Graham
stated two subtly different propositions: (1) "that directors are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates
until something occurs to put them on suspicion that something is
wrong," 310 and (2) that they are under "no duty ... to install and
operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing. "311 While both of these propositions stem from the earliest
Supreme Court cases on directors' liability,31'2 and while the first
proposition may melt at its margins into the second, it nevertheless
308 Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920); Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963);
Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 242 A.2d 512 (1968); Neese v.
Brown, 218 Tenn. 686, 405 S.W.2d 577 (1964); Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 941 (1969).
309 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963).
310 Id. at 85, 188 A.2d at 130.
311 Id. The court also noted that: "By reason of the extent and complexity of the company's operations, it is not practicable for the Board to consider in detail specific problems
of the various divisions." Id. at 82, 188 A.2d at 128. The Graham court thus recognized
the "control loss" problem and th6 infeasibility of monitoring from the board's "crow's
nest" vantage point. In the courts of Delaware, however, to recognize a problem is not
necessarily to suggest that it be solved.
312 Graham relies chiefly on the Supreme Court's early 5-4 decision in Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891), which exonerated directors alleged to have inadequately supervised their subordinates. For more recent decisions employing stricter standards, see note
308 supra and note 313 infra. Even some early cases seem to have required corporate
officials to take precautions beyond looking for signs of untrustworthiness in their
subordinates. See Chadwick v. Holm, 31 Idaho 252, 170 P. 87 (1918) (holding corporate
officer liable for negligent failure to bond against employee embezzlements).
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is worth asking if we can question and curtail the second while
acknowledging the basic legitimacy of the first.
The first proposition, reliance on subordinates, has an inherent
equity that makes its rejection by courts seem unlikely. Indeed,
even cases imposing liability generally have followed Graham's
approach, seeking first a telltale "clue" that should have put the
directors on notice. The deficiency in this approach, however, lies
at the point where it meets Graham's second proposition, that directors have no obligation to institutionalize any mechanism for
monitoring internal compliance. What happens after the clue is
found, an ad hoc investigation made, and no smoking gun uncovered? A court then has essentially three options. First, it could
follow Graham and absolve the directors because they were entitled to conclude their investigation upon finding no corroborating evidence. Second, it could find another clue that should have
caused the directors to search further. Or third, it could abandon
reliance on clues and instead require directors to install some
permanent monitoring system once the corporation has grown to a
size that precludes effective personal supervision by the board.
This third approach directly contradicts Graham's second rule,
but the alternatives are bleak. Absolving the directors after a
cursory investigation would institutionalize the problem of the
shut-eyed sentry by placing corporate officials in risk of liability
only if they have notice of the impropriety. Although there have
been recent decisions in which courts have searched for clues
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight, 3 3 the primary limitation of
this approach is obvious: unless one is prepared to hold directors
liable for clues that might have escaped Hercule Poirot, one cannot
expect directors in the modern decentralized corporation to discover many clues from their remote position in the corporate
crow's nest. Therefore, if we accept that the locus of corporate misconduct is generally at levels far below top management, and that
the board's effective "span of control" necessarily is limited, then
the only pragmatic approach is to require systematic internal monitoring.
313 From the standpoint of the corporate director, probably the most frightening of
these decisions is DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37, 43-44 (9th Cir.
1967), which imposed damages of $314,794 for failure of a director to investigate and to
discover that a proposed shift in control would be "inimical to the best interests" of his
corporation.

1977]

Corporate Misconduct

1185

But can we realistically expect courts to reverse the consensus of
authority that directors have no duty to install any such "espionage
system" (in Graham's pejorative phrase)? Some perspective on
this problem is gained when one recalls prior moments in the law
of torts when courts have recognized that a change in circumstances
necessitated new standards of care. The classic expression of this
judicial power to upgrade a standard of reasonable care is Learned
Hand's opinion in The T.J. Hooper.114 That famous case involved
the question of whether the operator of several ocean-going barges
lost in an Atlantic gale was liable for failure to install on board a
radio receiving set, which would have warned him in time of the
approaching storm. The defense was that because the industry had
not generally adopted the use of such receiving sets, their non-use
did not breach the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent man. Learned Hand responded:
Is it then a final answer that the business has not generally adopted
receiving sets? There are, no doubt, cases when courts seem to make
the general practice of the calling the standard of proper diligence
....
Indeed, in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common
prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may
have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It
never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages. Courts
must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their
omission. 31 5
Is the position of corporate director such a "calling" that has
"unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices"?
Graham ignored this question, simply assuming that a system of
internal monitoring was unnecessary because it previously had
been unnecessary.3 16 But, the period between Graham and the
earlier decisions on which it relied saw the transition from the
traditional unitary corporation to the modern multidivisional
corporation. With this metamorphosis came also the problems described earlier of communication distortion, authority leakage, and
subgoal pursuit. Similarly, the nature of corporate misconduct has
changed significantly. We are no longer concerned solely with the
60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
315 Id. at 740.
316 See note 312 supra.
314
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absconding cashier,31 7 but rather with the conscientious vice president who fixes prices. 18 With this rise of "regulatory" offenses, the
idea of "telltale clues" becomes an ineffective legal antique. Its
original premise was that signs of "untrustworthiness" would alert
the diligent director before the impending crime. That premise
does not apply to the problem of managerial overzealousness.
Does all this mean that, at the risk of otherwise incurring personal liability, directors might be required to establish a permanent
office within the corporation primarily responsible for internal
surveillance-in effect, a corporate Inspector General? 31' Tempting
as such a conclusion might be, such a quantum leap in legal standards probably exceeds the current reach of any possible tort law
approach. Hooper, after all, required only that the defendants buy
a radio already on the market, not that they hire Marconi to invent
one. But two less drastic remedies, which already have received
some degree of acceptance, should constitute "available devices"
within the meaning of Hooper. The first remedy is equipping the
outside members of the board with their own staff.3 20 This idea remains controversial, but some tentative steps in this direction are
discernible.3 2' The second remedy, the audit committee, is less
See Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920).
318 See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963).
319 Stanley Sporkin, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, has recently suggested such a reform. He has called for the creation of "business practices officers" to
"ferret out improper business practices within the corporation and bring them to the
attention of the board of directors." Berry, SEC's Sporkin Hits Business Crime, Wash.
Post, June 17, 1977, at D8, col. 1. Such a system seems vulnerable to the same criticisms as
an expanded staff system. In particular, it seems unlikely that talented young executives
would serve willingly in a position offering so little promise of future advancement.
320 See note 193 supra.
321 A recent survey by Korn-Ferry International, a management recruiting firm, foundthat of 370 major corporations surveyed, only 6.5% reported that they provided directors
with full-time or part-time staff assistance. Fowler, Management: Defining Role of a
Corporate Director, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1977, at D3, col. I. Low as the figure is, it
appears to signify an increase. For a description of the very limited information directors
typically receive today, see M. EIS.NBERC., supra note 12, at 143-44.
One idea related to a staff system that has gained recent adherents is the "officer of the
board" system. As first developed by Texas Instruments, this approach is to take a senior
officer of the company, such as an executive vice president, and make him a full-time
professional director, free from all operating responsibilities. 'The Mead Corporation and
Connecticut General Insurance Company have adopted variants of this approach. Fowler,
supra. Exxon also has followed a similar practice. C. BROWN, supra note 9, at 33-34. While
it may be premature to appraise this experiment, it seems likely that (a) such an
insider may find it difficult to be as skeptical as an outside director who is not substantially
317
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open to question. Indeed, it already has become prevailing practice. 22 Under an audit committee system, the corporation's outside
auditors report directly to a committee of the board's outside directors. The intended result is to out-flank the problem of information blockages by giving the board access to information, unfiltered
by management, on problem areas in the corporation's financial
performance. Within the area of accountants' expertise, such a
structure performs some of the same functions as a mini-board
system: it serves as an early warning system within the corporate
structure to warn the board of impending problems, and it alerts
the board to the degree of distortion in the information reaching
it by regular channels. Enthusiasts of the audit committee approach have suggested that its role be expanded beyond financial
matters, enabling a systematic "social audit" of the corporation's
activities. 2 3
Accountants, both academics and practitioners, however, are
more skeptical. They have warned that auditing techniques are
rarely adequate to detect outright fraud and have cautioned that
accountants are not competent to audit nonfinancial aspects of the
corporation's behavior. 2 4 Moreover, from the perspective of this
dependent on the corporation for his livelihood; (b) the temptation may arise to use
such a position as a sinecure for the "burnt out" case or the losing candidate in the
competition for some other corporate post; and (c) the post may be difficult to fill because the best qualified candidates may not wish to detach themselves from the corporate
hierarchy so completely (thereby forfeiting the opportunity to become chief executive
officer). Fowler reported (perhaps symptomatically) that the post on the Texas Instrument
board had gone vacant. See Fowler, supra.
322 80% of the companies responding to a 1974 survey of New York Stock Exchange
members reported having audit committees; another 13% reported plans to establish
one. M. EISENBERO, supra note 12, at 207-08. Under a recently adopted New York Stock
Exchange rule, which becomes effective on June 30, 1978, each corporation listed on
that exchange will be required to establish a qualifying audit committee. SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 34-13245, 42 Fed. Reg. 8,737 (1977). For the background of this rule and
the SEC's approval of it,see SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-13346, 42 Fed. Reg. 14,793
(1977), and note 386 infra.
a23 Branson, Progress In the Art of Social Accounting and Other Arguments for Disclosure on Corporate Social Responsibility, 29 VAND. L. REv. 539 (1976).
324 This view was articulated most forcefully in Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings
on H.R. 15481 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 94-115, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976) (Testimony of Thomas Holton, Chairman, Comm. on SEC Regulations, American
Inst. of Certified Public Accountants). At these hearings, the AICPA took the following
position: "We believe it is critically important to . . . recognize that illegal or improper
corporate activities can and will occur regardless of the strength of internal accounting
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article, reforms such as the audit committee or the expanded board
staff seem likely for a variety of reasons to yield only marginal improvements in the board's effectiveness. A substantial organizational distance would still remain between the board and the locus
of most corporate misconduct; positive incentives for a fuller flow
of sensitive information to the board still would be lacking. Unlike
improper payments, most forms of corporate misconduct do not
involve the falsification of financial records or other evasions of
accounting controls. Finally, by their nature, accounting safeguards offer only retrospective, rather than prospective, controls. 2 5
Nevertheless, the example of the audit committee illustrates the
capability of a negligence theory approach for producing desired
change. The effectiveness of negligence theory lies in its ability to
force the pervasive adoption of reforms once they have become
"available." For example, under prodding from the SEC, the New
York Stock Exchange has recently amended its listing requirements
to limit trading to securities of corporations having such an audit
committee32e As the audit committee thereby becomes widely accepted, there inevitably will be corporate stragglers among corporations not listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The directors of
such a straggler should face a high exposure to liability based on
negligence if their failure to adopt a reform of proven feasibility
harms the corporation.2 Moreover, this process could constantly
controls, because no system has yet been devised that can withstand collusive behavior or
circumvention by corporate officials." Id. at 158 (emphasis added). The AICPA testimony
added that "a careful analysis" of those cases studied in the SEC Payment Report would
show that "[a]ll of those cases involved companies that had systems of internal accounting
control . . . [that were] very good systems." Id. The problem, it added, was that these
systems had been deliberately circumvented by corporate insiders. In our terminology,
information was being "blocked." For similar comments from a respected academic accountant (N.Y.U. Professor Lee Seidler), see Why Everybody's Jumping on Accountants
These Days, FORBES, Mar. 15, 1977, at 37, 43.
325 Even ideal accounting controls tell a board only what has happened, not what is
about to happen. For the board as the corporate superego to have an advance role before
decisions become faits accomplis, other forms of monitoring, such as the mini-board, are
necessary.
326 See note 322 supra.
327 The AICPA reluctantly has accepted the proposition that an auditor has a responsibility to respond to indications that "irregularities," which are defined to include
"intentional distortions" such as slush funds and management misrepresentations, exist in
the financial statement. AUDITING STANDARDS EXECUTIVE COMM., AICPA, STATEMENT ON
AUDITING STANDARDS No. 16: THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DETECTION
OF ERRORS OR IRREGULARITIES (Jan. 1977) ; see AUDITING STANDARDS EXECUTIVE CoMM., AICPA,
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repeat itself: if a more comprehensive structural reform, such as the
mini-board, ever achieves a reasonable degree of acceptance and
demonstrated effectiveness, the negligence approach could similarly induce its general acceptance.
One major caveat, however, to the conclusion that courts could
use a negligence approach to spur the installation of adequate
internal corporate monitoring systems is the approaching codification of the Graham rules. As revised in 1974, section 35 of the
Model Business Corporation Act grants directors a specific defense
of reliance upon advice and information given them by certain
categories of persons. 28 The novel feature of this provision is that
it permits reliance not only upon experts, such as attorneys and
accountants, or upon highly technical data, such as financial statements, but also upon "information, opinions, reports or statements . . . prepared or presented by . . . officers or employees of
the corporation .... ,, '29This sweeping extension of the reliance
No. 17: ILLEGAL AcTS BY CLIENTS (Jan. 1977). The
auditor who detects such "irregularities" or who concludes that management "may have
overridden control procedures" is under a duty to report its findings to "an appropriate
level of management that is at least one level above those involved." STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 16, supra, flJ 10, 14. If necessary, the auditor must make "the board of
directors or its audit committee .. . aware of the circumstances." Id. Because Rule 202 of
the AICPA's Code of Professional Ethics requires adherence to the auditing standards
promulgated by the AICPA, a monitoring system now exists. However, its effect is largely
short-circuited where there is no audit committee of outside directors to receive such information.
328 Report of Committee on Corporate Laws: Changes in the MBCA, supra note
34. See also Hawes & Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel As a Defense in Corporate
and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 1, 70-72 (1976). Despite its recent vintage, Model
Act section 35 has already been enacted in several jurisdictions, including California. See
CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1977). In New York, an amendment conforming section 717
of the Business Corporation Law to the revised version of section 35 was vetoed in 1975,
but was again passed and signed into law by Governor Carey late in 1977, despite the
recommendation of the New York Attorney General that he veto it on the grounds
that it went "beyond the current law" and did not require a director "to exercise diligence
or skill in performing his duty." See Lefkowitz, Memorandum for the Governor Re: A.
245-B (June 29, 1977) (contained in the bill jacket and on file with the Virginia Law
Review). The criticisms here expressed of this expanded reliance defense are not that it
reduces the requisite level of skill expected of directors, but that it may absolve them
in many instances from any responsibility to install monitoring systems.
329 Section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act has three separate tests that must
be met before its reliance defense will be upheld: (1) the directors must exercise a standard
of due care defined basically as that of "an ordinarily prudent man in a like position . ..
under similar circumstances," (2) he must act "in good faith" and without "knowledge . ..
that would cause such reliance to be unwarranted," and (3) he must believe the person
STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS
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defense 330 appears to permit corporate officials to rely on the subordinates' assurances that the corporation's hands are clean, notwithstanding the absence of any internal compliance system. 331 Indeed, such a statute may create a disincentive for further inquiry by
the board, because any such inquiry might turn up suspicious
signs that would make reliance "unwarranted." 332 In short, under
such a system, ignorance is not only bliss, but for the liability conscious director it may be the prudent course.
3.

The Public Policy Doctrine

One last possible theory of liability for the derivative suit plaintiff is the claim that corporate officials are liable for all losses resulting from actions that contravene public policy. Although this
approach has lived more in academic commentary than in judicial
decisions, three opinions applying New York law raise at least the
possibility that the theory could be the basis for liability. The most
important, A brains v. Allen, 333 involved the claim that the directors
of Remington Rand had violated their fiduciary duties by deliberately relocating certain plants, in order to "intimidate" and
"punish" employees for joining a union. Earlier decisions of the
National Labor Relations Board and the Second Circuit had found
the corporation to have engaged in unfair labor practices amounting to the classic "runaway shop." 134 However, the lower court had
dismissed the derivative action, finding the defendants protected
by the business judgment rule. 3 5 The New York Court of Appeals
reversed, stating that such actions by the defendant directors, if
proved, "may be held to have amounted to actionable breaches of
the duties owed by defendants to the corporation, as its trustees and
agents." 33" Then, in a statement upon which a legion of cornon whom he relies to be "reliable and competent in the matters presented." ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 35 (Supp. 1977).
330 For an analysis of the more restrictive reliance defense statutes currently in effect,
see Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 328, at 69-79.
331 See Harris, supra note 126, at 1241 (questioning the wisdom of such an expansion
of the reliance defense).
332 As discussed at note 329 supra, knowledge of contrary or inconsistent facts can make
reliance "unwarranted" and the reliance defense unavailable under section 35.
333 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947).
334 NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938).
335 271 App. Div. 326, 65 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1946).
336 297 N.Y. at 55, 74 N.E.2d at 306.
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mentators has focused, the court added: "That the public policy of
this State and nation is opposed to the closing or removal of factories, for such purposes as here asserted, is obvious." 337 The contemporary reaction to this apparent rule that derivative suits could
be based on public policy was both excited and symptomatic. Perhaps characteristically, student writers in the HarvardLaw Review
warned ominously that it would subject directors to domination by
outside pressure groups,3 38 while the editors of the Yale Law
Journal heralded it as offering a new means by which irresponsible
3 39
corporations could be brought under greater social control.
But did Abrams justify either this alarm or enthusiasm? 340 The
court interpreted the complaint as alleging that the acts in question
were "not done for any legitimate business reason, but . . . were
done solely to discourage, intimidate and punish the corporation's
employees." 341 In particular, the court stressed the allegation that
the principal defendant had dominated the board and forced it to
permit him "to vent his personal bias, animus and hatred in
evolving and executing the policy" of closing the corporation's
factories.3 42 So construed, the wrong held actionable in Abrams
seems based more on the misuse of the corporation as a vehicle for
pursuit of a personal vendetta than on any broader theory of
liability grounded in violations of public policy. Indeed, the decision's penultimate paragraph notes that the defendants could at
trial rebut the plaintiff's allegations by showing that "they may
have done [the wrongful acts] for the best of reasons." 343 This
statement seems to suggest that a "legitimate business purpose"
would immunize directors from liability for acts contrary to public
policy, a proposition almost the converse of that for which A brains
has been cited.
While there are ambiguities in A brains' holding, 344 the interpre337 Id. at 56, 74 N.E.2d at 307.
338 61 HARV. L. REv. 541, 542 (1948).
339 Note, Use of the Derivative Suit by Groups Foreign to the Corporation to Prevent
Corporate Violation of Law and Public Policy, 57 YALE L.J. 489 (1948).
340 For perhaps the best contemporary asessment of the case, see 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 423
(1948).
341 297 N.Y. at 55, 74 N.E.2d at 306.
342 Id.
343 Id. at 56, 74 N.E.2d at 307.
344 See Note, Civil Responsibility for ,Corporate Political Expenditures, 20 U.C.LA. L.
REv. 1327, 1337 (1973), which suggests that it is arguable that a "legitimate" business pur-
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tation subsequently placed on the decision by the lower New York
courts may be the best guide to its meaning. On remand, the lower
court found that it was not clear that the plant closings were undertaken for other than legitimate business purposes, and it dismissed
the complaint. 45 Probably because of this anticlimactic denouement to A brains, its putative principle that corporate officials are
liable for acts in violation of public policy has lain dormant in New
York. Moreover, courts in Delaware and California have expressly
rejected the case's suggestion that courts may discover public policy
limitations on the implied powers of corporate officials, holding
that such a doctrine would amount to judicial usurpation of the
legislature's prerogatives.3 4
If the public policy doctrine experienced a still-born birth in
347
A brams, it may have been "born again" with Miller v. AT&T.
Miller held that corporate directors could not raise a business judgment defense to a derivative suit based on illegal corporate political
contributions. This holding seems to rest upon two distinct
grounds: its finding that plaintiffs were within the class protected
by the statute,3 48 and its interpretation of the New York public
policy doctrine. By beginning its analysis with Roth v. Robertson,34 9 the 1909 "hush money" case previously noted, the court in
Miller was able to avoid the limitations inherent in Abrams. It
focused on the stronger language in Roth and viewed Abrams
merely as a reaffirmation of Roth's principle "that directors must
be restrained from engaging in activities which are against public
pose cannot exist if action is contrary to public policy. However, such an analysis seems
to ignore that it was not the effect of the plant closings, but the motivation behind them,
that was asserted to be against public policy. Presumably, even under the most expansive
reading of Abrams, the same action would be valid if undertaken for different reasons
(i.e., to cut costs, which was the reason found on remand to be the actual motivation).
345 113 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
346 See Marsili v. Pacific Gas 9= Elec. Co., 51 Cal. App. 3d 313, 124 Cal. Rptr. 313
(1975); Kelly v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878, 879 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1970), aff'g 254 A.2d 62 (Del.
Ch. 1969) (stating that if certain tax payments violated public policy corporate officials
would not be liable if they had "exercised honest business judgment"); cf. Hausman v.
Buckley, 299 F.2d 696, 705-06 (2d Cir.) (applying New York law, court refused to substitute
"public policy" for established conflict of laws principles), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962).
347 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974) (discussed at text accompanying notes 232-35 supra).
348 See text accompanying note 234 supra.
349 64 Misc. 343, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (1909) (discussed at text accompanying notes 250-51
supra).
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policy." 350 Although this is a questionable progression, 351 it is
undeniably true that the Roth holding is broad and cannot be
confined by limiting concepts such as that of "protected class." In
Roth, the court wrote bluntly:
For reasons of public policy, we are clearly of the opinion that
payments of corporate funds for such purposes as those disclosed in
this case must be condemned, and officers of a corporation making
them held to a strict accountability and be compelled to refund the
amounts so wasted for the benefit of stockholders .... To hold any
other rule would be establishing a dangerous precedent, and tacitly
countenancing the wasting of corporate funds for purposes of cor352
rupting public morals.
But, it is not clear that Miller resurrects Roth to such an extent
that even legal conduct may be the basis for liability by virtue of
being against public policy. Because Miller dealt with an alleged
violation of a criminal statute, and the particular violation could
exist only if "legitimate business justifications did not underlie
the alleged inaction of the defendant directors," 353 Miller need not
be read so broadly.
Nonetheless, it might be. Despite the theoretical inability of
federal courts to make substantive state corporate law, after Miller,
it once again is conceivable that courts might hold corporate
officials liable for acts taken in the corporation's interest that, although not unlawful, still offend a court's sense of morality or
350 507 F.2d at 762.

351 It is questionable both because Abrams never cites Roth and because Roth's continuing relevance seems doubtful.
352 64 Misc. at 346, 118 N.Y.S. at 353. Thus, given this strict construction of the statute,
Miller's bottom line is 'much closer to the narrow interpretation of Abrams v. Allen
suggested above than it is to Roth's expansive holding. Given that Miller requires the
plaintiff to prove an absence of business justification, the question still left open by the
decision is what constitutes a "legitimate business justification." For example, would fear
of reprisal against the corporation justify non-collection of the outstanding debt? One
recent derivative suit case has concluded that the plaintiff has the "burden of showing
ulterior or wrongful directors' purposes lacking business justification" and that defendants
may escape liability if they can show a "legitimate, if not compelling, business purpose
for the transaction." See Heine v. The Signal Companies, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FM.. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) [95,898, at 91,317, 91,322 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). This suggests that
where there is an overlap between a purpose that is offensive to public policy and
one that is not, defendants will have an adequate defense, even if the Abrams doctrine
is revised.
353 507 F.2d at 765.
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public policy. Assuming that courts may have such a weapon within their reach to enforce higher standards of corporate morality, the
next issue becomes unavoidable: should they use it?
Before the doctrine announced by Roth and exhumed by Miller
is fully revived, however, some objections merit consideration
which suggest that the judicial orphan discovered in the bullrushes
by the Third Circuit in Miller is more likely to be Rosemary's
Baby than the pathfinder to the promised land of corporate responsibility. These objections to this "public policy" approach
materialize from at least four distinct perspectives. From an historical standpoint, the idea that public policy supplies sufficiently
clear standards to justify retroactive imposition of liability upon
corporate officials seems increasingly to belong to an earlier and
simpler era, when it was easier to conceive of "public policy" as
composed of a set of self-evident, generally accepted propositions.
This platonic view of public policy seems untenable in today's
world of competing policy goals, which more and more frequently
show a tendency to come into conflict. For example, our national
policy favoring the rapid development of energy resources coexists
at best uneasily with our national policy of preserving the environment. Similarly, a corporation may violate public policy by failing
to pursue affirmative action vigorously, while pursuing the same
goals too vigorously may constitute reverse discrimination. Unavoidably, corporations live today in the crossfire of conflicting
public policies. To place individual directors in this same exposed position is not only inequitable, but, given the rate of change
in social mores, may subject them to what is essentially an ex post
facto standard of accountability.
From the perspective of political science, a second objection to
the doctrine is its casual disregard for the value of pluralism in our
society. A number of commentators 354 have suggested that the
corporation as a major institution in our society must be recognized
as a mainstay of its pluralism. By its existence, it decentralizes the
exercise and accumulation of power within our society, affecting
a degree of separation between economic and political decisionmaking. Whether this is desirable may, of course, be debated354 This "pluralism" theme has been ably articulated by Kingman Brewster. See
Brewster, The Corporation and Economic Federalism, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN
SoclEry 72, 75-76 (E. Mason ed. 1959). For a more recent example, see Eells, Foreword
to C. BROWN, supra note 9, at xxii.
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although in the context of a post-Watergate society, such a separation of political and economic power riay well represent one of
the most important checks and balances on the ability of any group
to monopolize power. In any event, while it may be irritating to
some that those who possess economic power are not always easily
amenable to majoritarian political controls, courts should be cautious before initiating on their own any significant alteration in the
balance of power between the corporation and other countervailing forces. Other values hang in the balance. Yet, just such a
realignment of that balance is precisely what the public policy
doctrine would accomplish. By making directors individually
liable under a vague and shifting standard of liability, special interest groups could, by making an insignificant investment in the
corporation, threaten derivative litigation over any action that
transgressed their conception of public policy. Even if we should
discount the in terrorem effect of such a threat because of the
probability that courts ultimately would interpret the public policy doctrine cautiously, there remains the likelihood "that courts
would only infrequently receive opportunities to supervise and
domesticate their new doctrine. Strong incentives exist to settle
shareholders' derivative litigation. 5 - Thus, the doctrine's real significance might lie, not in the power it would give courts, but in
its threat potential, in the resulting leverage that it would give
plaintiffs for settlement negotiations. The net effect might be comparable to the effect that would result from adopting the recent
Nader proposals to grant seats on the board to these same special
interests. 5 The point here is not that corporations should be
beyond public control, but that the kind of control which results
355 Under the Model Business Corporation Act, the settlement of a derivative suit does
not require judicial approval, and such a settlement may provide for the payment by the
corporation of the plaintiff's attorney's fees. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORe. AcT § 5 (1971).
Such private settlements frequently are motivated by the coupled desires of the plaintiff's
counsel for a substantial fee and of the defendants to avoid payment of a large settlement
to the corporation. In addition under section 5(b), if there is an out-of-court settlement,
the corporation may indemnify the defendants for their expenses without court approval.
Id.
356 While hard evidence is unavailable, it is noteworthy that observers have found
most corporations shunning even permissible political activity in the wake of the recent
spate of disclosure and lawsuits. See' Bashful Business: Despite Liberal Laws Most Companies Shun "Partisan"Politicking, Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1976, at I, col. 1. It seems a likely
inference that this tendency towards overcompensation would be greatly magnified were
the "public policy doctrine" adopted.
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from the threat of litigation is itself perversely unaccountable because it is too invisible to be either measured or supervised. Among
its roles, the corporation is society's advocate for the values of
efficiency and an economically rational allocation of resources. To
the extent that these values have to be subordinated to other, more
human values (as at times they must), the balancing process should
be open to public scrutiny and arrived at through the conflict of
countervailing institutions (in part so that legislative modification
of such compromises is possible). Yet what the public policy doctrine would essentially accomplish is to pit ideological plaintiffs
against risk-averse defendants. Such a conflict is unequal because
of the difference in motivations: having to choose between a trial
and a settlement, the defendant director cannot be relied upon to
fight. The result may be the same chilling effect upon the corporation's advocacy of efficiency that might result from the "politicalization" of the corporation.
The third perspective for criticizing the public policy approach
is the traditional legalistic concern about usurpation of the legislature's function. Consider the example, suggested by one proponent
of the public policy doctrine, of a court utilizing the doctrine
to prohibit corporations from relocating their plants from urban
areas to nonurban areas, because of the adverse impact of such
movement on minority employment.3 57 In such an instance, a
court would be confronted with a plea for private subsidization of
a public goal (i.e., the alleviation of minority unemployment)
based on an inference of public policy that the court is asked to
derive from imprecise congressional and administrative pronouncements on employment discrimination. Arguably, directors should
(and sometimes clearly do) weigh such public policy considerations, but before a court either requires, or holds them liable for
declining to grant, such a private subsidy, it should consider two
objections. First, because the costs of such a subsidy are likely to
be reflected in higher prices, this example again reminds us of
the invisibility of the process by which directors might be deterred
from acting in what they considered to be the corporation's best
interests. Accountability is nowhere more lacking than under a
system where neither a court nor the legislature is in a position to
assure itself that the costs of the subsidy do not outweigh its bene357 Friedman, The Public Interest Derivative Suit: A Proposal for Enforcing Corporate
Responsibility, 24 CAsE W. Ras. L. REv. 294, 310-11 (1973).
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fits. Moreover, it would be simplistic to portray the conflicting interests implicated by such an assertion of the public policy doctrine
as simply those of the corporation in profit maximization versus
those of the society in attaining the public goal of greater minority
employment. Society is not that monolithic; the interests of consumers, of creditors, of the rural areas that would receive the enhanced employment are all involved and yet unrepresented when
decisions are made based on the threat of litigation. Secondly, the
more aggressive proponents of the public policy doctrine employ a
dubious assumption that when the legislature spoke in a limited
fashion to a problem, it simply overlooked the possibilities for
more thorough-going reform. In truth, of course, legislatures often
find piecemeal reforms the better part of political valor, and the
toleration of even obvious inconsistencies can be at the heart of a
political compromise. Thus, by extrapolating broad and specific
rules from vague statements of legislative purpose, the public
policy doctrine reverses the normal rules of statutory construction
that, if anything, a negaiive inference should result from a precise,
but limited, legislative pronouncement.
A final criticism emerges from the perspective of organization
theory. If it is clear that difficult decisions are often avoided by
everyone within a hierarchy, the strong tendency in uncertain circumstances being to delegate, 358 then the policy implication of
this observation is that a belief among board members that all
issues of public policy were referrable to a court for resolution
actually would hamper the development of a greater awareness
and sense of responsibility by the board. In addition, permitting
public interest plaintiffs to take all such issues to court might
prompt the board to view decisions with an eye toward their
appearance in future litigation. Once this happens, substance
yields to cosmetics, and we have installed not a stronger superego,
but only an additional public relations arm.
4.

A Preliminary Evaluation

With our scouting trip into the thicket of the common law now
half complete, it is time to take an initial inventory. We have encountered several theories by which shareholders' derivative suits
could redress corporate misconduct, although each involves signifi358 W. MORRIS,

supra note 1, at 53.

1198

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 63:1099

cant doctrinal obstacles. Courts could (1) declare any statutory
violation to be a per se breach of fiduciary duty, (2) impose on
corporate officers a comprehensive duty to disclose such misconduct
to the board, (3) require through negligence theories that corporate officials develop adequate internal monitoring systems, or (4)
adopt the public policy doctrine foreshadowed by Miller.
But should they? Here, it is useful to return to our earlier dichotomy of "moralistic" versus "pragmatic" legal responses. While
the monitoring and disclosure duties would involve pragmatic organizational changes, the strict liability and public policy strategies
are essentially substantive and "moralistic." The first priority of
these moralistic theories is to condemn illicit conduct, regardless
of whether condemnation will prevent it. Without restating the
arguments made earlier, it seems fair to say that these latter approaches ignore the organizational subtleties of the modern large
corporation.
In addition, a basic choice arising here is whether we want to
assign the primary responsibility for policing corporate misconduct
to the board or to the shareholder. Maximizing the shareholder's
role, through approaches such as the public policy doctrine, may
well correspondingly weaken the board's role. Strengthening the
shareholder's litigating posture may diminish what is potentially
the strongest positive incentive the board has to dissolve information blockages: its authority to reject derivative litigation as not in
the best interest of the corporation.35 9 The two roles are not mutually exclusive, but a primacy must be assigned. Clearly, "moralistic" approaches favor the shareholder-based model, while the
other approaches place principal reliance upon the board as the
corporation's embryonic superego.
If one accepts this premise that a conscious choice must be made
between a shareholder-based and a board-based model of corporate
accountability, then organization theory suggests that the board
model be given relative priority, because the board is far better
situated and equipped to monitor. Although from the standpoint of fiduciary ideology the stockholder is the beneficiary
whose rights the system is designed to protect (and hence is the
appropriate vehicle for enforcing greater corporate responsibility),
the picture is quite different when seen from the empirical per359

See text accompanying note 448 infra.
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spective of those who have studied behavior in large organizations.
Viewed from this angle, the stockholder becomes an outsider, a
stranger whose interference those within the system will resent,
and a force too remote in terms of organizational distance to monitor effectively. Indeed, Williamson's central contention is that the
modern corporation has already developed its own system of internal self-discipline (based principally on the auditing and capital
allocation powers of senior management), one that outperforms
even the discipline that the marketplace can provide.3 60 For our
purposes, the problem is how to transfer sufficient control over this
capability from senior management to an independent board.

C.

Corporate Counsel Rebuts: A Survey of the Defenses

In response to the foregoing theories of liability available to a
plaintiff stockholder challenging alleged corporate misconduct, a
defendant director might raise a number of defenses. These include (1) the "good faith" defense of reliance upon counsel's advice; (2) the defense of "duress"; (3) the defense of proximate

causation and, in particular, the New York "net loss" rule; and (4)
the "business judgment" defense that arises when "independent"
directors decide that it is not in the corporation's best interests to
pursue litigation against allegedly errant employees.3 6 1 This section
will examine each of these in turn, considering its common-law
basis, its utility in terms of our earlier diagnosis of corporate malfunctioning, and any appropriate limiting conditions within the

reach of the common law that might be placed on these defenses
in order to enhance our ability to influence organizational behavior.

1. The Defense of Reliance upon Counsel Versus the "Duty to
Disclose"
A corporate official who takes action in reliance upon counsel's
advice that the action is permissible currently is relatively immune
360

See

MARKErs AND HIERARCHIES,

supra note 1, at xv-xvii, 137-48.

361 Calling these legal doctrines "defenses" is technically incorrect, because in several

instances they involve issues for which the plaintiff has the burden of proof in order to
establish a prima facie case. Nevertheless, they are legal arguments that defendant directors
predictably will raise either to justify or to exculpate themselves when corporate misconduct has been found.
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from attack by a shareholder's derivative suit.3 62 As courts are fond
of saying, directors are not insurers.
The defense, however, is not available every time a corporate
official violates a law in reliance on the advice of a lawyer. A recent
comprehensive survey of cases discussing such reliance has concluded that to make out the defense, the defendant must prove:
(1) that the defendants reasonably believed counsel to be competent in the area covered by the advice; (2) that counsel received
full disclosure of the relevant facts; (3) that the advice pertained
to matters of law and was not general business advice; and (4) that
the defendants in fact relied upon the advice.3 63 These principles
indicate that reliance upon counsel will not always prevail as a
defense in the corporate misconduct context. Some misconduct
cases are likely to involve a corporate official who either relied
upon an attorney inexperienced in the relevant area of the law,
failed to inform the attorney of all the embarrassing details, sought
the advice only after a final decision had been made, relied upon
casual advice, or engaged in counsel shopping until he received the
desired advice.
Still, the foregoing limitations do not appear to represent major
inroads on the defense. Unfortunately, it is exactly in the most
egregious cases, where the client has a cooperative counsel willing
to engage in the necessary charade, that the defense seems the most
easily invoked. Thus, because the reliance upon counsel defense
enables one private party to exculpate another from civil liability,
a potential for abuse clearly exists. Recent judicial decisions have
indicated the possibility of a fifth limitation on the defense, one
which partially responds to this potential for abuse: a requirement
that the advising attorney not be known to be subject to a conflict
of interest.
362 See Pool v. Pool, 22 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 1945); Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum
& Transp. Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944); Gilbert v. Burnside, 13 App. Div.
2d 982, 216 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1961), afj'd, 11 N.Y.2d 960, 183 N.E.2d 325, 229 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1962);
Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1942), aff'd mem., 267
App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944); Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 328. Most of these
cases have involved alleged violations of the duty of due care in committing the corporation to an illegal course of action. The courts have upheld the defense even though the
corporation itself would not have invoked it, because the statutes violated (typically
the antitrust laws) required no element of willfulness. The defense has also been recognized
where the alleged fiduciary breach involved the duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Spirt v. Bechtel,
232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956).
363 See Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 328, at 19-37.
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In Fogel v. Chestnutt," the Second Circuit confronted the same
conflict of interest issue present in Moses v. Burgin:365 whether a
mutual fund investment adviser had a duty to seek recapture of
brokerage commissions. In Fogel, the board of the fund did not
seek recapture, relying upon the opinion of the investment adviser's house counsel that the recapture would have violated applicable stock exchange rules. The advising attorney was house
counsel, officer, director, and part owner of the investment adviser,
which would have been injured by such a recapture policy. In a
subsequent shareholders' derivative suit challenging this decision,
when the defendants asserted the defense of reliance upon counsel,
the Second Circuit denied the defense because of the attorney's
conflict of interest. The court's refusal to protect reliance upon advice from such an interested source is consistent with the traditional limitations on the defense, which stem from the recognition
that reasonable people do not rely on such self-serving advice.366
Although Fogel can be limited to its fact situation of a highly
partisan source, the subsequent case of Papilsky v. Berndt 117 cannot be confined so easily in its holding. Papilsky involved virtually
the same facts as Fogel, except that the legal advice relied upon
came not from a dubious source, but from a distinguished New
York law firm. Further, the advice was not equivocal. Judge
Frankel characterized it as both "adamant" and given in "earnest
good faith." 368 In rejecting the reliance upon counsel defense, he
noted first that the law firm, by representing both the adviser and
the mutual fund, "was counseling people with contrary interests." 3"' Second, he noted that the defendants had orchestrated
carefully the timing and manner of presentation of its legal advice,
so as to reinforce their own business advice against seeking recap364

533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976).

365 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). Moses is discussed at text

accompanying notes 266-69 supra.
366 In other words, both the "reliance" and the "competent counsel" elements of the
defense were lacking. See SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1959); Hawes &
Sherrard, supra note 328, at 20-29, 35-36. In Fogel, the Second Circuit suggested that the
"investigation of . . . legal consequences" should have been performed by "disinterested
counsel furnished to the independent directors." 533 F.2d at 750.
367 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,627 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
36S Id. at 90,133. However, Judge Frankel also characterized the advice as "inadequate,"
because of its "exceedingly 'casual'" nature.
369 Id.
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ture.7 Arguably then, Papilsky expands the Fogel rule so that it is
applicable not simply to the infrequent fact situation of a financially interested counsel, but also to the recurring situation of a
counsel subject to a conflict of interests.
It would be tempting to discover a new lever for reform by
framing the rule that emerges from these cases to be that reliance
on advice from a counsel known to the recipient to be subject to a
conflict of interest will not give rise to a valid defense. But, such a
rule seems too broad. Although language in Fogel discredits reliance on advice "from a lawyer having a personal stake adverse to
the shareholders," 371 the dimensions of this "personal stake" test
are uncertain and potentially greater than the court intended. For
example, it is difficult to distinguish meaningfully the "personal
stake" of a lawyer-stockholder in his investment from the "personal
stake" of a house counsel in his future employment or an outside
counsel in future fees, both of which may depend on the corporate
official who desires a favorable opinion. Economically, the counsel
in Fogel (who appears to have been an investor of some means)
was probably more independent than the typical assistant house
counsel, who may feel pressure to deliver a favorable opinion that
will immunize his superiors.
If this conflict of interest limitation on the reliance upon counsel
defense is inappropriate, how should Fogel and Papilsky be interpreted? A narrower interpretation of these cases begins at the
starting point supplied by Moses v. Burgin: "inside" directors and
other corporate officers owe a "duty of full disclosure of information" to the independent members of the board "in every area
where there [is] even a possible conflict of interest between their
interests and the interests of the fund." 372 As an element of this
duty of full disclosure in conflict situations, Moses identified an
obligation of "effective communication." .73Fogel defined this obligation as a duty to investigate all possible courses of action with
"an eye eager to discern them rather than shut against them." "'
370 Id. at 90,133-35. The action against the unaffiliated directors in Papilsky had
already been dismissed on procedural grounds. Id. at 90,122. The court thereby avoided
the question of whether outside directors could be held liable because of inadequate legal
advice to them. Suggestively, the case against the outside directors similarly was dismissed
in Moses v. Burgin. See 445 F.2d at 384.
371 533 F.2d at 749.
372 445 F.2d at 376.
373 Id. at 377.
374 533 F.2d at 749.
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Against this ba;ckdrop, both Fogel and Papilsky appear to say that
even if the board is receiving competent legal advice, the inside directors and other corporate officers have an obligation to communicate the opposing views of the SEC and the stock exchanges so as
not to "discourage any independent inquiry" by the unaffiliated
directors. In this light, the holding of these cases may have less to
do with the problem of biased legal advice than with the limited
relevance of reliance upon counsel as a defense to a breach of the
duty to "effectively communicate" all possible options to the board.
This latter interpretation of Fogel and Papilsky finds support in
subsequent cases that seem to have retreated from the suggestion
that a conflict on the attorney's part can preclude reliance on his
advice. Tannenbaum v. Zeller 37 5 presented the Second Circuit
with a situation identical to Fogel, except that the law firm's opinion letter advising that the board could forego recapture also
fairly summarized the contrary views of the SEC and the stock exchanges. In holding that this constituted "effective communication," the court stated that "[t]he fact that counsel were not disinterested does not violate the reasonableness of the judgment which
the independent directors reached here." 376

In sum, when corporate officers have the duty to effectively
communicate all options to the board, it would seem that reliance
upon counsel supplies adequate justification for nondisclosure to
outside directors only in those rare instances in which counsel's
advice proves false because of a sudden and unexpected change in
the law. When, however, a transition in the law is foreshadowed
by the usual storm signals of legal change, the defense of reliance
upon counsel should not be available to corporate insiders in conflict situations who are aware of those signals, because evaluation
members
of competing legal theories is a task for the independent
3 77
of the board (and their special counsel) to perform.

95,900 (2d Cir. 1977).
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
Id. at 91,345. In an amicus brief, the SEC, while critical of some of the reasons
advanced by the directors, also concluded that the judgment had been reasonable under all
the circumstances. See also Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (distinguishing Papilsky and approving of an attorney serving as one of the special counsel
to the independent directors, althouglh the attorney was technically an "interested person"
under section 2 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iv)
(1970), because of his firm's recent representation of the fund).
377 To a considerable extent the debate between the private bar and the SEC during
the late 1960's and early 1970's over the necessity of brokerage recapture resembles the
375
376
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But when does this duty of effective communication arise? The
conservative interpretation is that the basis for Moses v. Burgin
and its progeny was the special provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, which essentially create a federal law of fiduciary
duties uniquely applicable to investment companies.3 8 But this
narrow interpretation seems incomplete. Three distinct theories
support extending the duty to communicate effectively from investment companies to other publicly held corporations.
First, Moses v. Burgin did not assume that the duty to disclose
was a special creation of the Investment Company Act, unknown to
the common law. The case actually assumed that the majority rule
under the common law probably would produce an equivalent
result." 9 Support for such a common-law rule is not hard to find. 8"
To be sure, all of the investment company cases from Moses to
Tannenbaum have emphasized the special nature of investment
companies and their greater opportunities for conflicts of interest
and self-dealing.38 ' But, this factor should only heighten the duty
current debate between the same parties over the materiality of improper corporate activities. This being so, "inside" corporate officials seeking a release, ratification, or decision
not to sue from their own boards of directors might be found to have the same duty of
"effective communication." And, for counsel's advice to provide a defense, it may have to
summarize adequately the opposing arguments.
378 Both the First Circuit in Moses and the Second Circuit in Fogel and Tannenbaum
have relied upon two provisions of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52
(1970 & Supp. V 1975), for this principle: (1) section 10, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1970), which
requires that not less than 40% of the board of an investment company be composed
of "non-interested" persons; and (2) section 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970), authorizing
federal courts to grant civil recovery for "breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct." With respect to the duty of disclosure, primary reliance has been placed on
section 10. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH)
95,900 (2d Cir. 1977); Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 376-77 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). Both circuits agreed that the purpose of the unaffiliated director requirement of the Investment Company Act would be "subverted" if the unaffiliated directors were not furnished with sufficient information to enable them to
participate effectively in the management of the investment company. This theory dates
back to an earlier SEC decision, Imperial Financial Services, Inc., [1964-1966 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) M77,287, at 82,464 (SEC 1965).
379 In Moses, the First Circuit noted that a conflict of interest "routinely calls for disclosure quite apart from any special burden that may be implicit in the Investment Company Act." 445 F.2d at 383. In this light, the effect of the Investment Company Act was
largely to eliminate the possibility that Massachusetts law might have produced a
different result, given its hostility to derivative suits. The court found that section 36 of the
Act gave federal courts jurisdiction to enforce federal standards. Id. at 373.
380 See, e.g., cases cited at note 270 supra.
381 See, e.g., 445 F.2d at 376 (noting that "self-dealing is not the exception but ..
the
order of the day"); Tannenbaum v. Zeller, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
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and not create it. In addition, in the wake of the illegal payments
reports, revelations of self-dealing have surfaced with such frequency 38 2 that today there is less reason to view investment companies as unique. Even if the concept of conflict of interest is given
a narrow definition in terms of existing or contingent liabilities to
the corporation, it is clear that an employee who recklessly or negligently undertakes an illegal act on behalf of a corporation may be
liable to the corporation for resultant losses. Once this is said, the
failure to disclose to the board can itself be viewed as a decision in
which the employee has a conflict of interests (stemming from a
desire to hide his contingent liability). 3 Because the majority of
(CCH) M95,900, at 91,327; Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities
of Unaffiliated Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1058, 1059-60 (1967).
382 Several recent SEC enforcement actions have shown corporate officials to be receiving
undisclosed income and fringe benefits from their corporations. Those Business Payoffs
Didn't All Go Abroad; Bosses Got Some Too, Wall St. J., May 2, 1977, at 1, col. 6. See
also SEC v. Potter Instrument Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,924 (D.D.C. 1977).
383 One recent decision may seem at first glance to challenge this generalization that the
nondisclosure of a corporate official's involvement in misconduct gives rise to a conflict
between his interests and those of the corporation (which might then trigger the rule of
Moses v. Burgin). In Falkenberg v. Baldwin, [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,086, at 91,911 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the plaintiffs in a derivative suit against officials and
auditors of Uniroyal, Inc. alleged that nondisclosure of illegal payments and of a pattern
of sex discrimination at one plant created a conflict of interests between the defendants and
the corporation. The court began its analysis by recognizing the significance of such a
conflict: "In the ordinary situation, the knowledge of the board of directors or officers
provides the protection to the shareholders against the kind of fraud the securities laws
proscribe. Such protection is nonexistent, however, if a conflict of interest impedes the
flow of information." Id. at 91,911. On the facts pleaded, however, the court said no
such conflict existed, since the "only possible 'interest' alleged on the part of the officers
or directors is a desire to remain in office." Id. Then it added: "This interest may be
attributed universally to boards of directors and officers of corporations and is not a
basis for a claim of conflict with the interests of the corporation." Id.
Is the conflict of interest that we are postulating here similarly "universal" and at
bottom based on nothing more than the desire to stay in office? For two reasons, the opinion in Falkenberg indicates that that court would not have reached such a result in our
context. First, in contrast to Falkenberg, where the court found no "pecuniary interest"
involved, there is certainly a real threat of liability of the official to the corporation when,
through negligence or poor judgment, he exposes it to a penalty or loss. Second, and
more importantly, all the directors in Falkenberg were found to have been aware of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct. The issue there was the almost
metaphysical one of whether their knowledge could be imputed to the company; if it
could not, the corporation arguably had a cause of action under rule lOb-5, which then
could be asserted by the derivative suit plaintiff. In our proposed case, however, the official has withheld information from the board, in part for a pecuniary motive; thus, in
the Falkenberg court's phrase, he has "imped[ed] the flow of information" and has

1206

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 63:1099

illegal payments cases thus seem to involve conflicts of interest, the
presumption of Moses, that if disclosure had been made to it the
board would have acted differently, can be stretched to apply.
A second theory for the extension of Moses v. Burgin's rule is
that of implied representation. Although the requirement of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 that a mutual fund's board contain a requisite percentage of "non-interested" directors is a
unique legislative rule, prevailing practice among large public
corporations has caught up to and even surpassed this standard.
Today, a majority of public corporations have boards with a majority of "outside" directors. 84 This development should have legal
significance. With the voluntary adoption of such a precautionary
measure should come the imposition by estoppel of the duty of
"effective communication," which Moses implied accompanied the
legislative requirement of an outside presence. Outside directors
serve, as Professor Bishop once ascerbically phrased it, as "decoy
ducks;" 385 by their presence, investors are lured into having confidence in the corporation. If one accepts this premise, then an
estoppel concept seems appropriate. Because by installing an independent board management impliedly represents to investors
that "outsiders" are in control, this implied representation should
be made binding by judicial recognition of a duty to "effectively
communicate." With the benefits should come the burdens.
Finally, a third theory supporting the same result is appearing on
the long-term horizon. To the extent that the rule in Moses, Fogel,
Papilsky, and Tannenbaum is based on implicit federal fiduciary
standards, those standards soon may be generalized to cover all
public corporations listed on stock exchanges. The SEC has begun
to prod the New York Stock Exchange to consider an "indepen-,
dent" board requirement for listing eligibility.3 86 If the Exchange
undercut the shareholder's normal means of "protection ... against the kind of fraud the
securities laws proscribe." Id.
384 The most recent extensive study of board composition was conducted by Heidrick
and Struggles, a management consulting firm, in September, 1976. Surveying the 1,000
largest United States industrial corporations, it found that more than two-thirds of the
boards were composed of a majority of outsiders, and that the trend towards "outside"
majorities was increasing. HEIDRICK AND STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD: PROFIE. OF
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as THE CHANGING BOARD].
385 Bishop, supra note 16, at 1092.
386 On May 11, 1976, SEC Chairman Roderick Hills wrote New York Stock Exchange

President William Batten to suggest amendment of the Exchange's listing policies to increase the role and percentage of "outside directors on publicly listed companies." SEC
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eventually adopts a rule requiring a majority of the board to be
"outsiders," its approval by the SEC, pursuant to that agency's
authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,387 should

provide the same legal foundation for imposing the "duty to disclose" as did the statutory requirement, under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, that a lesser percentage of a mutual fund's
board be "non-interested." 388 Because the federal securities laws
contemplate an integrated system of regulation, these two statutes
should be construed in pari materiaand the same inferences drawn
from the requirement of disinterested directors. Both statutes impose the requirement to protect shareholders, and in neither case
is the rule effective unless management is forced in conflict situations to disclose fully to the board.
If this "outside" board requirement is adopted, it should be
enforceable by shareholders' derivative suits. Some authority indicates that shareholders may sue directly for breach of a stock exchange rule that injures them. 3 9 The arguments for implying such

a cause of action are strongest where, as here, the stock exchange
rule (1) is a "substitute" for direct SEC regulation, (2) imposes a
duty unknown to the common law, and (3) is intended to protect
a class of persons that includes the stockholder-plaintiff.3 90 But the
potentially complex issue of implied causes of actions under stock
exchange rules does not truly arise here, because the better view,
adopted by most commentators, is that even a state court hearing a
conventional derivative suit must recognize applicable federal
fiduciary standards in measuring the fiduciary obligations of the
defendants.39
PAYMENTs REPORT, supra note 2, Exhibit D. Testifying before a Senate Committee on
June 21, 1976, Hills indicated more specifically that he, and presumably the SEC, favor a
majority "outside" board. See [1976-1977 Transfer Binder) FEn. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
f 80,611 (June 21, 1976).
387 Such SEC approval is required by section 19b of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (Supp. V 1975).
388 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
389 See Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir. 1975); Colonial Realty Corp.
v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). For a discussion of these cases, see note 613 infra.
390 See note 613 infra.
391 See 59 MiCH. L. REv. 904, 912-14, 919-29 (1961). As this comment points out,
this issue has arisen most often in the context of antitrust derivative suits seeking to
recover from corporate officials compensation for the damages assessed against the
corporation. However, in this respect there appears to be little difference between the
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In summary, the reliance on counsel defense should be available
in general. But it is possible that courts could develop a partially
countervailing doctrine: persons subject to a "conflict" have a duty
to disclose all relevant information to the board to avoid a conclusive presumption that the board would have acted differently.
Where such a duty applies, and disclosure is not made, the reliance
upon counsel defense should be rejected. If the concept of "conflict" can be broadened to include, for example, the case of the
corporate president who has made illegal payments and never disclosed them to the board, 392 then we have a legal strategy that forces
information to the top.
2.

The Duress Defense: The CorporationAs Victim

In 1936, Paramount Pictures had just emerged from a bankruptcy reorganization and faced a shaky future, particularly in its
troubled labor relations. 95 Early in 1936, however, a new labor
agreement was reached, averting a paralyzing strike. But soon
afterwards a union official named Bioff approached Keough,
a senior officer of Paramount, to demand a substantial payoff for
himself and other union officials, threatening that otherwise Paramount would be crippled by strikes. On investigation, Keough
found that other major movie companies also had been approached
and had agreed to comply, that Bioff "was reputed to be a member
of Al Capone's gang," 394 and that a year earlier a rejection of
Bioff's demands had led to serious industry-wide labor unrest in
the Midwest, resulting in the extended closings of many theaters.
federal standards contained in the antitrust laws and the federal standards contained in
the securities laws. While both sets of statutes confer exclusive jurisdiction on the
federal courts, they also give content to the concept of fiduciary duty as it is to be measured by state courts having jurisdiction from another source.
392 Such a corporate official would have a conflict to the extent that his acts are unauthorized or negligent, and create undisclosed contingent liabilities for the corporation.
The officer's personal interest would be to resist disclosure of these acts to the board,
which may have a valid cause of action against him or may wish to remove him because
of the acts.
On a more theoretical level, the findings of Professors Maccoby and Bower indicate that
such risky decisions inherently involve a conflict between the careerist perspective of the
corporate manager, whose primary concern is short-term success, and the long-term
orientation of the more risk-averse reasonable investor. See note 13 supra.
393 The fact pattern being described is from Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 22
Misc. 2d 996, 37 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1942), aff'd, 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E.2d 740 (1944).
394 22 Misc. 2d at 999, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
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Paramount management therefore complied with the demand
after negotiating a 50%0 reduction in the payoff. The Paramount
board (of which Keough was a member) did not learn of these
developments until four years later, when Bioff and his confederates were indicted for labor racketeering. Minority stockholders
then commenced a derivative suit, alleging that the payoff was a
diversion of corporate funds from legitimate corporate purposes
and violated a New York statute prohibiting bribes to labor union
officials.
The decision of the New York Supreme Court in that case,
Hornstein v. ParamountPictures,Inc.,395 reached a number of conclusions that have considerable relevance to contemporary situations such as the Gulf Oil paradigm. First, the court found the
crime of bribery to have two essential elements: (1) a "voluntary"
giving of something of value, and (2) an intent "to influence the
performance of [an] official duty." 396 Finding Bioff to have been an
"extortioner" rather than "the acceptor of a bribe," 397 the court
ruled that the first element of voluntariness had been lacking. But
even if it had been present, the court added that the second element of an attempt to influence an official duty was missing, because Bioff had approached the corporation in a private capacity,
not "in the performance of any duty as a representative of the labor
union." 3"s Finally, turning to plaintiff's last argument that even
"submission to an illegal exaction" was "contrary to public policy"
because it encouraged further such demands, the court squarely
rejected the idea that the corporation had a public duty to resist
illegal demands:
To say that to permit corporate officers to use corporate funds to
buy off racketeers is contrary to public policy because likely to
produce or increase racketeering is appealing to one's sense of
moral principles, but as applied to this case it involves the fallacious
assumptions that business corporations owe a duty to the public to
prevent racketeering at their own expense and that corporate officers
are bound to observe that duty to the public even though it cause
the loss of all the corporate funds committed to their charge. I do not
395 22 Misc. 2d 996, 37 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1942), aff'd, 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E.2d 740 (1944).
396 Id. at 1003, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
397 Id. at 1004, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
398 Id.
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think it can be said that public policy requires that corporate officers
be thus required to serve two masters.399

Hornstein appears then to stand for three propositions that together provide substantial protection for the corporate executive.
First, submission to extortion under duress makes the corporation
a victim, not a coconspirator. Hornstein's liberal definition of duress is particularly important here. Borrowing from contract law,
the court adopted a definition of duress that not only includes
economic pressure, but suggests that the requisite quantum of economic pressure exists whenever there is "fear that otherwise [the
submitter] would suffer a greater detriment." 400 'Whether the
corporation should yield or should offer "stout resistance" was seen
as a decision protected by the business judgment rule.40 ' Second,
the "official duty" limitation in Hornstein would exculpate even
voluntary payments. For example, a payment by a Lockheed official to a Middle East defense minister having procurement responsibilities would constitute bribery under this test, while a payment
399 Id. at 1006, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 415. The court added that submission to such demands
made the corporation the "victim," not the wrongdoer. Because the court's construction
of the statute led to a finding of no violation, Hornstein is not literally a case of knowing
illegality.
The lower court opinion suggests one other exculpatory concept. Paramount, it said,
"did not violate any law of the State governing Paramount's existence." Id. (emphasis
added). This suggests that only some statutes limit the corporation's authority. The same
theory was put forth in Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270
(1942), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944) (discussed at pages 1175-77

supra).
400 22 Misc. 2d at 1006, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 415 (quoting Berg v. Hoffman, 275 N.Y. 132, 134,
9 N.E.2d 806, 808 (1937)). Elsewhere, after citing Williston on Contracts, the court added
that "[t]he characteristic of duress is that the choice is made of the lesser of two evils." Id.
at 1008, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 417 (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70
(1918)).
401 Id.
at 1007, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 417. The court added, however, that "abuses of discretion" could be reviewed.
This resort to contract law principles and the business judgment rule on an issue of
criminal law is probably the weakest aspect of Hornstein, given the existence in the New
York criminal code of a specific duress defense provision that defines duress more narrowly
in terms of yielding to physical force. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.00 (McKinney 1975). That
provision now permits an affirmative defense that the defendant was coerced "by the use
or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force ....
which force or threatened
force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist."
Id. At the time Hornstein was decided, the immediate predecessor of this section required
a showing of "instant death or grievous bodily harm." See id., Practice Commentary.
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to a politician having no official role in procurement, but possessing the de facto power and willingness to block or delay the contract unless paid off, might constitute submission to extortion.
Third, the idea that a corporation has no greater obligation to
resist extortion than a private citizen has to resist blackmail or
usury raises the most sensitive public policy issue touched upon
by Hornstein. If such a principle is unconfined, corporations might
find the best approach to be to yield coyly, after the requisite formality of a pro forma protest. In addition, if the duress defense
were so easy to invoke, it could be combined with the. reliance
upon counsel defense to provide a potentially ironclad protection.
Under the reliance defense, the opinion of an independent, fully
informed counsel that duress rendered a payment not unlawful
would provide an additional penumbra of protection, even when
the payment did not in fact meet Hornstein's test.
Although the preceding analysis might suggest, that Hornstein
should be limited, it is difficult to read the case without some
sympathy for the position of Keough, as well as a sense that at some
point the duress defense should be available to corporations. To be
sure, a large corporation does not much resemble the widows and
orphans who are the typical objects of judicial benevolence. But
the injury to a corporation that is unfairly prevented from conducting its business eventually passes to its stockholders, employees,
creditors, suppliers, and customers, all of whom deserve protection.
The ripple effect of even one major corporate bankruptcy can be
far-reaching. Thus, even if we recognize that directors are expected
to serve as quasi-trustees for a broader constituency than simply
stockholders, the interests of that broader constituency of employees, creditors, suppliers, and customers seem similarly allied.
Where then should the watershed lie in applying Hornstein?
On its facts the case seems correct: faced with insolvency and
threatened by a gangster, a corporation should have authority to
make a "questionable payment," and ambiguous penal statutes
should not be stretched to prevent such a result. A satisfactory
resolution would be to restrict Hornstein to its facts. If this were
done, three atypical aspects of the case could provide parameters
by which to distinguish corporate rape from corporate prostitution.
First, the corporation faced the ultimate form of economic "duress," the threat of bankruptcy, if a strike occurred. Thus, the rule
could be limited to situations involving a risk of an extreme loss or
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possibly a threatened injury severely disproportionate to the payment. Second, the threat was credible, as the previous year's events
had amply demonstrated. Third, the payment by Paramount was
not an attempt to obtain new business, which is the chief evil perceived by those most critical of contemporary corporate behavior. 402
Thus confined, Hornstein might shield corporate officials in situations such as the Gulf crisis in South Korea, which threatened a
$300 million fixed investment. But it would offer no protection
for corporate officials of major arms dealers like Lockheed or
Northrop, who appear to have succumbed to "duress" with the
quiet professionalism of a Xaviera Hollander.
An additional limitation on the duress defense, one that is particularly relevant to our special interest in the problem of information blockages, was clearly recognized by the Hornstein court.
Even if the decision to submit to or resist pressure for payoffs falls
within the business judgment rule, it does not follow that the
judgment should be made by a subordinate corporate official, such
as Keough. If the corporate superego is to function adequately, it
is exactly such decisions that must be forced upwards. In Hornstein, this facet of the case did not prove fatal to the defendants
because ultimately Keough's actions were ratified by the Paramount board acting with the advice of counsel.0 3 Such nunc pro
tunc involvement of the board as the dispenser of merciful ratifications obviously is less than ideal, and more recent case law might
be read to suggest that prior disclosure is required, on the theory
that such policy decisions belong properly to the board. 40 But, if
the board (or an appropriate subcommittee of outside directors)
could be positioned in the corporate structure so that all within
402 Suggesting that we limit Hornstein so that it does not apply to attempts to obtain
"new business" forces us to define that term. At what point is the business no longer
"new"? When does the expectancy that a corporation has in a profitable contract or
project sufficiently ripen that the corporation is justified in protecting its interest by submitting to extortionate demands? To ignore this problem is to create an exculpatory rule
capable only of protecting companies in capital intensive industries (such as the Gulf
and United Brands situations) and not those in service or construction industries.
Perhaps the appropriate test to apply here is that suggested by the law of contracts: look
to whether the corporation has substantially changed its position in justifiable reliance
upon the contract. Such a test would ignore the usual preparatory costs associated with
bidding on a contract, but would recognize that an expected profit that the corporation
had substantially earned was an interest in property subject to the Hornstein rationale.
403 22 Misc. 2d at 1006-09, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 417-19.
404 See cases cited at note 270 supra; text accompanying notes 266-70 supra.
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the corporate hierarchy perceived it, and it alone, as the only source
of legal immunity for corporate officials who find themselves
caught in such delicate situations, then a relatively powerful positive incentive would exist for information flow to the board.
As a final observation, it cannot be ignored that Hornstein
stands alone as a precedent. It remains uncertain whether courts
in other jurisdictions, influenced by our current post-Watergate
morality, would follow the case today. Nevertheless, Hornstein's
root idea has deep support in the law. The defense of "justification" is recognized by the Model Penal Code, 40 5 and the concept of
"excusable violations" has found growing acceptance in the law of
torts.40 0
3.

The Proximate Cause Defense and the Net Loss Rule

Before imposing liability on a corporate official, courts have required a higher showing of causation than simply the demonstration that "but for" a given act or omission, the loss in question
would not have been experienced. Instead, courts have applied the
familiar proximate cause standard of tort law, requiring a sufficiently close connection between the culpable aspect of the defendant's conduct and the damage sustained by the corporation to
assure that no intervening cause was more directly responsible.0 7
In the context of corporate misconduct, a defendant might raise
this issue of proximate causation in any of three basic fact patterns.40 8 First, where the defendant's liability is to be predicated
3.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
400 See text accompanying notes 241-45 supra.
407 For an excellent description of the shifting trends in the case law on this issue, see
Dyson, The Director's Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 358-67 (1965). Cases in
which the defense of lack of causation has exempted directors include Hoehn v. Crews, 144
F.2d 665 (10th Cir.), aff'd, 324 U.S. 200 (1944); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y.
1924) (L. Hand, J.); Wallach v. Billings, 277 I1. 218, 115 N.E. 382 (1917); Allied Freightways v. Cholfin, 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (Mass. 1950).
408 It must be noted that the proximate cause defense seems to have lost much of its
earlier potency, possibly reflecting shifting public attitudes toward corporations and increased concern about corporate misconduct. Some modern cases appear to conclude that
all that must be shown is that the directors "abdicated" their responsibilities. See, e.g.,
Neese v. Brown, 218 Tenn. 686, 405 S.W.2d 577 (1964). In DePinto v. Provident Security
Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1967), the defendant raised the proximate cause defense, arguing that even if he had made a prudent investigation, he would have discovered
nothing suspicious. 374 F.2d at 43. The court artfully evaded this argument, without discrediting the idea that proximate causation must exist.
However, the proximate cause doctrine does remain alive to an uncertain degree. See
Bellis v. Thal, 373 F. Supp. 120, 133 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd without published opinion, 510
405 MODEL PENAL CODE §
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upon an omission, such as inadequate supervision of a subordinate,
the issue arises of whether the loss would have been averted even
if reasonable diligence had been exercised. Where a reasonably
prudent supervisor would still not have detected the misconduct,
the negligence of a less careful one might be said to have been
causally irrelevant. Second, where the loss is attributable to a
supervening cause, the question becomes whether that intervening
cause was reasonably foreseeable. For example, disclosures of foreign bribes occasionally have resulted in the nationalization of the
bribing corporation's assets in the host country. Depending upon
the given facts, such a sequence of events might be characterized
alternatively either as a predictable response to conceded illegality
(i.e., "the wages of sin") or as the intervention of an independent
cause (the desire of a militant faction in the host country to seize
upon the disclosures as a pretext for nationalization). 40 9 The third
situation raising the proximate cause issue is where the payment is
"defensive," and arguably represents the less severe of two adverse
alternatives. In this situation, a loss already was inevitable, and the
corporate official's actions only mitigated a greater one. Finding a
lack of proximate cause in this situation might supplement the
duress defense (particularly in situations involving clearly illegal
payments, where Hornstein would be inapplicable).
Few cases have considered the proximate cause issue in this
third situation, where the defendant in effect has faced a Hobson's
choice. An exception is Michelsen v. Penney.410 There, Judge
Augustus Hand argued in dissent that directors of a failed national
bank should not be liable for losses on loans made in violation of
certain statutory reserve requirements, because the alternative
they faced, to cease making loans altogether and thereby force the
bank into "early liquidation," was worse. 41 1 As long as the loans
F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1975); Lawson v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 967,
984 (D. Md. 1972) (in both cases, negligent directors held not liable for reduction in value
of certain assets in absence of proof that they "caused any such decline"); W. FLETCHER,
supra note 246, § 1087.1; H. HENN, supra note 246, § 234, at 456.
409 Tracy states that the United Brands bribery disclosures gave Honduran politicians
an "irresistible opportunity to extract valuable concessions from United Brands." Tracy,
supra note 2, at 147. However, it certainly also is arguable that such reactions by now are
sufficiently foreseeable to be within the scope of proximate causation.
410 135 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1943).
411 Id. at 436. Judge Hand agreed that "'but for' the violation of the statute the
loans would not have been made" nor the loss incurred. But he argued that the impairment of the bank's reserves, which made the loans unlawful, was not sufficiently causally
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were prudent, he contended, the directors merely were making the
best of a bad situation. Yet, writing for a divided majority, Judge
Charles Clark found sufficient proximity between the violation and
the loss to impose liability. 412 Elsewhere in that decision, however,
Judges Hand and Clark joined (over Judge Jerome Frank's strong
dissent) to absolve from liability defendants who had participated
in a scheme to place statutorily ineligible directors in office, because they could not see any "causal connection between the act
interdicted and the loss." 413 They sought to distinguish this statutory violation from the other by the fact that the "illegal" directors
had not been "irresponsible." 414 However, this appears equally
true for the "illegal," yet financially sound, loans. The only reasonable distinction to justify the differing legal consequences flowing from these two violations is the degree of remoteness of the
harm from the defendants' actions.4 15 In short, the majority opinion rejects both the argument that the defendants' illegal actions
avoided a greater loss and the counter-argument that, having acted
illegally with at least a reckless disregard for the law, they should
be held liable for all losses thereby caused in fact. Instead, Michelsen shows a sophisticated court turning (albeit on a highly divided
basis) to proximate causation as a mediating doctrine, both to
preserve the flexibility to reach desired results and probably to
respond to unarticulated equitable considerations.
Closely related to the issue of causation is the question of
whether there has been any loss at all. Michelsen adamantly placed
on the plaintiffs the burden of proving the loss flowing from the
violation.416 Some New York cases have gone further, requiring
plaintiffs to prove that the damage from the illegal activity was not
related to the loss. The majority's position, he concluded, unwisely gave directors of the
troubled bank the impossible choice of either becoming guarantors of the loans they unlawfully make or liquidating the bank, a step which the bank regulators had deliberately
refrained from taking. Id.
412 Id. at 419 (citing Restatement of Torts § 286 and noting that the violated statute
was "for the benefit" of the creditors bringing the suit).
413 Id.
414 Id.
415 Although both making the loans and appointing the ineligible directors were unlawful, the proximity between the unlawful act and the loss does seem considerably closer
in the case of the loans. The court also refused to find certain other illegal borrowings to
have caused losses. Id. at 427.
416 Id.
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outweighed by any profits that also resulted.417 In the most recent
and expansive of these cases, the court dismissed a derivative action
against officers of Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, reasoning:
The serious weakness in plaintiff's complaint, whatever the relief
sought may be, lies in the fact that damage in a situation such as is
presented in this complaint may not be presumed from the mere imposition of a fine, the expenditure of specified substantial sums of
money in defending criminal contempt proceedings or the exposure
to anti-trust suits on the part of customers, in the absence of allegations in the complaint excluding the possibility that "Olin" may
have gained more from the price-fixing conspiracy than the amounts
of the fine-paid and the expenditures said to have been incurred or
418
risked.
It is, of course, possible to criticize this "net loss" rule on a number
of grounds. 419 Most vulnerable to attack is its allocation to the
plaintiff of the burden of proving that a known loss was not offset
by possible past profits. That allocation fails to recognize that the
defendants, given their control over the corporation, are relatively
417 See Smiles v. Elfred, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1963, at 14, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.) (discussed at note
418 infra and accompanying text); Borden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1962) (dismissing
complaint alleging $50,000 fine after plea of nolo contendere and threat of treble damage
actions for antitrust violations); Spinella v. Heights Ice Corp., 186 Misc. 996, 62 N.Y.S.2d
263 (1946); cf. Hoffman v. Abbott, 180 Misc. 590, 594-96, 40 N.Y.S.2d 521, 525-27 (1943);
Diamond v. Davis, 263 App. Div. 68, 69, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582, 584 (1941) (specific wrongful
acts and resulting losses must be alleged). In each of these cases, the court ruled that no
damage to the corporation is to be inferred from antitrust violations. Because the treble
damage provisions of the antitrust laws make the costs of an antitrust violation more
likely to outweigh its benefits than other kinds of statutory violations, the rule of these
cases would seem to apply a fortiori to illegal payments situations, where the sanctions are
less.
An analogous "out of pocket" damage rule seems to have evolved under the federal
securities laws. See Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971); Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 810 (5th Cir. 1970); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp. 741,
746-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (profits offsetting losses).
418 Smiles v. Elfred, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1963, at 14, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.) (emphasis in
original). To the extent that the court would also deny prospective injunctive relief
pursuant to the emphasized language, this case seems to represent a minority position.
See W. FLETCHER, supra note 246, § 5823; note 261 supra.
419 For the best discussion of problems in this area, see 64 COLUm. L. REv. 174 (1964).
One New York case has taken a contrary position, but did not discuss its apparent rejection
of the "net loss" rule. See Premselaar v. Chenery, Civil No. 6151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y.
County, Feb. 13, 1963). See also Forte, supra note 271, at 336-39 (approving the "commendable restraint" of courts following this net loss rule).
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better situated to prove the economic consequences of their conduct. Also, considerations of fairness favor placing the burden on
the defendants, because they both have the resources available to
offer any relevant evidence and, as lawbreakers, are not unjustly
420
prejudiced by having to raise the issue as an affirmative defense.
In response, the defendant can argue that allocating the burden
of proving a net loss to the plaintiff may conform with the practice
of assigning the burden of proof to "the party alleging the less
probable alternative," 421 if most illegal corporate practices are
profitable. However, this is both a formalistic rule and one inconsistent with the allocation of the burden in such related areas as

transactions involving "interested" directors or the business judg422
ment defense.
But should the "net loss" rule be accepted at all? From a public
policy perspective, it obviously undercuts the deterrent value of
the derivative suit as a means of discouraging corporate misconduct. In addition, these New York cases-although decided by unusually able judges --4 23 reflect historical attitudes towards the derivative suit that now seem dated. During the period that courts

clearly recognized the "net loss" rule,424 the prevailing popular
perception of the derivative suit was as an action brought by a

money-hungry "strike suit" lawyer, who lacked a client with a true
economic interest in the outcome and who was motivated solely by
a contingent fee. Since then, however, an unmistakable shift in
public attitudes towards the derivative suit has taken place so that

today we tend to favor the notion of "private attorneys general." 42
420 64 COLVM. L. REV. 174, 178 (1964) (quoting 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486, at 275 (3d
ed. 1940)).
421 Id. (citing Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12
STAN. L. REV. 5, 12-14 (1959)).
422 Id. See also ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 41 (1971) (permitting an "interested"
director to defend a self-dealing transaction by proving that it was fair).
423 For example, Justice Shientag, the author of Spinella v. Heights Ice Corp., 186 Misc.
996, 62 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1946), also authored Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup.
Ct. 1940), Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1944). and a number of other
important corporate law decisions that cannot be characterized as overly sympathetic to
management.
424 The first decision recognizing the rule was Spinella v. Heights Ice Corp., 186 Misc.
996, 62 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1946). The last was Smiles v. Elfred, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1963,
at 14, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.).
425 This transition was signalled by the Supreme Court's policy-motivated relaxation of
the procedural barriers to a derivative suit in Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363
(1966). See Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74 (1967).
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As a result, it is unclear whether courts in other jurisdictions would
follow these New York cases. The Third Circuit's decision in
Miller v. A T&T 42 is symptomatic of this reversal in attitudes. The
court restrictively read the New York "net loss" rule to mean only
that there must be an allegation of illegal conduct resulting in
427
"independent damage" to the corporation.
Rejection of the "net loss" rule means civil liability is to be imposed on corporate officials for conduct that, although illegal, may
actually have produced economic benefits for the corporation.
Arguably, such a draconian approach, although inspired by the
desire to deter misconduct, results in unjust enrichment of the
corporation, which will recover from its own officials as well as
receive the net benefits of the official's actions. The Supreme
Court's decision in Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor &
Aroostook R.R.4 28 provides major support for this argument that
the imposition of liability in such a context would be inequitable.
In Bangor,a railroad sought to recover against its former owner for
alleged acts of corporate mismanagement and violations of the federal antitrust and securities laws (statutes that are likely to be cited
in any modern case involving corporate misconduct). However,
the present majority shareholder of the plaintiff railroad, who was
the real party in interest, had purchased its shares at a price that
reflected the injury already done to the railroad. Therefore, the
Court held the plaintiff to be estopped on equitable grounds from
maintaining the action either on a common-law or a federal statutory theory of liability, because recovery would produce a "windfall" profit to the majority shareholder.429 Technically, the decision
found the "contemporaneous ownership" requirement of rule
23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to bar the suit.430 But,
in refusing to create an exception to reach a wrongdoer who would
otherwise go unpunished, the Court enunciated several principles
that directly concern us here. First, the Court stated that a loss
suffered by the plaintiff is a prerequisite to a derivative suit, because any other rule would "permit the shareholders to reap a
507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
Id. at 763 n.5. Miller, however, does present a situation in which it is much more
difficult to infer a likely benefit from illegality. This is because political contributions,
unlike price fixing, only sometimes are intended to benefit the corporation financially.
428 417 U.S. 703 (1974).
429 Id. at 711.
430 Id. at 718 n.15.
426

427
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profit from wrongs done to others." 431 It added that the need for
deterrence standing alone is insufficient to justify the imposition
of liability in a derivative sUit.432 Finally, the Court concluded that
fiduciary duties are owed "primarily to those who have a tangible
interest in the corporation," 433 not to the public at large, even
though the public's interests are substantially affected. Although
this hard-nosed attitude split the Court, winning only a bare 5-4
majority, 434 it nonetheless suggests that federal courts may regard
proof of a net gain to the corporation as fatal to any derivative
action for damages.
In response, courts sympathetic to plaintiffs might take a broader
view of the corporate injury involved. A well-known New York
Court of Appeals decision, Diamond v. Oreamuno,435 raised the
possibility of defining the injury expansively to include the stigmatization suffered by the corporation. 43 6 Although Diamond involved not improper payments, but the quite different problem of
insider trading, the court concluded that it could infer from illicit
conduct an injury to the corporation's public image and goodwill.437 In the improper payments context, at least in cases where
431 Id.

432 Id. at 717. The Court relied chiefly on the equitable doctrine announced by then
Judge (later Dean) Roscoe Pound in Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W.
1024 (1903). In rejecting a derivative suit where the plaintiff had suffered no economic loss
from the defendant's wrongdoing. Judge Pound wrote:
It is not the function of courts of equity to administer punishment.... If a wrongdoer deserves to be punished, it does not follow that others are to be enriched at his
expense by a court of equity. A plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own
case, not on the weakness of the defendant's case.
Id. at 673, 93 N.W. at 1035.
433 417 U.S. at 717 n.13. Thus, according to this view, where the stockholders suffer no
injury, damage to the public is apparently not actionable through a derivative suit.
434 The opinion was authored by Justice Powell. Justices Marshall, Brennan, White,
and Douglas dissented.
M 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
436 The Diamond court took a view of the derivative suit that seems contradictory to
that of the Supreme Court in Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Diamond held that "the function
of such an action . . . is not merely to compensate the plaintiff for wrongs committed
by the defendant but. . . 'to prevent them, by removing ..

all inducement ...

Id. at

498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81. Nonetheless, because Diamond dealt with
recovery of a wrongful gain by insiders (i.e., an unjust enrichment situation), rather than
a loss to the corporation, it did not clearly overrule the earlier New York "net loss" cases.
In the typical situation where the "net loss" rule is relevant, no element of self-dealing is
to be expected, particularly where the corporate official intends to benefit rather than
injure the corporation.
437 Id. at 499, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 82 (noting that the corporation "has
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the corporate management has been thoroughly discredited (for
example, Lockheed), some such intangible injury seems obvious.
For example, the corporation may have to increase expenditures
for public relations, or divert valuable management time; it may
lose potential contracts, or have difficulty attracting and retaining
able personnel.
Two objections to this theory are foreseeable. First, the stock
market prices of the corporations' securities generally have not
declined significantly following disclosure of illegal payments.4 38
Second, the problem of measuring with any reasonable certainty
the actual damages from such stigmatization is exceedingly difficult.
In Diamond v. Oreamuno, the court could escape this problem by
measuring damages under the principle of agency law that an
agent must turn over to its principal any profits received from
trading upon inside information.4 39 With improper payments, however, the question involves calculating intangible and inherently
speculative losses, such as the injury to goodwill and the anticipated profits on cancelled contracts, and offsetting them against
ascertainable profits from improper conduct.
Problematic as such a balancing may appear in the abstract, as
a practical matter the outcome is likely to depend on which side
bears the burden of proof. Therefore, a sensible resolution to this
quandary would be to allocate to the defendant the burden of
proving the absence of a net loss. The defendant would have to
prove not only the existence of tangible benefits, but that such
profits were not offset by countervailing intangible losses. If such
a resolution seems too harsh, because proof of such negative facts
is often impossible, a further refinement is possible. If the affirmative defense of no "net loss" fails, under traditional principles the
burden of proof could shift back to the plaintiff to prove his actual
damages. The court still might disregard intangible or highly speculative losses on the basis of insufficient proof.440 In short, injury to
goodwill might be considered for purposes of establishing liability,
but not for computing damages. The primary practical effect of
a great interest in maintaining a reputation of integrity, 'an image of probity, for its
management and in insuring the continued public acceptance and marketability of its
stock").
438 See notes 567-69 infra.
439 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388, Comment c (1957).
440 See 64 COLUM. L. REV. 174, 176 nn.8 & 9 (1964).
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such a shifting burden of proof might be to encourage settlements.
But when a settlement does not result, such an approach would
maximize the court's ability to reach a result it considers equitable
on the facts. And, in many instances, the rule would result in the
defendant's accountability for the exact amount of the improper
payment-a result that may have some degree of equity.
The foregoing attempt to strike a compromise between Diamond
and Bangor should not blind us, however, to the irreconcilable
theoretical conflict between the two decisions. Diamond justifies
imposing liability solely for the purpose of prevention,44 ' while
Bangor equally emphatically rejects such a focus in favor of compensation. 442 This issue of end purpose-deterrence versus com-

pensation-has long troubled the contiguous field of tort law.
Within that related field, Professor Calabresi has demonstrated
that when the law seeks only to compensate accident victims, its
foundation is inadequate. Prevention must be a coequal goal.44
Therefore, Calabresi argues that wrongdoers should be "punished
for wrongful acts quite apart from whether they ... compensate
victims." 444 Penalties should be imposed, he argues, for creating

risks even when there has been no accident, 4 5 a position that is the
See note 436 supra.
See note 432 supra. In the debate between Diamond and Bangor, much hangs on
the choice of words used to characterize the position one is rebutting. While Diamond
speaks of "prevention," Bangor uses the term "punishment" and thus finds it easier
to announce that courts should not inflict "punishment" at the behest of uninjured
stockholders in the absence of legislative instructions to do so.
443 G. CALABREsi, THE CosT oF ACCIDENTs 37-45 (1970). This oversimplifies Professor
Calabresi's terminology, which recognizes three distinct goals: (1) "primary cost avoidance"
(roughly, the goal of reducing the number and severity of accidents), (2) "secondary
cost avoidance" (the goal of reducing the societal costs resulting from accidents through
loss spreading and insurance), and (3) the "tertiary" goal of reducing accident avoidance
costs and administrative expenses. Id. at 39-67, 68-129, 224-26.
444 Id. at 302-03.
445 Id. at 306. Professor Calabresi's basic argument here (which seems equally applicable
to the corporate context) is that there are not simply two parties to an accident, but
broader social interests involved that require that our primary focus be on institutionalizing an effective system of deterrence. In addition, Calabresi suggests that where hazards
are created and no accident results, the penalties assessed should be paid into a tort
fund to compensate the predictable future victims of similar hazards. Id. While this idea
is less applicable to the corporate context (where the need to compensate is less urgent
and the idea of corporate officials contributing to a fund which would compensate stockholders of other corporations is less appealing), such a tort fund could be redirected and
used to create goodwill for the corporation (for example, by funding its charitable contribution budget).
441

442
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functional equivalent of imposing liability in the corporate context
where the corporation has not suffered a loss. Of course, one problem with applying this notion simplistically in the corporate context is that the activity deterred might not be fiduciary misconduct,
but rather the high risk occupation of being a corporate director.44
Nevertheless, the arguments for giving coequal status to the goals
of deterrence and compensation seem impregnable. Thus, because
the Bangor decision poses a serious roadblock to the pursuit of
deterrence, and because the dangers of excessive deterrence are
probably more serious here than in the arena of accident law, we
are reminded that the common law has a limited plasticity, and
legislative balancing will be necessary to establish appropriate
relative roles for the goals of compensation and deterrence. 447
4. The Business Judgment Defense: But Who Will Guard the
Guardians?
At present, two potentially contradictory principles coexist uneasily in corporate law. Each has a wealth of supporting precedent,
but few cases have faced the potential conflict between them. On
the one hand, it is well established that a decision by the disinterested members of the board of directors not to sue a corporate
official effectively bars a derivative suit.448 In theory, courts will
respect such a decision as an exercise in sound business judgment,
even where the underlying cause of action appears meritorious. On
the other hand, case law also supports the proposition that shareholders may not ratify an illegal or fraudulent act.449 Although
446

See note 17 supra.

447 For example, to avoid the creation of a counterproductive in terrorem effect, the

most prudent course might be statutory ceilings on the maximum penalties that could be
imposed in the absence of either self-dealing or a net tangible loss to the corporation. That
could be coupled with restrictions on the ability of corporate officials to insure against such
losses (at least where active misconduct was alleged). Such a ceiling setting approach to the
question of damages has been adopted in an analogous context by the ALI's proposed
Federal Securities Code, to deal with the problem of misuse of inside information.
See ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1401(d)(2) (Revision of Tentative Drafts 1-3,
1974). This section would limit damages to the value of the securities bought or sold.
448 See Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915
(1963); Ash v. IBM, 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 3S4 U.S. 927 (1966); Swanson
v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957); H. HENN, supra note 246, § 365, at 772; Note,
The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. Cm.
L. REv. 168, 193-200 (1976).
449 W. FLETCHER, supra note 246, § 724; H. HENN, supra note 246, § 366, at 772-73;
19 Am. JUR. 2D Corporations § 542, at 78-79 (1965).
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rarely discussed, a few decisions seemingly have rejected ratification
even by a disinterested majority of shareholders. 451 This presents
a paradox: although the stockholders themselves cannot ratify
illegal acts, the directors as their proxies effectively may release the
perpetrators from liability by declining to sue them. At least from
the standpoint of internal consistency, it seems incongruous that
disinterested directors have powers denied the disinterested owners
of the corporation, who appointed them. The traditional answer to
this paradox is that the decision not to sue differs from a decision
to ratify the underlying conduct, but at times this answer clearly
elevates form over substance.
Heightening this anomaly is the fact that virtually all the recent
decisions upholding the business judgment defense have come from
federal courts, 451 while earlier cases holding certain acts to be nonratifiable were mainly state decisions. 45 2 Thus, nearly four decades
after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,4 5 3 the federal common-law doctrine surrounding the business judgment decision not to sue remains alive and well without support from any federal statute. The
federal courts continue to follow pre-Erie Supreme Court decisions
delineating the power of directors,45 4 which under Cohen v. Bene450 Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962); Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del.
Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (1958); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138
(1912).
451 See cases cited at note 448 supra.
452 For state cases that cast doubt on the board's power in this area, see Parish v.
Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 102-05, 242 A.2d 512, 556-57 (1968) (the
directors gave certain corporate officers a general release, but the court ruled that the
burden of showing that the release was fairly obtained was on the defendants); Groel v.
United Elec. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616, 61 A. 1061 (1905) (compare the result in this case with
that of Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), which also dealt with a New
Jersey corporation); Harris v. Pearsall, 116 Misc. 366, 190 N.Y.S. 61 (Sup. Ct. 1921),
appeal dismissed, 202 App. Div. 785, 194 N.Y.S. 942 (1922) (minority stockholder may
sue directors for failure to pursue a clear cause of action); Epstein v. Schenck, 35 N.Y.S.2d
969, 981 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (no right to reject a "clear cause of action"); Shaw v. Jamieson,
N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1976, at 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (suggesting that the directors' decision is not
conclusive, but can be substantively reviewed by the court in some circumstances), rev'd
on other grounds, 55 App. Div. 2d 875, 390 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1977).
453 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
454 See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64
(1917); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903) ("The directors represent all the stockholders and are presumed to act honestly and acording to
their best judgment for the interests of all."); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
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ficial Industrial Loan Corp.4 5 is now an area in which state law
45 6
should govern.
The immediate issue for our purposes, however, is whether the
two doctrines can be reconciled by imposing limits on the scope of
either or both of them. A good starting point is to ask a definitional
question: when does a decision not to sue amount to a ratification
of the underlying conduct? A partial answer is that this decision
might be based on a variety of factors unrelated to the merits of the
underlying conduct, such as the expense of litigation or the unlikelihood of recovery. But such an answer at times can be a cosmetic
one: boards sometimes do ratify conduct by purporting to decide
only not to sue. Accordingly, the important question is under
what circumstances (if at all) should a court invalidate a board
decision not to sue on the basis that it amounts in substance to an
impermissible ratification?
An answer to this question, specially applicable to the context
of corporate misconduct, once seemed to exist in the judicial
counterrule that the business judgment defense did not apply when
the underlying wrong involved illegality, rather than mere negligence or breach of a fiduciary duty. The source of this counterrule
was Ashwander v. TVA. 4 57 There a stockholder's derivative suit
challenged the right of the corporation to enter into a contract with
the TVA, because the TVA was allegedly "illegal" on constitutional grounds. The initial barrier for the plaintiff was whether he
455 337 U.S.541 (1948).
456 Under Cohen, a federal court hearing a diversity-based derivative suit must apply
the "substantive" law of the forum state, but may apply federal "procedural" law. Id. at
555-56. After Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & A.R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974), there
seems little doubt that questions such as the necessity of demand upon the board will be
viewed as "procedural" and therefore governed by FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1. Although the
power of the board to reject litigation is closely linked to the question of demand, it
seems inherently "substantive." It involves the allocation of power within the corporation
between the stockholders and the board, rather than the procedural issue of whether
intracorporate remedies must be exhausted. Thus, the early Supreme Court cases cited
in note 454 supra should be irrelevant if they conflict with the substantive decisional law
of the state of incorporation. See note 464 infra.
The situation is more complex when federal jurisdiction is also based on the existence
of a federal question. In such cases, some courts have refused to apply state "substantive"
corporate law where it would "frustrate" a federal cause of action. See Levitt v. Johnson,
334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co.,
292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961). However, to the extent state
rules may potentially limit the power of the board to refuse to sue, they are likely to
enhance rather than "frustrate" the shareholder's ability to pursue a federal claim.
457 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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had standing to bring the action, because the corporation's board
of directors had declined to sue. The Court split evenly on this
point. Writing for the Court in an opinion joined by three of his
colleagues, Chief Justice Hughes concluded that the business
judgment defense did not operate where the complaint alleged
illegality. He wrote that if the directors were guilty of "yielding,
without appropriate resistance, to governmental demands" 158 that
were unlawful, then the plaintiff was entitled to protect the corporation from this "breach of duty." '" Conversely, Justice Brandeis's
concurring opinion, in which Justices Cardozo, Stone, and Roberts
joined, stated that the issue of illegality was irrelevant because
"[s]tockholders are not guardians of the public." 460 Thus, Ash-

wander, as a closely split pre-Erie decision, resolves little, but it
does show that in the context of alleged illegality, courts will feel
uneasy in accepting the business judgment defense.461
The recent decision in Gall v. Exxon Corp.4 62 has reopened the
issue of the proper scope of the business judgment defense. In
Gall, the plaintiff sought to hold corporate officials liable for $59
million in corporate funds that Exxon's Italian subsidiary had expended on foreign bribes and disguised political contributions.
Because certain of Exxon's inside directors and senior management
had varying degrees of prior knowledge of this program, the Exxon
board appointed a special committee of three directors (one an
Exxon employee), which determined after an intensive study and
review that no action should be taken against any Exxon employee.
To justify its decision, the committee cited the classic factors that
458 Id. at 319.

459 This, of course, reflects a view directly contrary to Hornstein's holding that a
corporation has no public duty to resist illegal demands heroically. See pages 1209-12
supra.
460 297 U.S. at 343. Justice Brandeis, himself perhaps the original private attorney general, added: "Mere belief that corporate action . . . is illegal gives the stockholder no
greater right to interfere than is possessed by any other citizen." Id.
461 Subsequent cases have seemingly split in their interpretation of Ashwander. Klotz
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 386 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), gave a very restrictive
interpretation, limiting Ashwander's applicability to situations in which the statute is
itself unconstitutional, as opposed to cases of unconstitutional action by state officials
under a valid statute. See also Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1179-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Conversely, Ashwander's reasoning seems implicit in Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d
Cir. 1974). However, there the Third Circuit looked also to New York law, specifically the
"public policy" doctrine. Id. at 762.
462 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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have supported business judgment defenses: "the unfavorable prospects for success of the litigation, the cost of conducting the litigation, [the] interruption of corporate business affairs and the undermining of personnel morale." "I In rebuttal, the plaintiff argued
the position of Chief Justice Hughes in Ashwander.
The Gall court responded with a decision that did not consider
the New Jersey law under which Exxon was incorporated, but
rather assumed mistakenly that the "demand" rule of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.1 subsumes the question of the extent of the
board's business judgment discretion.46 4 It then found the Hughes
position in Ashwander inapplicable chiefly on the grounds that,
unlike Ashwander, the allegedly illegal conduct in Gall was no
longer continuing, but had ceased four years earlier. 465 Thus, because the decision not to sue was "not itself a violation of law and
[did] not result in the continuation of the alleged violation of
law," 466 the court held Ashwander to be distinguishable and not
controlling. 467 The broad principle that Gall establishes is that a
463 Id. at 514 n.13.
464 Id. at 515 n.16. The cases cited by Judge Carter for the proposition that the demand
rule is "the corollary of the business judgment rule" do not support that proposition. Both
Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1975), and In re Kauffman Mutual Fund
Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973), are true demand cases
in the procedural sense. Each involved a situation in which demand on the board was not
made.
In contrast, the most important moderm precedent on the business judgment defense
makes clear that Erie is to be respected and state law controls. In Swanson v. Traer, 354
U.S. 114 (1957), the Supreme Court remanded a case to the Seventh Circuit with instructions to determine whether under Illinois law the action was of "that exceptional character
which stockholders may bring." The Court specifically instructed the lower court that
Cohen made Illinois' substantive law determinative. On remand, the Seventh Circuit
answered in the negative, but expressly looked to Illinois law. See Swanson v. Traer,
249 F.2d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 1957).
At most, the "demand" requirement of rule 23.1 seems to give the board of directors a
right of first refusal to take over the suit and an opportunity to interpose a business
judgment defense. If that defense is interposed, its validity should depend upon state law.
If the Supreme Court meant seriously its recent comments in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1977), that it would not "federalize" state corporation law without explicit
legislative support, then it would seem inconsistent to treat the business judgment defense
as governed by federal standards.
465 The court also felt that Ashwander could be limited to the situation of a shareholder's derivative suit raising constitutional objections to statutory or regulatory controls'
on the corporation. 418 F. Supp. at 518.'
466 Id.

467 The court also held Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974), to be distinguishable because in that case the failure to sue was alleged to be itself illegal. 418 F. Supp. at
518 n.19.
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business judgment by corporate directors not to sue can bar a
derivative action, even when the prior conduct giving rise to the
corporation's right to sue was illegal.46 8
How snug is this seemingly safe harbor created by Gall? For
several reasons, it may be shallower and more guarded by shoals
than appears at first glance. First, since Gall applies literally only
when the alleged misconduct has terminated, the calculating
plaintiff may be able to circumvent its rule easily by alleging that
the improper activity is still continuing and, by demanding an
injunction, argue that his case now fits within the Ashwander exception.
A second potential limitation on Gall emerges from its misinterpretation of rule 23.1 and its myopia regarding Erie. There may be
important discrepancies between state and federal rules on the
business judgment defense, thus making Erie relevant. The recent
unanimous decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Barr v.
Wackman 419 suggests that directorial negligence in uncovering
misconduct may render the board incapable of reaching a business
judgment not to sue. Although that case dealt with the issue of
demand on the board (as does rule 23.1), a logical relationship
exists between the business judgment defense and the long-standing
rule that before a plaintiff can commence a derivative suit, he must
exhaust his intracorporate remedies by demanding action by the
board of directors. The major exception to this demand rule is
where the court finds that the demand would have been futile because of some bias preventing the board from reaching a disinterested decision. Logically, such a finding of futility necessarily
implies that on the same or similar facts the court would have to
470
reject a business judgment decision not to sue.
In general, recent federal cases have interpreted this futility
exception restrictively, virtually holding that only specific allegations of directorial fraud or self-interest can excuse failure to make
468 Id. at 518.
469 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.YS.2d 497 (1975).
470 One case, however, does suggest that a court could reject demand as futile and still

accept a business judgment refusal to sue. See Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976). That case
excused demand, but refused to consider whether it would dismiss the case if such a
business judgment defense were interposed. Id. at 879. However, because the board had
not formally raised the defense, and on the facts may have been unable to do so, the
court's distinction seems to have been based more on considerations of ripeness than on
a belief that different standards should apply to the two determinations.
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a demand on the board. 471 Conversely, Barr,found the futility
exception applicable even though the shareholder's derivative suit
did not allege fraud or self-dealing by a majority of the directors.
Barr involved an unusually visible situation in which two inside
directors had engaged in self-dealing, and the remainder of the
board, which had stood by passively, was therefore alleged to have
been negligently responsible for the resulting injury. On these
facts, the court excused demand as futile because the majority
directors would themselves be subject to potential liability if the
suit succeeded, and accordingly could not exercise disinterested
business judgment regarding the suit.472 Assuming that under the
same circumstances the court would also reject a decision not to
sue as tainted,4 73 the message here to the experienced attorney is
that plaintiffs have available an easy way to circumvent the demand requirement. Simply alleging "with particularity" 474 that
the independent members of the board were negligent in failing
to discover the breach may preclude them from asserting a disinterested business judgment not to sue the insiders. Exactly such
a result is what federal courts have predicted and therefore refused
to accept.47 5
The implications of this divergence between state and federal
law are significant. Shaw v. Jamieson 476 illustrates the likelihood of
disparate results from state and federal rules. There, in a case
identical to Gall, and also challenging the Exxon "Italian Connection," a New York state court followed the Barr approach and refused to accept the same business judgment not to sue to which
Gall deferred.4 77
471 See In re-Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 857 (1973). But see id. at 269 (Coffin, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that it is unreasonable to expect that any director would authorize a suit against himself).
472 36 N.Y.2d at 379-80, 329 N.E.2d at 186, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 505-06.
473 Barr's test ultimately seems to hinge on the fact that the directors actually "participated" in the transaction rather than simply negligently failed to supervise errant subordinates. The court emphasized that mere "conclusory allegations of wrongdoing" would not
make demands futile. Id. at 380, 329 N.E.2d at 186, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 506. Nonetheless, Barr
seems strongly at odds with the reasoning in In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479
F.2d at 264-65.
474 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
475 See, e.g., In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d at 265.
476 N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1976, at 8 (Sup. Ct.).
477 The Jamieson court declined to grant summary judgment to Exxon, finding that
a trial was necessary to determine the "reasonableness" of the decision not to sue and
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Given the unsettled state of directorial discretion not to sue, it
seems wiser to focus instead on the public policy implications of
the rule and to ask how a court should use its discretion in this
area. On the one hand, the defense can degenerate into a ritualistic incantation, by which a servile board, exercising no meaningful
judgment, protects its management from lawsuits. On the other
hand, the rule does respect the corporation's autonomy by permitting it to decide for itself whether it has been injured. Even
more important, the rule may provide a potentially useful positive
incentive by which the board can force full disclosure of information to it, since the case law is fairly clear that a release from liability given to a corporate official by a board that lacks information
4 78
is ineffective.
If we want to institutionalize a stronger corporate superego, no
area of the corporate common law seems more important than that
surrounding the business judgment defense. Gall notwithstanding,
one has the sense that many courts would feel uncomfortable with
any doctrine so prone to manipulation as the business judgment
defense apparently is today. Therefore, it is important to determine
how the defense's relatively nebulous standards can be tightened.
Potential limitations can be grouped under two headings: procedural and substantive.
a. ProceduralLimitations
Gall, Jamieson, and other decisions have recognized that the
board must be disinterested to reach an effective judgment not to
sue.4 79 But the recent federal decisions implicitly rely on the assumption that a board (or subcommittee thereof) that is not dethe procedures by which it was reached. Id. The subsequent reversal of Jamieson by the
Appellate Division was on grounds of collateral estoppel and did not question the decision
on the merits. See 55 App. Div. 2d 875, 390 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1977).
478 See Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 863-64, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 415 (1965);
Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 103-05, 242 A.2d 512, 556-58
(1968).
479 In Gall, the court declined to grant summary judgment for defendants in order
to give the plaintiff an "opportunity" to test the "independence" of the Exxon Special
Committee through "discovery, and if necessary, to request a hearing." 418 F. Supp. at 520.
But the burden of proof in this regard was placed on plaintiffs. See Lasker v. Burks, 404
F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario
-S.P.A., 69 F.R.D. 592, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); cf. Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166,
176-78, 240 P.2d 421, 427-28 (1952) (refusal of board to sue on a fraud claim is insufficient
to charge fraud on information and belief).
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monstrably partisan is therefore independent.4 80 Once this questionable logical jump is made, the message to corporate counsel
seems clear: to safeguard the board's power to thwart derivative
litigation, simply make sure that the subcommittee of the board
assigned to make the decision regarding the litigation has no
"inside" members and has clear authority to reach an irrevocable
decision. Barr, of course, supplies the counter principle that a director is not disinterested if he is a potential defendant. But, even
an expansive interpretation of Barr does not eliminate one possible
cosmetic solution available to defendant directors: expand the
board and appoint as the litigation subcommittee new directors
who, not having been in office at the time of the challenged transaction, cannot be disqualified under Barr on grounds of alleged
negligence. 5 '
In any event, extending Barr much beyond its own facts would
pose serious policy problems. If we disqualify directors from deciding not to sue because they had some prior knowledge of an improper transaction and therefore argnably were negligent, we may
once again significantly inhibit fuller information flow within the
firm. Corporate officers would soon learn that prospective disclosure to the board would legally taint its disinterestedness and
thereby undermine its ability to release them from liability. Prior
involvement of the board, therefore, may be exactly the wrong
basis for disqualification, because our goal is that the board prospectively review major decisions. This again presents our now
familiar conflict between moralistic and pragmatic perspectives. To
make the board more effective, it may be necessary to encourage
the board to become involved in decisions that involve risks of
illegality, not to require it to remain aloof. Such a goal requires
selectivity in the sanctions we direct at the board. Again, the
480 Recent Supreme Court constitutional decisions on bias or partisanship in administrative boards seem also to take a restrictive view of what should disqualify a hearing
board as partisan. See Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n,
426 U.S. 482, 493 (1976) ("Mere familiarity with the facts of a case gained by an agency
in the performance of its statutory role does not, however, disqualify a decisionmaker.");
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (ruling
that so long as prison guard was not a participant in incident he may constitutionally
serve on inmate disciplinary hearing panel); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
481 Such a change in board composition has been held to make demand necessary,
although demand on the original board might have been excused as futile. See Brody v.
Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1975).
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counter-intuitive answer suggested by Forrester's Law appears to
offer the more probable hypothesis: to make the corporation more
responsible, it may be necessary to relax, not tighten, some fiduciary standards applicable to one class of corporate official-the outside director.
What procedural limitations on the business judgment defense
then do make sense? I suggest we look not to the board's level of
involvement, but rather to its level of "independence." Two definitions of this critical concept of "independence" are possible. It
might mean only disinterestedness in the sense of not benefiting
by the outcome. But a more meaningful and traditional definition
of the term would be to view a board as independent only if it is
"entirely autonomous, and not subject to the ... dictation of any
exterior power." 482 Such a broader definition seems particularly
appropriate in evaluating what is expected of a board of directors,
because the board's proper role consists of more than merely being
a neutral hearing body, but also subsumes the multiple tasks of an
investigator, a prosecutor, and a monitoring supervisor as well.
If we condition the availability of the business judgment defense
upon the existence of a board that is not merely financially unaffected by the outcome, but rather that possesses some minimally
adequate capacity to investigate, supervise, and monitor management, then we have to identify the factors that give a board that
capacity to hold management accountable. Within the last several
years, there has developed a considerable degree of consensus over
what those minimum prerequisites are. Surveying proposals to
make the board more effective, one recent study identified the
basic tenets of this new consensus as follows: (1) "outsiders" must
constitute a majority of the board, (2) they must have direct access
to internal information about the corporation through such devices
as an audit committee or a staff system, and (3) they must control
the proxy process by which the corporation nominates candidates
for election to the board. 8 3 While the first two of these criteria
would have been wildly heretical only a decade ago, today both are
commonplace. A 1976 survey of 646 public corporations, conducted
by the management consulting firm of Heidrick and Struggles,
482 BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 911 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
483

J.

BACON & J. BROWN, CORPIORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRAcTICES: ROLE, SEECTION AND LEGAL

STATUS OF THE BOARD 5 (1975).
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found that "outside" directors composed the majority of the board
in over two-thirds of the corporations studied." 4 In addition, 93%
of the same companies utilized an audit committee. 485 More importantly, the mandatory institutionalization of these reforms for
public corporations already seems to be close to realization. As
noted earlier, the New York Stock Exchange will soon require
"audit" committees. 4 6 And, since 1976, the SEC has begun to urge
the stock exchanges to consider requiring listed corporations to
487
have majority "outside" boards.
As for the third criterion, although it has begun to gain notable
adherents among academics, 48 practitioners,4 9 and members of
Congress,49 ° the idea that the outside members of the board should
control the proxy machinery for purposes of nominating successor
directors is both further from general acceptance and more critical
in its impact. The basic goal of the reform would be to alleviate
the much-observed phenomenon of outside directors feeling a sense
484 THE CHANGING BOARD, supra note 384, at 6.
485 Id. at 10.
486 See note 322 supra.
487 See id.
488 See Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Director of the Publicly Held Corporation,
31 Bus. LAW. 1799, 1830-31 (1976). Professor Eisenberg would go further and give a
greater role to the shareholders themselves. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 97-127.
From the standpoint of this article, such a dependence on shareholder initiative seems
unrealistic, and may be counterproductive to the extent that it might retard the process
by which an "outside" director majority could obtain the balance of power on the board.
In this process, delegating the nomination of new directors to a committee of outsiders
is the key catalyst, and that would be lost if we instead were to depend on a complex
shareholder nominating procedure. Such a shareholder procedure is, however, under
consideration. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13482, [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH)
81,130 (April 28, 1977).
489 See ABA Subcomm. on Functions and Responsibilities of Directors, Committee on
Corporate Laws, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 5, 35-36 (1976). Not surprisingly, this report takes a somewhat weaker position, suggesting that the nominating
committee of outsiders only recommends nominations to the board, where presumably the
chief executive officer could seek to have their nominations blocked. The report also
recommends close "consultation" between the chief executive and the committee. Id. In
what may be a rear-guard action, however, even these proposals have been attacked by the
ABA Committee on Corporate Law Departments (a committee composed of inside or
"house" counsel). See ABA Comm. on Corporate Law Departments, Report on Corporate
Director's Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 1841 (1977).
490 The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on
Interstate Foreign Commerce has endorsed the idea of an independent nominating committee for public corporations. See FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM, Supra
note 2, at 35.
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of reciprocal loyalty to the chief executive officer who appointed
them. 9 ' But, the impact would be greater. A legal strategy that
forces management to cede control over the nomination process to
the outside members of the board might as a by-product also reduce
the tendency towards "group think," which organizational theorists
regard as perhaps the greatest barrier to improved decisionmaking
within organizations.49 2
The significance of management's control over the selection of
even outside directors comes into clearer focus when we note that
the Heidrick and Struggles survey found the chief executive oificer
to be the "initial decision-maker regarding a prospective director"
in 46.5% of the companies studied.49 3 Even this figure does not
reveal the full extent of the chief executive's veto power over the
selection of any potentially independent new director. Still, the
most striking finding of the Heidrick and Struggles study is the
evidence of a trend: the chief executive's role is actually growing
in the selection of outside directors.49 4 It seems reasonable to infer
that this increased role of the chief executive relates closely to the
opposing trend toward majority "outsider" boards. As the composition of corporate boards has shifted toward "outside" directors,
chief executive officers increasingly have begun to "hand pick"
the outsiders who hold the balance of power. Although a chief
executive has other reasons to select directors personally than
simply a desire to surround himself with loyalists, it is likely that
he also recognizes that the shift toward an "outsider" board would
eventually reach a "critical mass" level in terms of the directors'
group consciousness-a development that he can attempt to forestall by seeking to frame their group identity in terms of their
relationship to him. In any event, these two diametrically opposed
491 For a good summary of this argument, see M. EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 146-47
(collecting the evidence on the degree to which even outside directors are hired and fired
by the chief executive officer).
492 Janis and Mann argue that the dangers of "group think" are greatest in "highly
cohesive" and homogeneous groups. I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 29, at 129-33. The
answer that they propose is a "multiple advocacy" system, which seems to require the
systematic introduction of outside, heterogeneous viewpoints-a pattern less likely to be
achieved where the chief executive appoints and fires the board. Id. at 397-400.
493 THE CHANGING BOARD, supra note 384, at 8.
494 Compare id. (chief executive officer initial decisionmaker in 46.5% of companies)
with Corporate Boards Have Gotten Smaller Over Past 5 Years, Survey of Firms Finds,
Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1977, at 6, col. 2 (discussing earlier Heidrick & Struggles survey that
found the CEO dominant in only 14% of companies in 1971 survey).
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trends may well offset each other in their net effect on the "independence" level of the typical board.
An equally ominous finding in the Heidrick and Struggles survey
is that chief executive officers frequently are able to demand the
resignations of directors who resist their policies. Approximately
one-third of the corporations responding in the survey reported
such involuntary removals of directors. 415 Abraham Pomerantz, the
noted plaintiff's attorney, once told a congressional committee
that the problem with the idea of a "watchdog board" was that the
watchdog was chosen by the man he was supposed to watch. 96
What he neglected to add, as this statistic shows, is that the watchdog who bites is quickly sent to the pound. In conclusion, if "group
think" is a leading cause of the often poor quality of decisionmaking within organizations, then reduction of the chief executive's power over the composition of the board may be a wise reform. The centrality of his role in both hiring and firing directors
may be responsible for the shared and often incestuously narrow
perceptions of reality within the board, which is at the heart of
the "group think" problem. In corporate decisionmaking, as in
genetics, cross-breeding can produce a stronger hybrid.
There are of course many routes by which to force increased
independence of the board, including legislation, stock exchange
rules, and increased disclosure. But the possibility of a judicial
initiative has received little attention. The judicial approach would
be far less intrusive upon the corporation's autonomy, because
courts would not have to mandate such a reform. Instead, they
simply could create a positive incentive to induce management
voluntarily to surrender control of the proxy machinery to a nominating committee of "outside" directors. Exactly the opportunity
to create such an incentive is presented by the Gall-type problem:
by conditioning the availability of this defense upon the existence
of a board that was not selected by those whom it is charged with
watching, courts could promote the institution of a truly "independent" board, an important corporate reform. Companies would
be free not to adopt such a reform, but it would be precisely those
384, at 11.
496 Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967: Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 691 (1967).
495 THE CHANGING BOARD, supra note
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companies that deserve close judicial scrutiny when they assert the
business judgment defense.
How realistic is it to expect courts to pursue this or any other
policy-oriented strategy in the context of shareholders derivative
litigation? At present, few signs at the federal court level are encouraging. Rather, the trend seems to be toward a hollow, formalistic definition of "independence." Lasker v. Burks,497 another
mutual fund derivative suit, is a depressing case in point. There
the plaintiffs contended that the court should disregard the board's
decision not to sue the fund's investment adviser, because the
allegedly disinterested directors were also directors of other funds
established and serviced by the same investment adviser. 498 Thus,
suing the investment adviser might cost them their positions as
the "independent" minority directors of the other mutual funds.
Initially, the court gave the plaintiffs a designated period to prove
their contention that these directors were not disinterested. 499 But

later, the court held that a showing of such a structurally inbred
relationship was insufficient proof, and that only a demonstration
of "improper motive" would suffice.500 In addition, it rejected the
plaintiffs' attempts to place the burden of showing the board's independence on the defendants. 501 By placing the burden squarely
on plaintiffs, Lasker gives decisive effect to the kind of evidence
that is most subject to formalistic manipulation: evidence that
the allegedly partisan directors met with independent counsel,
considered counsel's views in detail, and studied the matter in
depth before deciding not to sue. 2
497 426 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). After this article went to press, the Second Circuit
reversed Lasker on grounds unique to the investment company context. See No. 77-7060
(2d Cir., filed Jan. 11, 1978).
498 426 F. Supp. at 850.
499 Id. at 847.
00 Id. at 849.
501 Id.. at 852-53. Plaintiffs of course cited Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955), and Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
Defendants relied on Bellis v. Thal, 373 F. Supp. 120, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1974), afj'd, 510 F.2d
969 (3d Cir. 1975); Marco v. Bank of New York, 272 F. Supp. 636, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
afr'd, 398 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1968); and Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 221 A.2d
487 (1966). The court distinguished Perlman and Pepper as cases involving self-dealing
by fiduciaries and saw the procedural setting not as an affirmative defense raised by
defendants, but as involving the issue of plaintiffs' standing.
502 Clearly, the court was impressed by the special committee's use of the former Chief
Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals as their special counsel. Judge Fuld's role in
Lasker was later paralleled by a similar appearance of retired New Jersey Chief
Judge Joseph Weintraub in Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). This

1236

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 63:1099

In contrast to this judicial deference, the SEC recently used
evidence of a corporation's halfhearted investigation of its insiders
as proof of securities law violations. In a 1977 consent order,50 3
Zale Corporation agreed to restructure its audit committee, provide adequate training for its new directors, and expand the number of independent outsiders on its board, largely because of evidence that the board had engaged in an investigation of certain
alleged illegal activities by management that amounted to a coverup. At issue in the Zale case were allegations by a former treasurer
of the corporation that the company had systematically violated
United States and foreign tax laws, and had split the spoils between
the corporation and management. 50 4 To evaluate these charges,
which centered on the corporation's chairman, the Zale board
relied on an investigation conducted principally by the chairman's
son. Although the "independent" committee charged with conducting the investigation was composed of outsiders, as in Lasker, the
SEC concluded that it had failed to "conduct a meaningful independent investigation." 505 When increasing pressure led the committee to attempt a fuller investigation, the full board interfered
and eventually abolished the committee.50 6 Although the Zale
situation involves more outrageous conduct than Lasker, the point
is that decisions such as Lasker and Gall may encourage such attempts at token compliance, because they show little judicial interest in piercing the veil of formalism to achieve a meaningful
definition of board "independence." The vacuum these decisions
create then invites SEC activism to fill the void, resulting in an
overexpansion of that agency's jurisdiction that may well be unde50 7
sirable.
suggests that, if nothing else, recent developments will provide full employment for retired
appellate judges. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to point out in Lasker that, although
Judge Fuld had delivered a formal opinion advising the special committee as to their
options, the actual counsel present at meetings of the committee were two attorneys
who would not have qualified as "non-interested" persons under section 2 of the
Investment Company Act. 426 F. Supp. at 849-52. The court, however, distinguished
Papilsky on the basis that the law firm in question represented only the fund and not the
investment adviser.
503 SEC v. Zale Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 8081 (N.D. Texas Civil Action No.
CA 3-77-1119c, Aug. 24, 1977).
504 Zale Consents to SEC Order Requiring 3 New Directors, Revamped Audit Panel,
Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1977, at 8, col. 1.
505 SEC Litigation Release, supra note 503, at 2.
506 Wall St. J., supra note 504.
507 See Part III infra.
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Substantive Limitations

Procedural reform has its inevitable limitations; no matter what
procedural reforms are instituted, the possibility of a passive
board will remain for at least the immediate future. The issue,
therefore, is whether a court can ever distinguish between a "valid"
business judgment and a purported judgment that amounts in
reality to a ratification of a "nonratifiable" wrong. For practical
purposes, this issue translates into the question of what standard of
judicial review a court should employ in scrutinizing the reasons
given for a decision not to sue. Several commentators have suggested that the common-law rule that some acts are nonratifiable

justifies a limited degree of judicial review. 50 But how would such
a system work?
In overview, there are several potential bases on which a court
could reject the justifications given for such a decision. First, the
reasons given might appear patently spurious. For example, the
justification that the law was too uncertain would hardly suffice in
a case of simple price fixing. Second, the reasons might appear to
amount to a continuing authorization of palpably illegal action.
Presumably, no court today would accept the justification that
illegal domestic political contributions promoted the corporation's
longrun best interests. Third, the reasons given might lack particularity, seem unfocused, or involve a defective chain of reasohing. For example, one reason given in Gall was that any litigation
against employees would hurt employee morale. Unless carefully
limited, such a reason proves too much, because it could justify
overlooking virtually any offenseY0 9 Presumably no board would
phrase its justifications quite as clumsily as the foregoing examples
suggest; still, their statements may contain unexplained discrepancies or ambiguities, and frequently may raise further questions. 510
508 See Note, The Nonratification Rule and the Demand Requirement: The Case for
Limited Judicial Review, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1086, 1103-04 (1963); Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisiteto a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REv. 746, 759-62,
762 (1960) ("In theory, at least, ratification of the wrong and disapproval of the suit are
not the same, but in practice the two are ... closely related .... ").
509 For a summary of reasons that courts have accepted in upholding directors' disapproval of suits, see S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating
Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 108-09, 93 N.E.2d 241, 246 (1950); 35 MINN. L. REv. 401, 403 (1951).
See also note 463 supra.
510 The reports submitted by corporations in connection with the Voluntary Disclosure

1238

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 63:1099

Does this mean that a court should reject the validity of a decision not to sue only in egregious cases, otherwise abstaining from
interference in internal corporate affairs? While this may happen,
the judicial responsibility in this area should be broader. Beyond
looking simply at the persuasiveness of the reasons given, the court
should consider context as well. For example, a board disapproval
of a derivative action against unrelated third parties should require
less justification than a refusal to sue corporate insiders. Beyond
this simple level, the symptom that should most arouse judicial
concern would be when the underlying conduct suggests that the
corporation's own system of internal accountability has broken
down. For example, in Gall, Exxon's senior management, including its chief executive officer, knew of Exxon's Italian Connection,
but never disclosed it to the board.511 Such a fact pattern is decidedly different from the garden variety allegation that a corporate official has been negligent or disloyal. If the first principle of
corporate law is that the board of directors shall manage the corporation, then, because nondisclosure undercuts the board's ability
to monitor, a court should recognize an obligation to assure itself
that the basic system of corporate accountability imposed by the
state-supervision by the board-has been reinstated and is functioning. Therefore, a court should only accept a decision not to sue
corporate insiders in such a case after it has determined that the
Program bear this out. The Exxon Report presents a good example. Written in a far
more argumentative, self-justifying tone than the McCloy Report, it places virtually the
entire blame on one subordinate official, the president of Esso Italiana, despite varying
degrees of prior knowledge on the part of his superiors in the corporate hierarchy.
Particularly disturbing is the report's failure to address the published statements of Exxon's
former general auditor that:
The principal factor which permitted the irregularities to occur and remain undiscovered for such a long time was the fact that higher levels of management in
both the region (Esso Europe in London) and Jersey (Exxon in New York) condoned
the falsification of records to obtain funds for confidential special payments.
Fiasco in Italy: Political Slush Fund Hid Other Spending, Cost Exxon Millions, Wall St.
J., Nov. 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6, 24, col. 3 (quoting H. Schersten). It is exactly this kind of remaining ambiguity that a court might be expected to resolve before accepting the business
judgment disapproval of a suit.
511 418 F. Supp. at 512. In addition, the Exxon Report reveals classic information
blockages. Information was hidden from internal auditors, and the general counsel and
controller agreed to withhold information from the chief executive because "detailed
knowledge could be embarrassing to the Chief 'Executive at some occasion on the
witness stand." ExxoN REPORT, supra note 2, at 26. The president of Exxon's European
subsidiary became aware of some of the most questionable payments before they were made
and did not alert higher authorities. Id. at 33-34.
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ability of the board to monitor has been restored. Put simply, the
board's watchdog role is not optional. Just as it would be beyond
the board's power to abolish itself, so too it cannot relinquish its
obligation to "manage the corporation" (at least in the sense of
maintaining some degree of internal supervision). Supervision is a
duty imposed by the state, which neither the board nor a court
can permit to be usurped. 12
The appropriate interaction between court and board in this
area seems best modelled after the kind of dialogue that frequently
arises in the judicial review of administrative action.5 ' 3 In reviewing decisions by those bodies, courts do not substitute their own
determinations even when confronted by a justification from the
agency that clearly is inadequate. Rather, the court will remand
for reconsideration, thereby prodding the agency to articulate its
decision more fully, to consider other possibilities or simply to
utilize the greater expertise it presumptively possesses. Similarly, it
seems equally inappropriate for a court to substitute its own judgment when considering whether a corporation should institute a
lawsuit. That determination is better left to the expertise of a
properly functioning board, which is more familiar with the needs
and goals of the corporation.
Additionally, by simply overturning a board's decision not to
sue, a court would do little to create a more effective board. In
contrast, the opening of a dialogue of questions and answers between court and board may crystallize a greater sense of self-awareness on the part of the board, particularly if its outside majority
theretofore had been passive. For example, if the board's decision
not to sue was based on a conclusion that the proposed lawsuit
lacked merit, the court might inquire whether independent counsel
had been consulted and what theories of liability were explored. If
the board received a special report, and its treatment of the issues
512 Those familiar with the history of corporate law in the United States will recognize
that I am here taking the side of the "concession theory" of corporate law in its neverending battle with the "contract theory." For a description of the debate, see O'Neal,
Molding the Corporate Form to ParticularBusiness Situations: Optional Charter Clauses,
10 VAND. L. Rav. 1, 20-22 (1956). While modem corporation statutes have tended to be
"enabling" statutes that view the corporate charter as only a contract between the
participants, the trend today may be back to a "concession" view, which sees the
charter as a grant of self-governing authority from the state. See note 516 infra.
513 A classic statement of this rule of self-restraint is set forth in SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80, 88, 94 (1943).
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seemed incomplete, the court similarly should be responsible for
seeing that any ambiguities apparent to it were clarified before it
accepts the board's judgment. In this process of corporate therapeutics, the plaintiff's attorneys might also be given a role in
framing questions and issues for the court (and receive adequate
compensation therefor). In reality, the ultimate result of such extended hearings generally would be "bloodless"-the court would
eventually accept the board's determination. But, in the process,
the court effectively would strengthen the board's position vis-a-vis
senior management in the internal tug of war that characterizes
many corporations. If this can be done in a "bloodless" fashion,
without either imposing draconian liabilities on executives or
substituting judicial judgment for that of the board's, so much
the better.
This analogy between an agency's decision and a board's may
strike some as ignoring the fundamental distinction that agencies
are public bodies and corporations private ones. But the limited
degree of judicial intervention into corporate decisionmaking here
advocated is justified by the ancient "concession theory" underlying corporate law. This theory rests on the premise that the
state has granted the corporate charter as a privilege extended on
the terms and conditions set forth in the state's corporation statute.51 4 If one accepts this starting point that the state has in effect
delegated control over the corporation to the board as the selfregulatory body entrusted with ensuring compliance with the
state's charter, then the conclusion follows logically that when this
system of corporate accountability demonstrably has malfunctioned, the state has a right to demand through its courts at least a
full and reasoned explanation of why the board has declined to sue
those at fault. This enables the state to assure itself that the terms
and conditions of its charter will thereafter be observed.
At the conclusion of Gall, Judge Carter declined to exercise any
substantive review of the Exxon committee's justifications, claiming that he had no basis for asking, after the Roman poet Juvenal,
"Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" 5' To say-that is to say that
our current system of corporate accountability is purely a voluntary one, that no failsafe mechanism exists. If, however, directors
See note 512 supra.
515 418 F. Supp. at 519 (translated: "But who is to guard the guards themselves?").
514
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are to a degree trustees for the state as well as for the stockholders,
then the state has its own independent claim to an accounting of
their stewardship.51 6
D.

Summary

The initial purpose of the reconnaissance mission now completed was to survey the degree of discretion available to a court
confronted with a shareholder's derivative suit claiming that corporate officials should be held liable for misconduct engaged in to
benefit the corporation. As we have seen, the spectrum of possible
judicial responses ranges from imposing strict liability to recognizing defenses that, at least in combination,5 1 7 could immunize almost any form of misconduct from the reach of shareholders. Most
516 A distinction must be drawn here between a limited "concession" theory and the
full-blown argument that directors are trustees who must serve the public interest. This
latter position has been expounded and challenged in a classic debate in the history of
corporate law. Compare Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145 (1932), with Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARv. L. REV. 1365 (1932). But this more expansive argument has never been accepted by
courts, and in Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & A.R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974)
(discussed at notes 428-34 supra and accompanying text), a majority of the Court seemed to
accept the proposition that directors are fiduciaries only for those possessing a "tangible
interest in the corporation," not the public at large. See 417 U.S. at 716 n.13. See also
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 343 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring: "Stockholders are
not guardians of the public.").
But even if directors are not required to serve the public interest, however that term
may be defined, they still might be expected to perform the specific mission delegated to
them, and to be accountable to the state that assigned them that mission pursuant to the
state corporation law, which has been incorporated into the corporate charter. Thus, the
duty to monitor stands on a higher ground than any duty to protect the public interest.
In turn, this narrower responsibility is one that courts can be expected to supervise, not
simply to compensate injured stockholders, but to ensure compliance with the terms of the
contract to which the state is a party. Even if the state's injury is too intangible for it to
sue for damages, its courts should recognize the obligation to make certain that no continuing violation of the state-mandated system of corporate accountability is occurring
before they accept a business judgment not to sue. In this light, the criticisms made earlier
of the recent amendments to Model Act section 35 are again pertinent, because their
tendency to reduce the duty to monitor also reduces the justification for greater judicial
supervision of the substantive merits of the business judgment not to sue. See note 328
supra.

517 For example, a colorable defense of duress might support a business judgment not
to sue on the grounds that the board, advised by counsel, did not consider the litigation
sufficiently promising to justify the expense. The "net loss" defense similarly could be
used as such a rationalization for a counsel's opinion. See ExxoN REPoRT, supra note 2, at
28-29, 32, for a recital of several possible defenses, including the neglected defense of
proximate causation, that the Special Committee on Litigation then found justified a
decision not to sue.
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likely, of course, neither extreme will prevail, and the common
law's genius for deciding cases on their special facts and circumstances will function here as elsewhere.
Having examined the options open to a court, the normative
question still remains. What should a court seek to accomplish by
exercising its discretion in this area? Initially, three standards
should guide it. First, a court should be skeptical about its ability
to achieve substantive goals and aware of the limits of its institutional competence. Direct frontal approaches to the problem of
corporate misconduct, such as the "public policy" doctrine, are
very likely misguided. Public policy is, in the apt words of an
early English jurist, "a very unruly horse, and when once you get
astride it you never know where it will carry you." 118
Second, as Christopher Stone in particular has argued, the law
is only one of several forces impacting upon corporate behavior,
and often not the most powerful. If we attempt to change fundamentally conduct that is deeply engrained, such as the corporate
norms of loyalty to superiors and secrecy vis-a-vis outsiders, simply
by revising legal norms that are at best only tangentially related to
the daily world of corporate executives, then either of two unintended consequences is likely. First, we may succeed only in taxing
conduct that will remain prevalent. Alternatively, if we adopt
more punitive sanctions, we may merely create a judicial lightning
bolt which will strike down isolated trespassers, but will not create
a sufficient risk, standing alone, to provide much deterrence.
However, we can attempt to channelize conduct. If we place
lesser expectations upon legal norms, we many find that legal
restraints that are incapable of serving as roadblocks still may perform effectively as detours-if there is an alternative course of action available to the person whose conduct we wish to influence.
For example, if information blockages within the corporate structure are symptomatic of a deep-rooted instinct within all organizations to withhold adverse information, the answer-is not to enact
laws to protect and encourage "whistle blowers." Rather, the law
should seek to utilize other basic instincts, such as the engrained
sense of obedience that characterizes most hierarchial institutions,
to compel internal disclosure to the board (or mini-board). As
518 Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824) (Burrough, J.).
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another example, the reliance on counsel defense presents a debatable issue, because it is subject to misuse. However, we hardly
can eliminate the dependence of the businessman upon his private
counsel; not only is it a phenomenon of American business life,
but there is no practical alternative. Nevertheless, channelization
is again possible. Courts can seek to regulate what counsel is relied
upon, to require greater dependence on legal specialists, and to
induce the employment of independent special counsel by the
board.
The third standard that should guide a court requires our return
to Forrester's Law and its dictum that complex social systems behave counter-intuitively. The intuitive answer to corporate misconduct appears to be that courts should enhance the role of the
shareholder in the enforcement of corporate morality. This answer
is questionable, because expanding the role of the shareholderplaintiff without careful consideration of the consequences may
diminish the role of the board. Without some latitude, the board
is likely to respond to the threat of nonfrivolous litigation by
choosing the course of risk avoidance. 519 Thus, if courts were to
take an activist role in determining the public policy implications
of corporate conduct, the result often will be boards acting not on
the basis of their best judgment, but out of a fear of being sued.
To promote effective and responsible boards, a balance must be
struck between the countervailing tyrannies of management and
of the litigious minority stockholder.
To the extent that there is an inverse relationship between the
roles of the board and the minority stockholder, which should we
519 Directors do face a real risk of personal loss because their insurance or right to indemnification by the corporation may be inadequate. As noted earlier, officers' and directors' insurance policies (which many companies do not carry on their directors in any
event) contain ambiguous exceptions, particularly for acts involving dishonesty. See note 17
supra. For a recent attempt by an insurer to renege on such a policy on the grounds that
payment to wrongdoers was against public policy, see Flintkote v. Lloyd's Underwriters,
N.Y.L.J., July 27, 1976, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mere., 56 App. Div. 2d 743, 391
N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1977). The extent to which liabilities under the federal securities laws
may be indemnified presents a complex unresolved issue, which this article will not
attempt to explore. See generally Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). However, a recent trend has been toward the
cancellation of liability insurance for directors (or at least certain features of such
insurance), as a basis for settling derivative actions, even over the objections of the
previously insured directors. See American Employers' Ins. Co. v. King Resources Co., 556
F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1977).
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favor? Drawing upon the work of organization theorists and economists, this article already has argued that the proper locus for reform is the board. Unlike the shareholder, who in terms of organizational distance is essentially an outsider, the board has the potential to command the corporation's auditing and internal compliance monitoring machinery. These mechanisms, according to
Williamson, are much more capable than either the shareholder
or the market of detecting and disciplining inappropriate behavior.5 20
To be sure, the board today neither commands the corporation's
internal monitoring machinery nor is perceived by those within the
corporate hierarchy as the ultimate authority to whom they owe
allegiance, such loyalty being reserved instead for senior management. But, it is exactly these structural deficiencies-the imbalance
between the board and senior management and the pervasive problem of information blockages-that courts can help to redress by
intelligently manipulating legal doctrine to increase the flow of
information to the board. Such increased information will augment the power of the board and, derivatively, the shareholder's
power as well. This article has suggested several strategies to this
end:
(1) Vigorous expansion of the principle, first enunciated in
Moses v. Burgin, that subordinates must "effectively communicate" policy options appropriate for the board, or face a
judicial presumption that the board would have acted differently. To date, this principle has been subject to two major
limitations: a conflict of interests must exist, and federal
fiduciary law must apply. This article has suggested that the
first limitation is of reduced significance in the context of
corporate misconduct, because unauthorized actions by corporate officials create contingent liabilities, producing inherent
conflicts of interest. Further, the second limitation can be surmounted both at common law and under an implied representation theory. In addition, it is possible that the eventual
adoption of stock exchange rules requiring audit committees
and an "outside" majority will make the obligation to disclose to the board at least as inferable from the Securities Ex520

See text accompanying notes 155-61, 360 supra.
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change Act of 1934 as it was from the Investment Company
Act of 1940.
(2) Extension of the concept of negligence to require not
simply reasonable diligence by directors, but reasonable steps
to institutionalize an adequate internal monitoring system.
The justification for the change would be that personal supervision of corporate affairs is now hopelessly beyond the board's
effective "span of control."
(3) Conditioning the "business judgment" defense upon the
existence of a truly "independent" board, whose outside members constitute a majority and possess the power to nominate
their successors through the corporate proxy machinery.
(4) Restricting the "duress" defense of Hornstein to the board,
in order to create a positive incentive for prospective disclosure to the board.
(5) Reallocation to the defendant of the burden of proof under
the "net loss" rule.
To the extent courts have doctrinal latitude in responding to
shareholders' claims of corporate misconduct, this article has
argued that they should exercise that discretion less to achieve an
abstract ideal body of substantive law than to induce organizational
reform. By a combination of positive and negative incentives, the
foregoing strategies are intended to upgrade the level within the
corporate hierarchy at which sensitive decisions are made.
But, is judicial reliance on such a self-regulatory system justified
by any evidence that boards will behave more responsibly than
management acting on its own? This question can by no means be
answered definitively, but reference to the improper payments
controversy is again instructive. Relatively unnoticed among the
lurid tales that have surfaced has been the seeming absence to date
of involvement by outside directors.Y-' Indeed, the elaborate precautions taken by some chief executives to prevent the board's
discovery of such programs indicates a belief that even a generally
22
passive board might take a principled stand against misconduct.
Such a belief appears realistic. Witness, for example, the recent
experience of Eberhard Faber Inc. (the pencil company), where a
board that hardly qualified as "independent" rebuffed its chief
521 See notes 92-95 supra and accompanying text.

522 See text accompanying notes 89-100 supra.
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executive officer on just this issue. 23 Faced with a proposal that
Eberhard Faber acquire a minority equity position in a foreign
concern that paid off local Third World officials, the board balked
at even this fairly tenuous association with such payments. Ultimately, the chairman found himself outvoted by a majority that
consisted in part of his college roommate, his former brother-inlaw, and even his mother. The message here is not that such an
incestuous board provides a generally reliable restraint on managerial overzealousness, but that, once into the ballpark of corporate
morality, directors seem more inclined to stop deferring to management and to act instead on the basis of their own standards. If
one generalization about the "passionate chapter in corporate history" 524 that was the improper payments controversy seems justified, it is that directors, once sensitized, tend to respond rapidly to
prevailing ideas of social and moral corporate responsibility where
a public consensus exists. If so, then at least with respect to those
potential levers for reform that we have just surveyed, the better
part of judicial valor may lie in a discretionary self-restraint, in a
response that seeks less to define proper corporate conduct than to
ensure that the corporation's own internal reflexes are working
properly. 2 5
III.

THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS AND CORPORATE MISCONDUCT:
DOES THE SEC HAVE A BETTER IDEA?

A much-delayed question now surfaces: why is it necessary to
strain the common law to find a remedy for corporate misconduct
when the SEC appears to be directly confronting the issue? This
section will explore SEC action in the corporate misconduct area
as an alternative model for corporate reform.
Often hard to pin down, particularly in this area, the SEC has
waivered between potentially inconsistent definitions of its role. At
523 Faber, supra note 2, at 186-88.
524 Hills, supra note 54, at 8.
525 The question here is by no means whether we should rely
devices to prevent corporate misconduct. The simplest route
bribery is, of course, a criminal statute. The issue is rather how we
particular levers for reform that affect the corporation's internal
can accomplish anything by these levers that cannot be induced
forces for change.

totally on self-regulatory
to prevent commercial
should manipulate those
affairs, and whether we
by other, more external
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times, it has stood by its traditional economic definition of materiality. 26 At other times, it has acknowledged that disclosure can
be used as a tool to realize social goals and to protect the public
interest. 27 In the recent past, the Commission gave serious consideration to addressing the "control loss" problem directly, by pre526 By "economic" definition of materiality, I mean a standard, such as the one recently
recommended by the SEC's Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, which deems
information relating to social and environmental affairs to be "material to investors only
when it reflects significantly on future financial performance." Advisory Comm. on Corporate Disclosure, Disclosure Study Report, [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,300, at 88,480 (Sept. 8, 1977). That committee concluded that even in the area of
corporate sufferage decisionmaking, information was material only when it related to
"expected return on investment." Id. Even under such a standard, there remains an issue
as to when the level of "significance" is reached. While the Commission has always declined
to be specific in this context, the instructions to Form 8-K recurrently use tests of 5%
and 10%.
Although the Commission itself has not taken as hard a line as that recommended by
its Advisory Committee, a similar attitude is discernible in its releases on environmental
disclosures. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5704, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 180,495, at 86,292 (May 6, 1976); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5627,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ff 80,310, at 85,724 (Oct. 14, 1975).
These releases followed the first decision by Judge Richey in Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974). In these releases, the Commission
resisted the somewhat heavy-handed efforts of that court to increase the required disclosures on "social matters" of interest to "ethical investors." The debate between that
court and the Commission continues. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC,
[1977 Current Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) % 96,057 (D.D.C. 1977) (discussed at
note 556 infra).
527 While the SEC PAYMEN ,S REPORT, supra note 2, at 19-20, approaches such a position,
the clearest endorsement of this deterrent function of disclosure in an official Commission report is in SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORs 10 (1969) (popularly known as the
Wheat Report) ("appropriate publicity tends to deter questionable practices and to
elevate standards of business conduct").
Recently, several commentators have pointed to language such as that in the Wheat
Report or published contemporaneously with the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933
to argue that one of the principal intended functions of disclosure has always been the
deterrence of unethical behavior. See, e.g., Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal
Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINCs L.J. 311 (1974); Stevenson, supra note
19. Although there is clearly some merit to this argument, one important qualification is
that when the Wheat Report or the other relevant official sources have asserted that it
is a function of disclosure to deter unethical behavior, they generally have implicitly
meant unethical behavior by controlling stockholders directed against minority stockholders, not misconduct standing alone. A case frequently cited as an expression of
judicial approval of this function of disclosure, Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp.
356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), is consistent with the interpretation that only unethical behavior
directed against the intended beneficiaries of the statute is within the purview of the
statute. While it is possible to argue for a more generalized deterrent use of disclosure,
the burden of proof should rest on those who would advance a broader theory of the
deterrent intent of the federal securities laws. See note 577 infra.
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5 28
scribing federal standards for directors of public companies.
Eventually, it quietly abandoned this project, as it came to recognize that the task was of herculean dimensions,5 29 and as doubts
grew that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
could support such a substantive set of dutiesP' 0 Nonetheless, with
characteristic independence, 531 the SEC's Division of Enforcement
has sought to address the problem of the board's impotence by obtaining consent orders that have required a variety of novel remedies. These have included the expansion and reconstitution of
boards,5 32 the installation of a majority of independent directors,

528 The proposal to draft guidelines for the duties and responsibilities of directors was
first announced by then SEC Chairman Bradford Cook. See Address by G. Bradford Cook,
Southern Methodist University School of Business Administration (April 6, 1973), reprinted
in [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 79,302. A flurry of speeches by Commission members then discussed the problems of setting standards in this area. See, e.g.,
Address by Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. before the Conference Board, San Francisco, Cal.,
A Commission Dilemma: Directors' Guidelines Revisited (May 7, 1974).
529 By the end of 1974, Chairman Garrett decided it was necessary to abandon the
project. He announced that although the SEC expected directors "to do the right thing,"
it could not draft a code defining the "right thing" for complicated fact situations. In
part, the Commission feared that courts might misinterpret a detailed code as creating
ironclad rules. See Address by Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. before Arthur D. Little Corporate
Directors Conference, Washington, D.C., What the SEC Expects of Corporate Directors
(Dec. 17, 1974); Chairman Hills also subsequently acknowledged the futility of the attempt. See Hills, supra note 49.
530 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), seems particularly hostile to any
attempt to supplant state regulation of fiduciary duties through expansion of relatively
vague federal antifraud rules. See notes 558-60 infra and accompanying text.
531 This level of independence (or, depending on one's perspective, disregard for Commission policies) has been praised by some and criticized by others. Senator Harrison
Williams, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Securities, recently attacked the
"'overbearing influence" that the Enforcement Division has had over the Commission and
accused it of intruding into "regulatory and policy matters specifically delegated to
others." Senator Assails Official of S.E.C. In Alleged Slurs, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1977,
at 37, col. 5, 39, col. 4. In this light, it is worth recalling that Professor Tullock's original
research on "control loss" concluded that government agencies were particularly susceptible to the problems of "authority leakage," in part because of the ability of career civil
servants to immunize themselves from the control of constantly changing political appointees. See notes 139-40 supra. Thus, given the hesitancy and divisions noted earlier
among commissioners on the issue of materiality, see note 49 supra, the recent action of
the staff suggests that the SEC is equally as susceptible as the large public corporation
to the "control loss" phenomenon.
532 The best known and most controversial of these decisions was SEC v. Mattel, Inc.,
[1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
94,754, 94,807 (D.D.C. 1974). There
the negotiated consent order required the company to name a majority of unaffiliated directors satisfactory to the SEC and to maintain executive, audit, and other committees
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the establishment of audit committees staffed by outsiders, and
even orientation and minimum fee schedules for outside directors. 33 In perhaps the high water mark of this campaign, the Division of Enforcement advanced the theory in one recent complaint
that directors (including outside directors) who failed to control
management adequately could violate the federal securities laws,
because implicitly they falsely represented the material fact that
they were in control of the companyY3 4 Under such a theory, the
effect of state cases such as Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 3 which permit extensive reliance on management, is overcome by the seemingly deus ex machina discovery of a federal duty
of due care for directors. Apparently, directors are expected to
meet some undefined federal standard of diligence in holding
management accountable or make a public confession of their inability to do so. Unfortunately, such an approach seems ill-conceived from the perspective of organization theory. The imbalance between the board and management cannot be rectified so
consisting mainly or wholly of unaffiliated directors. See also Malley, supra note 41.
Similar, if less drastic, relief also has been obtained by consent order. See SEC v. Coastal
States Gas Corp., Litigation Release No. 6054 (S.D. Tex., Sept. 12, 1973) ; SEC v. WestgateCalifornia Corp., Litigation Release No. 6142 (S.D. Cal., Nov. 9, 1973). Private litigation
also has led to settlements in which independent directors have been appointed and the
nominating process entrusted to a special committee of outside directors. The best known
of these cases are those involving Phillips Petroleum and Northrop. See M. EISENBERG,
supra note 12, at 175-76 n.28 (discussing Springer v. Jones, Civ. Action No. 74-1455-F (C.D.
Cal. 1974) (Northrop)); Herlihy & Levine, supra note 2, at 617-18 (discussing Gelbar v.
Keeler, Civ. Action No. 75-611-EAC (C.D. Colo. 1975) (Phillips)). Each settlement provided for appointment to the board of a majority of specially defined outside directors.
In Springer,Professor Eisenberg served as consultant to plaintiffs and drafted the definition
of "independence" used in the settlement. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 12. Detailed
descriptions of recent SEC enforcement actions and consent orders are contained in the
ALI-ABA Conference materials. See note 39 supra.
533 See SEC v. Zale Corp., supra note 503. That consent order established a special
audit committee of the board to be empowered to investigate and press claims against
management. A special corporate code of ethics, which must be submitted to the SEC,
was also required, along with an orientation program and a minimum compensation
schedule for outside directors.
534 See Complaint, SEC v. Shiell, Civ. Action No. TCA 76-204 (N.D. Fla. 1976); SEC
Litigation Release No. 7763, at 2 (Jan. 31, 1977). The corporate defendant was the Commonwealth Corporation.
535 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963)
(discussed at text accompanying note 309
supra). See also ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 35 (Supp. 1977) (discussed at notes
328-32 supra).
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easily, and some forces (as King Canute also found) may be
beyond the power of a naked edict to change. 5 36
More recently, the Commission itself has returned to the problem of corporate governance by beginning a far-reaching inquiry
into the applicability of the federal securities laws, particularly the
proxy rules, as a basis for reforming the allocation of power within
the corporation. 37 However, the lead-off witness at the hearings
that commenced that inquiry, Columbia Professor William Cary,
admonished the Commission to be wary of "proliferating agency
intrusion where private action suffices." 538 "A self-executing statute empowering ... a shareholder derivative suit," he suggested,
might present a more "desirable" model for reform than reliance
on "direct S.E.C. involvement." "I At about the same time, the
Commission released the report of its Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure, which strongly urged the Commission not
to "use disclosure solely to regulate corporate conduct unless expressly authorized to do so by the Congress." 540 This resistance on
the part of careful commentators to the SEC's expanding use of disclosure as a deterrent rests at bottom upon two concerns. First,
these observers fear that reliance on disclosure may not be effective from a cost/benefit standpoint. Second, there is a foreboding
sense that inflation of disclosure requirements in order to influence
536 Given the pathological situations occasionally faced in these cases, such drastic intervention and disregard for the rights of the stockholders (on whom these reforms and
unelected directors were pressed without any attempt at securing their consent) may have
been justified. But dearly, a remedy designed for a pathological situation should not
necessarily be generalized. In particular, the Shiell theory, under which outside directors
would also be liable, seems ill-considered. It seemingly requires the individual director
either to engage in what frequently will be a suicidal collision with the entrenched
management of many corporations, or to make a public confession of his inadequacy.
537 See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,901, [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH)
81,296 (Aug. 29, 1977); SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,482 [1977 Current
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
81,130 (Apr. 28, 1977).
538 Testimony of William L. Cary before the SEC, Shareholder Communications and
Participation in Corporate Governance 2 (Sept. 29, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Cary].
539 Id. Professor Cary added that with respect to his proposed federal minimum
standards bill, he saw "no necessity for Commission regulation or even participation" but
would rely on a "private right of action" for its enforcement. Id. at 10.
540 See Disclosure Study Report, supra note 526, at 88,483. The Advisory Committee
further expressed the view that the Commission should be skeptical of attempts to expand
disclosure requirements to comprehend more "social and environmental information" and
that no additional disclosures in this area were necessary. Id. at 88,485.
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corporate conduct may subordinate the interests of investors, who
5 41
were the intended beneficiaries of those laws, to other interests.
The issue thus framed is obviously significant. In contrast to the
at best interstitial opportunities for reform through the common
law, the federal securities laws appear to offer a more direct route
to corporate reform. On the simplest level, disclosure does raise
the corporation's "embarrassment cost,"

542

often to a prohibitively

high level. Why then should we depend on an internal corporate
superego at all, when the SEC has the potential to serve as an externalized corporate conscience? The answer given by the critics
is that the deterrent effect of disclosure comes only at a price that
is being wrongfully charged to investors. This section will examine
the nature of this price, as our focus shifts to the comparative
strengths and -weaknesses of the two competing models for corporate reform: the private derivative suit versus a mandatory disclosure system enforced by the SEC. A particular interest during
this inquiry will be to consider if, by restricting the focus of the
"therapeutic disclosure" justification, we can identify certain kinds
of disclosures that do not involve trade-offs between the investor's
interests and those of other groups within society.
The immediate advantage of placing primary reliance upon the
federal securities laws is obvious: the SEC can focus its enforcement resources directly at the substantive evils it perceives. But a
further inquiry is required to decide whether the benefits of this
approach outweigh its costs. In at least three respects, the SEC
541 Professor Cary in particular criticized the result in the recent Natural Resources
Defense Council decision, see notes 526 supra, 556 infra, as giving insufficient attention to
the "costs and benefits" of disclosure. See Cary, supra note 538, at 3. The SEC Advisory
Committee similarly focused on costs and benefits and warned that "investment decisionmaking would be hampered by adding to the amount of information through which investors would have to sift in making investment decisions." Disclosure Study Report, supra
note 526, at 88,477. Both also warned about overextension of the Commission's mandate
if it sought to provide information to other "interest groups in addition to investors." See
id.; Cary, supra note 538.
542 While this phrase "embarrassment cost" has begun to enter the public domain, I
believe it was first coined by my colleague Professor Donald Schwartz, in Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-existence with Society, 60 GEo. L.J. 57, 97 (1971). Recent
experience with stockholder proxy proposals, particularly the unprecedented success of the
American Jewish Congress in challenging the Arab boycott of Israel, suggests that their
efficacy is considerable and increasing. See Talking It Over: More Concerns Willing To
Enter Negotiations On Holder Resolutions, Wall St. J., March 23, 1977, at 1, 32 (noting
that many public corporations have agreed to shareholder resolutions rather than be
placed in the position of "being against motherhood").
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already has given a priority to the goal of eliminating substantive
evils over that of protecting investors and stockholders. First, early
in the improper payments controversy, the Commission's staff departed from its conventional form of consent decree, which enjoins
only further violations of the securities laws (thereby leaving unresolved the critical issue of whether the prior payments were
sufficiently material to require disclosure). Instead, the staff began
to negotiate uncharacteristically broad consent decrees that enjoined the "use of corporate funds for unlawful purposes." 14 In
some cases, these injunctions went well beyond the criminal law in
prohibiting specified actions, even with disclosure. For example,
one recent injunction prohibits the corporation from making any
payment "in the nature of a commercial bribe" to induce business. 544 Because many states and foreign nations limit their criminal proscription of bribery to governmental bribery,545 the SEC's
Division of Enforcement apparently is claiming the right in such a
case to make its own public policy determination of what acts
should be criminalized. One could pause at length here to consider a number of questions regarding the legitimacy of administrative agencies making such legislative decisions, the use of injunctions rather than the rulemaking process to establish policy, and,
most important, the absence of standards to guide the Commission. 546 However, the overwhelming leverage possessed by the
SEC's staff in the settlement of enforcement actions has deterred
virtually all corporate defendants 547
from challenging the chinks in
the Commission's litigating armor.

543 For a discussion of the issues raised by the breadth of these injunctions, see Lowenfels, supra note 41, at 3-7. See also Ferrara & Brandon, supra note 39 (representative
recent consent orders).
544 In SEC v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Civil Action No. 76-1854 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 6,
1976), the permanent injunction negotiated by the Division of Enforcement enjoined "any
payment of corporate funds . . . in the nature of a commercial bribe . . . for the purpose
of, or which may have the effect of, inducing the purchase or sale of goods, services or
supplies."
545 See notes 84, 205 supra.
546 Former Commissioner Sommer in particular has stressed the potentially lawless
character of the authority claimed by the Commission if it accepts the broadest of possible
justifications: that it may use disclosure simply as a tool to deter disfavored conduct without regard for its constituency's interests. As he points out, a nation concerned about recent
abuses of FBI and CIA authority might well pause to consider carefully the granting of
such an unlimited mandate to the SEC's enforcement attorneys. See Sommer, Therapeutic
Disclosure, 4 SEc. REG. L.J. 263, 273-74 (1976).
547 Faced with an SEC enforcement action, the corporate defendant has little to gain and
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A second instance of SEC efforts to extirpate the substantive evil
rather than simply to compel disclosure is evident in the administration of the Commission's Voluntary Disclosure Program. A precondition of participation in that program generally has been a
"declaration of a total cessation of all questionable payments" by
the board of directors. 548 Why such a sweeping rejection of all
forms of improper payments was thought to be in the best interests
of shareholders is obscure. After all, reasonable investors may wish
management to retain at least the discretion to make "defensive"
or "grease" payments. Behind this moralistic stance, a shift seems
discernible in the Commission's own self-image, from an agency
representing a limited constituency composed of investors, to one
representing the much broader constituency of the public at large.
Perhaps the clearest example of this transition is the recent consent
decree obtained by the Commission from Solon Automated Services, Inc.5 40 Under the decree, the company agreed to repay
$800,000 in improperly "skimmed" commissions. The recipients
were not investors or stockholders, but rather third parties with
whom the company had contracted. 550 The settlement was heralded
by the SEC as a precedent: the first occasion on which the SEC
has required compensation for injuries sustained in business dealings with a public corporation to persons who were not in any
sense securities holders of the corporation. One SEC attorney justified the consent order on the general authority of federal courts to
assure that "all wrongs are righted." 551 However, even accepting
the highly questionable proposition that federal courts have such
jurisdiction, one wonders why the SEC has any basis for seeking
to right such wrongs at the expense of its traditional constituency,
the investor (who ultimately would seem to bear the expense of
everything to lose through litigation, because a loss to the SEC will encourage private
plaintiffs to sue and to assert the res judicata doctrine. On the other hand, a negotiated
consent order does not require any admission of wrongdoing nor does it constitute evidence
thereof. As of this writing, it appears that the only major United States corporation that
has decided to litigate with the Commission is the Schlitz Brewing Co. (charged with
illegal kickbacks to customers). See SEC Accuses Schlitz Of Making At Least $3 Million In
Illegal Payments, Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1977, at 5, col. 2.
548 See Herlihy & Levine, supra note 2, at 587-88, for a description of this phase of the
Voluntary Disclosure Program.
549 See Solon Agrees to Pay $900,000 That SEC Says It Owes Lessors, Wall St. J., Apr.
26, 1977, at 3, col 5.
550 Id.
551 Id.
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such a repayment).552 Once it is asserted that the fact of nondisclosure of the corporate misconduct in filings required to be made
with the Commission or in statements otherwise subject to the
securities laws justifies SEC intervention on behalf of the victim
a52 Another example of this use of "deterrent disclosure" without regard to its effect on
stockholders is the complaint filed by the SEC in SEC v. General Tire & Rubber Co., [19751976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) q 95,542 (D.D.C. May 6, 1976). Although
this case was ultimately settled by consent order, one fascinating portion of the complaint,
which alleged violations of rule lOb-5 and rule 14a-9, bore the caption "Arab Boycott" and
alleged as follows:
In 1970, General Tire initiated a concerted effort to get itself removed from the
Arab League Boycott list. In this regard, it retained the services of Perco Establishment ("Perco"), an affiliated company of Triad Financial Establishment,
which, in turn, was headed by Adnan Khashoggi. In August 1970, General Tire
executed an agreement whereby in return for Perco's assistance in having General
Tire ... removed from the Arab League Boycott List, General Tire paid $50,000 to
Perco at the time of the agreement, and agreed to pay an additional $100,000 to
Perco contingent on the removal of General Tire... from the Arab League Boycott
list. In 1972, such removal took place and General Tire forwarded $100,000 to
Perco.
49. Another paragraph of the complaint alleged that General Tire was in
Complaint
compliance with the Arab Boycott, but did not allege that it had committed any illegal
act. Id.
50. In short, both paragraphs may be read as alleging that the corporation
was seeking to defend itself in a manner that was less than heroic. But was it material?
It is difficult to see what theory of materiality warrants the inclusion of this paragraph
in the SEC's complaint. If boycotts are a business risk that might have a material adverse
effect on the corporation's earnings, they are certainly even more of a risk to noncomplying
companies than they were to General Tire. General Tire's payments already had
enabled it to escape the boycott's sanctions. Somehow, the Division of Enforcement seems
to have determined that the described events were per se material (or perhaps the better
word is "newsworthy") on the grounds that disclosure might deter others from'complying.
Of course, one problem with such a bootstrap theory of materiality is that the disclosure
comes at the expense of the corporation's stockholders, who will indirectly suffer the sanctions for noncompliance. Relatively, it does not benefit any group of future investors, who
presumably need more to be warned about the possible risks facing companies still endangered by the boycott. Admittedly, the issue would be different if General Tire had
violated the antitrust laws, but apparently the SEC did not believe it had, because the
Commission made no such complaint. In fact, because the antitrust laws may proscribe
some forms of participation in boycotts, the deterrent argument for expanding the definition of materiality in this case collapses, because antitrust enforcement provides an
alternative means of deterrence that is more clearly authorized.
One need not weep for the fate of General Tire to be concerned about the amorphous,
subjective character of the SEC's seeming use of a "public interest" standard and its
abandonment of the traditional priority to the interests of investors in favor of the pursuit of timely causes. A forthcoming article by Professor Allan Roth will provide a more
extensive discussion of this case and the lack of coherence behind the SEC's position in
this area. See Roth, The Arab Boycott and the Federal Securities Laws, 5 Sac. RFG. L.J.
318 (1978).
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without any showing of a causal relationship between the nondisclosure and the wrong, or of the victim's status as an intended beneficiary of the securities laws, then we are in one step at the base of
the proverbial slippery slope, and no meaningful distinction seems
apparent between the Solon Automated Services fact pattern and
any other instance of undisclosed corporate misconduct by a public
corporation causing an injury somewhere to someone. In short,
the implications of Solon are not only that the Enforcement Division is claiming an effectively unlimited jurisdiction over corporate
misconduct, but that, in the process of seizing the high ground of
moral righteousness, it seems prepared to accept casualties among
its traditional wards, investors and stockholders.
A third occasion on which the SEC may have subordinated the
interests of investors to the goal of substantive reform of corporate
conduct may have been reached with the apparent recent termination of the Voluntary Disclosure Program. 3 The end of the
program also seems to imply a rejection of its compromise concept of "generic" disclosure.5

54

By accepting terse "generic" dis-

closures of the amounts and general purpose of the payments,
the program succeeded in inducing significant information flow
while shielding the corporation from the likely consequences of a
full "confessional" disclosure of its misdeeds. A moment's reflection
will show that a substantial difference exists between disclosing that
"XYZ Corporation paid $3.8 million in bribes to secure business
over the past five years" and that "XYZ Corporation paid $1
million to President Y of Country Z to secure an arms contract in
1976." In the latter case, the "embarrassment cost," and hence the
deterrence, is much greater. But, the "confessional" disclosure also
has a higher potential for causing fines, nationalizations, and loss
of future business in country Z. The paradox is, of course, that by
disclosing such contingent liabilities, we make dangers come true
that otherwise might not have materialized; the prophecy of contingent liabilities is in a sense self-fulfilling. To its credit, the Voluntary Disclosure Program minimized this inherent conflict between the interests of the public and of the present investors by
accepting the compromise of "generic" disclosure. The approach
553 See SEC Will Publicize Receipts, Names in Payment Cases, Wash. Post, Apr. 29,
1977, at Cl, col. 5; SEC's Programfor Voluntary Disclosure of Questionable Payments May
End Soon, Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1977, at 4, col. 2.
554 Wall St. J., supra note 553. See also SEC PAYMENTs Rmraor, supra note 2, at 32-34.
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gave prospective investors some notion of the corporation's contingent liabilities, without "ripening" those liabilities into actual
losses or forcing the revelation of facts that, absent disclosure,
posed no reasonable danger to the corporation. With the abandonment of the program, the Commission's new disclosure approach
gives a perhaps unintended and probably ill-considered priority to
the interests of potential investors over those of present stockholders.555
If our concern is corporate misconduct, this asserted cost to investors may not much trouble us at first. But, if the SEC's claim to
regulate corporate morality is tenuous, if its arguments prove too
much, then the Commission's extraordinary success in challenging
corporate misconduct therefore may be a short-lived phenomenon.
Moreover, the approach probably cannot be a similarly effective
remedy for private litigants, upon whom we ultimately depend for
successful policing of securities law violations.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions have shown the current
Court to be highly skeptical of federal agencies seeking to expand
their jurisdiction by resort to a "public interest" standard. NAACP
v. FPC ,56 found that the "public interest" standard set forth in
555 Several commentators have warned against giving the interests of prospective
investors an undeserved priority over those of innocent stockholders. See Mann, Watergate
to Bananagate: What Lies Beyond?, 31 Bus. LAW. 1663, 1666 (1976); Note, Disclosure of
Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under the Securities Acts, 89 HARv. L. Rv.
1848, 1860-61 (1976). Since today's potential investor is tomorrow's stockholder, a disclosure system which opts for warning the former of possible risks that are not otherwise
ripe at the price of exposing the latter to the consequences of such publicity seems difficult to justify from the standpoint of investor protection.
556 425 U.S. 662 (1976). See also Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 151 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.
1945), aff'd sub. nom. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946). Consistent with the
reasoning in these cases, the Commission has stated that "it is generally not authorized
to consider the promotion of social goals unrelated to the objectives of the federal securities laws .... " SEC Securities Act Release No. 5627, supra note 526, at 85,706.
Despite the decisions in these cases one district court apparently remains unpersuaded
that the Commission cannot be forced to expand its disclosure requirements to provide
more information of interest to ethical investors. In Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. SEC, [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,057, at 91,761-64 (D.D.C.
1977), Judge Richey has taken the position that statutory language in both the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizing the Commission to
promulgate rules "necessary or appropriate in the public interest" justifies requiring expanded environmental disclosures and equal opportunity statistical data, even if such
information is not of interest to the reasonable investor. Judge Richey appears to have
taken the position that such a "public interest" standard supplies an independent justification for disclosure, which makes irrelevant the question of whether the information
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the FPC's enabling statute did not authorize that agency to adopt
rules against employment discrimination by public utilities, because such a standard had to be interpreted more narrowly in
terms of the interests of the agency's special constituency, i.e., the
consumers of power. The Court's tone suggests a simple, blunt
message to federal agencies: "Shoemaker, stick to your last." 557
The Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.

Green 118 poses a far more sweeping limitation on the reach of the
federal securities laws in this area. In upholding the validity of
state "short form" merger statutes against the claim that the
"squeeze-outs" of minority interests violated the policies of rule
1Ob-5, a sizable majority of the Court implicitly agreed that the
purpose of that rule is disclosure and not the substantive regulation of corporate conduct. Going even further, six justices joined
to express serious doubts that "a federal cause of action" could
be implied in circumstances where "'the cause of action [is] one
traditionally relegated to state law .

. .'""

" Again, the scope

of the decision is debatable, but its tone seems to radiate hostility
toward any attempt to "federalize" the state law of fiduciary
duties.5 60
was "material" at all. Id. at 91,769 n.56. Compounding the confusion, the court loosely
cited NAACP v. FPC as authority for this proposition. Id.; see note 541 supra.
557 The Internal Revenue Service appears to have received a similar warning in a
recent investigation of corporate slush funds. United States v. Richards, 431 F. Supp.
249 (E.D. Va. 1977), held that certain questions asked by the IRS relating to corporate
slush funds were "beyond the relevant scope of an Internal Revenue Service investigation" of a corporation's tax liabilities, because they related only to the illegality of the
payments and not to their deductibility. Id. at 252.
558 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
559 Id. at 478 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 40 (1977)).
560 Two interpretations of this last section of the case seem possible. Read broadly, the
test appears to be whether the subject matter is one that has been "traditionally relegated
to state law." Read narrowly, the test is whether "established state policies of corporate
regulation would be overridden." Id. at 479. The difference between the former "overlap"
test and the latter "conflict" test could be important, because few states' policies favor
corporate misconduct in the same way that Delaware law clearly authorized short form
mergers in Santa Fe Industries. In this light, only the broader "overlap" test would be an
obstacle to SEC action, because regulation of most forms of corporate misconduct have
been "traditionally relegated to state law." Arguably, however, some established state
policies would "conflict" with a federal securities law approach to corporate misconduct.
These include the "duress" defense, the business judgment decision not to sue, and state
"security for expenses" statutes-all doctrines that are largely outflanked under a federal
securities law approach.
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Cognizant that its jurisdiction is not unlimited, the SEC has
responded on two quite different levels. First, it has articulated
with uncharacteristic specificity various theories of materiality
that attempt to explain why financially immaterial payments are
of interest to reasonable investors. Second, based upon its statutory powers to require the filing of periodic reports and proxy
statements'5 6 1 it has promulgated proposed rules intended to foster
an improved "system of internal accounting controls." 562 The
potential efficacy of these approaches deserves a brief examination.
The Commission has articulated three theories of materiality
to cover questionable payments. The first is that corporate involvement in these schemes is material because such acts "bear directly
on the integrity of management and the adequacy of its stewardship." 563 Second, to the extent that making questionable payments
involves concealing secret funds or falsifying records, such practices are material because they subvert the accuracy of a company's
financial statements and reveal the inadequacy of its financial controls.56 4 Under the third theory, improper activities reflect on the
"quality of earnings" of a company and may give rise to undisclosed contingent liabilities.5 65 These three justifications-which
may be referred to, respectively, as the "stewardship justification,"
the "falsification justification," and the "contingent liability justification"-have been debated at length. 66 For our purposes it is only
necessary to consider the general contours of that debate to reach
two conclusions. First, such theories of materiality are open to a
well-reasoned attack at several junctures. Second, even if valid,
these theories do not provide a sufficient theoretical basis for
spreading the "sunlight" of disclosure over all, or even the most
common, forms of corporate misconduct.
561 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1970).
562 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,185, [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH)
80,896 (Jan. 19, 1977).
563 SEC PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, at 31. See also Herlihy & Levine, supra note 2,

at 575.
564 SEC PAYMENTS REPORT,

supra note 2, at 23-24; Herlihy & Levine, supra note 2, at

573.
565 SEC PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, at 29-30; Herlihy & Levine, supra note 2, at
574.
566 See sources cited notes 39 & 41 supra; Note, supra note 555; Note, Foreign Bribes and
the Securities Acts' Disclosure Requirements, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1222 (1976).
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The "stewardship justification" is predicated on the normative
premise that stockholders care about the level of integrity of
management. The empirical foundations of this premise are somewhat shaky. Polls of investors have seemed to show that there is
56
relatively little such concern among sophisticated investors. 7

Litde evidence can be found that disclosure of questionable activity adversely affects the market price of a corporation's stock. 68
In addition, proxy proposals to restrain management discretion in
this area have gone down to overwhelming defeat where management has resisted.56 9 In sum, shareholders appear to show little concern about the moral peccadillos of management, or at least those
adventures intended to benefit the corporation. It is certainly
arguable, therefore, that only in exceptional cases do "integrity
disclosures" involve information that falls within the Supreme
5 70
Court's most recent and restrictive definition of materiality.
567 Only 28% of the respondents to a poll taken at the AlI-ABA Securities Institute in
1975 reported that information to the effect that a corporation had made foreign payments
would have a material adverse impact on their willingness to invest in that corporation.
On the other hand, 62% said that a refusal by a corporation to make such payments
might have a material negative effect on their willingness to invest in the corporation's
securities. With a touch of cynicism, one commentator has questioned whether it is not
"disclosure of the unwillingness to make" such payments that the SEC should require.
Mann, supra note 555, at 1665. After considerable investigation of the needs of investors,
the SEC's Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure also has expressed doubt that
investor interests would be served by the inclusion of more social and economic information. See note 540 supra.
508 Note, supra note 555, at 1855 n.45.
569 The most recent example was the lopsided rejection by Gulf shareholders of
minority shareholder proposals to prohibit illegal bribery and political contributions.
See Gulf Rejects Proposals to Detail Payoffs, Wash. Post, Apr. 20, 1977, at D-1l, col. I.
570 In TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), the Supreme Court
rejected as the test of materiality that the fact be one that "a reasonable shareholder
might consider important," id. at 446, and substituted the standard that there exist a
"substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important .
"
Id. at 449. More importantly for present purposes, the Court emphasized the dangers of
information overload:
Some information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its disclosure
may accomplish more harm than good. . . . [I]fthe standard of materiality is
unnecessarily low, . . .management's fear of exposing itself to substantial liability
may cause it simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial informationa result that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.
Id. at 448-49. Of course, this narrow definition of materiality is irrelevant if a court is
prepared to view rules adopted under a "public interest" standard as unconfined by the
parameters of "materiality." See note 556 supra. However, reading NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S.
662 (1976) (discussed at note 556 supra), and TSC Industries together, most courts are
likely to be reluctant to interpret such a public interest standard in a way that risks
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Case law on this issue of "integrity disclosures" is sparse.'
Those few judicial decisions that have focused on the materiality of
integrity disclosures all have involved self-dealing by management.57 2 As noted earlier, however, much modern corporate misconduct may be intended to benefit, not to injure, the corporation.
In any event, even if the courts adopted the Commission's position
regarding "integrity disclosures," the approach has a significant
conceptual limitation. While the investor might be presumed to
have an interest in the integrity of top management, that interest
hardly extends to every corporate employee. Yet, the locus of a
substantial portion of recent corporate misbehavior appears to be
at a considerable organizational distance from top management.
In this respect, the efficacy of "sunlight" appears bounded.
The "falsification justification" similarly is of limited potential
scope. 73 Much corporate misconduct does not involve distortion
of financial records. Even where it does, the financial information
disseminated to investors is not necessarily inaccurate or misleading. As one commentator has pointed out, as long as improper payments are "properly categorized as capital expenditures or sales
expenses, it is difficult to understand how the payment of bribes
causes financial statements to be misleading." 574 Such procedures
overloading investors. For evidence of a new, more conservative judicial approach, see SEC
v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
571 The most frequently cited decision is In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964), in
which the Commission said that the "[e]valuation of the quality of management-to whatever extent it is possible-is an essential ingredient of an informed investment decision."
Id. at 170. Citing a Commission decision to establish Commission authority does, however, involve an element of bootstrapping. See also Note, supra note 555, at 1858 (criticizing the foundations of this theory of ethical materiality). Ironically, the author of the
Francharddecision, former SEC Chairman Cary, has recently advised the Commission not
to "drown shareholders in information about the character of management," suggesting
that a line must be drawn between the Franchardfact situation (a prior felony conviction)
and that of instances of management misconduct. See Cary, supra note 538, at 2.
572 See SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FEo. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) f 95,226,
at 98,184 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Chris Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354
F. Supp. 895 (D.C. Del. 1973); Robinson v. Penn Central Co., 336 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa.
1971); Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp., 334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). But see note 577
infra.
573 The limitations on this justification are, however, of the SEC's own making, because
it generally has focused only on accounting controls to the exclusion of other forms of
monitoring. That misconduct by subordinate officials escapes detection by their superiors
because of inadequate, substandard monitoring controls within the corporation may be
material not because of its own intrinsic significance, but as a symptom of that inadequacy.
See text accompanying notes 585-88 infra.
574 Mann, supra note 555, at 1667. See also Note, supra note 555, at 1856-57.
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neither overstate profits nor understate taxes. Under generally accepted accounting principles, there is no additional requirement
that the income statement shown to investors subdivide selling
expenses into two categories: "legal" and "illegal."
The "contingent liability justification" presents probably the
most pervasive and meritorious argument for finding corporate
misconduct to be material. Some risks of future liability clearly are
material to investors. 575 But once we reduce the issue of corporate
misconduct to financial terms, the relative size of the liability
unavoidably becomes central to determining materiality. The
legal and accounting professions have recently agreed to joint
criteria for determining when contingent liabilities must be disclosed. They have decided that disclosure of an unasserted possible
claim is required only when (1) it is reasonably probable that the
claim will be asserted, (2) there is a reasonable possibility that, if
asserted, the outcome will be unfavorable to the corporation, and
(3) the liability resulting from the unfavorable outcome would be
material under traditional standards to the company's financial
condition. 576 If in a given case the type of questionable conduct in

the particular foreign country seldom results in any liability, under
this theory of materiality it would seem to follow that disclosure is
not required. In sum, these theories do not exhaust the possible
scope of "materiality"; ingenious new theories will continue to be
advanced, and to a degree, courts may accept them. But this discussion suggests that defendants have a number of plausible responses to these theories that make it unlikely that the scope of the
575 In Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969), the
Second Circuit held that failure to disclose a contingent liability resulting from overcharging the federal government under a cost-plus contract could make financial statements materially misleading and thereby violate rule lOb-5. But apparently at the suggestion of the SEC in an amicus brief, the court carefully avoided the problem of
whether corporate misconduct inherently creates an obligation to disclose because of its
potential impact on financial statements. See Stevenson, supra note 19, at 70-71.
576 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. -5,
Accounting for Contingencies,
was adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board in March, 1975. It is
explained in a Statement of Policy adopted by the American Bar Association's Board of
Governors on December 8, 1975. See ABA, Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers'
Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, 31 Bus. LAw. 1709, 1719-31 (1976).
Several commentators have suggested that these standards should be used as the measure
of the corporation's obligation to disclose unlawful acts. See Mann, supra note 555, at
1666-67 & n.14; Sommer, The Disclosure of Management Fraud, 31 Bus. LAw. 1283, 1287
(1976).
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securities laws can be stretched to cover all instances of corporate
misconduct. That these responses have not yet been faced by courts
is more testimony to the SEC's overwhelming leverage in enforcement litigation than to the merits of the case. Eventually, the child
will come forward to announce that he sees revealing holes in the
Emperor's new wardrobe.'t
Beyond the technical issues inherent in defining materiality, a
more generalized problem accompanies any attempt to expand the
standards for disclosure to include most forms of corporate misconduct. Making corporations liable under an expanded definition
of materiality may increase the losses ultimately falling on innocent
stockholders or even consumers. To this objection, however, a
satisfactory resolution may be in sight: the SEC could minimize
such losses from an expanded theory of "ethical materiality" by
simultaneously adopting a "contextual" theory of materiality.57 8
The transactional context would determine what information was
material. For example, a different standard of materiality would
exist for a proxy contest than for an issuance of shares, because each
entails substantially different decisions. In a proxy contest, stockholders are making a noninvestment decision about whom to elect
as their stewards (and therefore are more interested in integrity),
while in an issuance of shares investors confront a pure investment
decision.
577 In this light it is noteworthy that courts have rejected with seeming uniformity all
recent attempts to impose liability against corporate officials in private actions under the
federal securities laws where the alleged misconduct was not coupled with any element of
self-dealing. See Falkenberg v. Baldwin, [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH)
[ 96,086 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Lewis v. Elam, [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
[ 96,013 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Levy v. Johnson, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FEtD. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH)
95,899 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Meer v. United Brands Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,648 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). While these actions have been rejected
on other issues than that of materiality-most notably, the "transaction causation" issue and
the question of implied rights of action-they suggest in their uniform result some
judicial skepticism of plaintiffs' theories. Where action is alleged by plaintiffs to have been
illegal, but the operative facts have been disclosed, most courts have agreed that disclosure is not required of plaintiff's "unproved . . . legal theory." Shapiro v. Belmont
Indus., Inc., [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 96,206 (E.D. Pa. 1977); see Ash v.
LFE Corp., 525 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1975). See also SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8
(2d Cir. 1977).
578 See Address by Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Slippery Slope of Materiality
(December 8, 1975). (discussing the "faintly heard suggestion that perhaps standards
for determining materiality differ depending upon the context").
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The practical significance of such a contextual approach would
be that courts and the SEC could require the disclosure of information without drawing along the potentially astronomical liabilities
that today exist under rule 1Ob-5. For example, the legal conclusion that undisclosed information bearing on the integrity of
management was relevant to a decision by shareholders asked to
approve incentive compensation for management generally would
implicate rule 14a-9, 79 which regulates proxies, but not necessarily
rule lOb-5. By making a distinction between investment decisions
(where rule 1Ob-5 would apply) and noninvestment decisions
(where it would not), courts would be able to make the punishment come closer to fitting the crime. Some indications exist that
the SEC is leaning in this direction. 8 0°
Before one can realistically place primary reliance on the federal
securities laws as a remedy for corporate misconduct, a greater
hurdle must be overcome: at present only a relatively reduced role
exists for private enforcement of disclosure standards with respect
to corporate misconduct. Unlike the SEC litigator, who can partly
compensate for the logical weaknesses in his theory of materiality
by donning the mantle of the white knight fighting corruption, the
private litigant seeking damages occupies a less sympathetic position and faces far more serious obstacles in the form of standing
and causation requirements.5 8 Since the first cases implying a private right of action under the federal securities laws, reliance upon
579 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977). The basic prohibitions of the two rules are equivalent.
However, rule 14a-9 only applies where there is a "solicitation" of proxies, while rule lOb-5
requires that there be a purchase or sale of securities. The remedy for a misleading statement in a proxy statement relating to approval of an incentive compensation plan probably
would consist of little more than the rescission of such plan, because of the existence of a
"transaction causation" requirement. See note 581 infra.
580 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5627, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) [ 80,310, at 85,719-23 (Oct. 14, 1975); SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,185,
80,896, at 87,383 (Jan. 19, 1977) (hinting
[1977 Current Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
that the involvement of corporate officers in questionable payments may be material to
shareholders only "in determining whether to give a proxy").
581 A private litigant wishing to sue under rule lOb-5 because of the failure to disclose
improper payments or practices faces two immediate obstacles. First, he must be a purchaser
or seller of securities at or about the time of the misleading statement or nondisclosure.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Second, he must prove
scienter, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), which may be difficult where
the improper activities were localized at a lower level within the corporation and unknown
to senior management. Although there is conflict of authority on the question of scienter,
it appears likely that the SEC need meet neither of these requirements in an injunctive
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private attorneys general to supplement public enforcement has
been recognized as essential to the full enforcement of the securities
laws. 2 Yet here, it is likely to be the exception, rather than the
rule.
In addition to these practical limitations on the ability of the
securities laws to remedy corporate misconduct, there may also be
a policy reason for not choosing disclosure as the primary means to
remedy corporate misgovernance. Disclosure undoubtedly does
raise the "embarrassment cost" to the corporation, and so acts as a
deterrent. But to complete the syllogism by saying "therefore more
disclosure means less misconduct" is to omit a critical step. This
article has argued that a principal obstacle to closer monitoring
of corporate behavior is the phenomenon of "control loss" that
seems to characterize many large decentralized organizations. If
centrifugal forces exist within large corporations that often inhibit
and sometimes cripple the ability of those at the top to learn of and
to deal with problems at lower levels, then the first step towards
institutionalizing a stronger corporate superego appears to involve
improving the upward flow of information. This means increasing
action (although even it must show a "material" omission or misstatement and a future
"propensity" to violate the securities laws in order to justify the issuance of an injunction). Compare SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540-41 (1st Cir. 1976),
with SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd, 565 F.2d
8 (2d Cir. 1977). The private litigant may not sue under section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (which requires the filing of certain periodic and annual reports with
the Commission), because an implied private right of action has been held not to exist
under this section. See Levy v. Johnson, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP,
(CCH)
95,899 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Meer v. United Brands Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,648 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). While a plaintiff who relies upon misleading statements in a document filed pursuant to section 13 may sue under section 18(a)
of the Act, he must again meet a purchaser-seller requirement under.section 18, and the
defendant may establish a good faith defense.
By suing under section 14 of the Act and rule 14a-9, the private litigant avoids these
obstacles but encounters another. At present, a showing of scienter is not required to
establish a violation of the proxy rules. GouMd v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d
761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976). But several cases dealing with improper payments have held
that the "transaction causation" requirement that exists under section 14 precludes a
corporation from suing its directors to recover illegal payments, on the theory that the
stockholders would not have reelected the directors had such payments been disclosed,
thereby preventing further payments. These courts have taken the narrow view that because
the payments were not the subject of the proxy solicitation, "transaction causation" was
lacking. See Lewis v. Elam, [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,013,
at 91,554-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Levy v. Johnson, [197 6 -1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE'.
(CCH)
95,899, at 91,324 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
582 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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the flow to the board, the organ within the corporation most capable of exercising a detached, long-range judgment. But such disclosure to the board will be inhibited if as a necessary corollary it
must also make a "confessional" revelation to the world of the
embarrassing specifics of corporate misbehavior. Organization
theorists agree that a necessary precondition for information sharing within an organization is a reasonable degree of trust and confidence between the informant and the recipient. 5 3 Approaches
such as the mini-board concept are based on the premise that information flow can be increased best by giving subordinates positive incentives to divulge potentially adverse information and by
minimizing negative incentives such as public exposure. Indeed,
the SEC's enforcement staff has itself found corporations far more
prepared to reveal sensitive information when the disclosure could
be exempted from the Freedom of Information Act.58 4 Put simply,
information flows best when there is some assurance of privacy.
This is not an argument against disclosure per se. A major distinction exists between "generic" disclosure and "confessional"
disclosure. By destroying any degree of privacy, "confessional" disclosure probably creates a disincentive for subordinates to pass
sensitive information to the board. Because a corporate official can
always rationalize nondisclosure to the board, reliance on a system
of compelled public confession may not eradicate corporate misconduct, but only make it less visible and more covert. Since the
reduced effectiveness of the board that such an approach risks
might exceed any positive gain realized by the creation of an increased deterrent, there is reason for proceeding with caution in
this area, particularly if we believe that the board as an internal
monitoring apparatus possesses a far greater capability for serving
as an effective watchdog than any external agency.
These considerations do not mean that disclosure is an undesirable remedy. Rather, our earlier diagnosis suggests that the focus
should shift from a preoccupation with the details of misconduct to
a concentration on the process of monitoring itself. A number of
583 See text accompanying notes 165-69 supra.

584 For a review of corporate attempts to obtain such exemptions, see Herlihy & Levine,
supra note 2, at 591-93. Other members of the Enforcement Division staff have confirmed
to me that FOIA disclosure is often the major stumbling block in the negotiation of
consent decrees, and that sensitive documents are more likely to be given to the staff
when they can be confidentially retained within the agency's work papers.
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questions should be asked. What internal controls does the corporation have? Has the corporation rejected other recommended procedures for improved supervision, and, if so, why? How "independent" is the board, and what procedures are used to prepare
and alert it? If the outside directors have not been provided with a
staff of special counsel or other recommended auxiliary services,
why not? 585 Asking these and other questions might spread the sunlight of disclosure not simply on corporations that already have
been caught, but also on those that are insufficiently safeguarded.
Such required disclosures need not result in mere boilerplate
answers, because empirical research indicates that there are presently wide disparities in the internal information systems that
exist within large corporations 8 6 Nor are boards alike in their
level of independence.
More importantly, such a new orientation to disclosure would
exert a desirable influence on corporate management to -adopt
recommended monitoring controls and reforms. One precedent
provides persuasive evidence of this conclusion. With the adoption
of Accounting Series Release No. 165 in 1974, public corporations
are now required to disclose the details of any disagreement within
a specified period preceding the removal or resignation of the
corporation's outside auditors.5 8 7 This disclosure reform apparently has significantly strengthened the position of the outside
auditor and made him more independent.5 8 8 By analogy, similar
disclosures could be required regarding the circumstances surrounding directorial resignations or removals, and the effect might
585 A forthcoming article by Professors Donald Schwartz and Elliott Weiss will attempt
to describe in detail the kinds of disdosure that such a reorientation might require.
See Weiss & Schwartz, It's Time for the Board to Come Out of the Closet, HARV. Bus.
REV., January-February, 1978, at 18.
586 See Mace, Management Information Systems for Directors, HARV. Bus. REV., November-December, 1975, at 14.
587 See note 190 supra. A.S.R. 165 requires the corporation to explain disagreements
(not including those over the accountant's fees) within two years prior to the accountant's
removal or resignation that, had the disagreement not been resolved in the accountant's
favor, would have resulted in a qualified opinion. The accountant then is required to
confirm or to comment upon management's explanation of the disagreement. For useful
discussions of A.S.R. 165, see Kay, Disagreements Under Accounting Series Release No. 165,
J. ACCOUNTANCY, October, 1976, at 75; Weiss, Disclosures Surrounding a Change in
Auditors: Accounting Series Release 165, CPA J., March, 1975, at 11.
588 For this conclusion and recommendations concerning methods for increasing the
accountant's independence, see Nichols & Price, The Auditor-Firm Conflict: An Analysis
Using Concepts of Exchange Theory, 51 ACCOUNTING RV. 335 (1976).
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also be to strengthen the position of the outside director, who is
the linchpin of any board-based system of corporate accountability.58 9

Such a system of disclosure focused on the process of monitoring
would not have many of the undesirable aspects of "confessional"
disclosure. It would not force the board to operate in a fishbowl
environment, nor overload investors with an avalanche of information about each incident of questionable corporate conduct, nor
subject the corporation and its stockholders to the losses that might
result from "confessional" disclosure. Here then, the public interest and the interest of investors may coincide rather than conflict. 5"
It would be a serious mistake, however, to equate the potential
role of the federal securities law in the reform of corporate conduct
with a disclosure strategy. Other avenues are open to the SEC. In
overview, these other basic options, all of which the SEC has recently begun to explore, are threefold. First, the Commission can
increase the capability of shareholders to object to questionable
practices by expanding the shareholders' right to submit proxy
proposals. 591 Second, it can make the board more independent
through devices such as the audit committee. 592 Third, as we shall
see next, it can strengthen the internal monitoring controls of the
public corporation. All these approaches shift the focus of ameliorative efforts from substantive reform to basically procedural reform.

593

589 For a discussion of the possible impact that even a single dedicated maverick director
might have, see STAFF OF THE SEC, THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL
COMPANY, STAFF REPORT OF THE SEC TO THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE
COMMERCE, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 166-70 (Subcomm.
Print 1972) (reviewing the futile attempts by Penn Central director Odell to alert other
board members to the symptoms of impending disaster).
590 As noted in note 581 supra, if such disclosure were required exclusively in proxy
statements there would be little possibility of damages being assessed against the corporation (unless the adoption of monitoring controls were the subject of the proxy solicitation),
because of the "transaction causation" requirement of Lewis v. Elam and Levy v. Johnson.
Plaintiffs might seek injunctive relief, however, and attorneys' fees could be awarded to
provide an incentive without stockholders experiencing a material decline in the value
of their securities.
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN

591 Schwartz & Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder ProposalRule, 65 GEO. L.

J. 635 (1977).
592 See text accompanying note 386 supra.
593 Interestingly, Professors Deutsch and LaRue have detected a similar shift to procedural reform in the efforts of federal courts. They feel that the emphasis of the Warren
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The Commission's recently issued proposed rules under section
13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provide a particularly
interesting case in point. In Exchange Act Release No. 13,185, 594
the Commission proposed four rules to require most public corporations to maintain accurate books and records and "an adequate
system of internal accounting controls designed to provide reasonable assurance that specified objectives are satisfied." 595 Two of the
rules specifically proscribe substantive evils that the Commission
saw as underlying the improper payments crisis: the falsification of
accounting records and the deception of the corporation's independent auditors. But the most intriguing rule from our perspective is proposed rule 13b-2, which pursues the goal of greater corporate accountability through the procedural reform of tighter internal accounting controls. 59 The rule appears to be the first explicit effort under the federal securities laws to require the corporation to install and maintain monitoring controls-in effect to buy
itself a watchdog. Equally important, the Release seems to announce a norm directly addressed to the "control loss problem":
"The establishment and maintenance of a system of internal controls is an important management obligation. A fundamental
Court on obtaining desired end results has been replaced by a new judicial self-restraint
focusing on procedural improvements. See Deutsch & LaRue, The Law of Fogel v. Chestnutt: An Historical Analysis, 5 Sac. REr. L.J. 56, 57-58 (1977).
594 [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) If 80,896 Uan. 19, 1977).
595 Id. at 87,375. It seems unlikely that the proposed 13b rules will ever be adopted
(at least under that section), since legislation amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
to prohibit governmental bribes and to require adequate accounting controls was passed
late in 1977, see note 65 supra, thereby superseding these proposed rules. But because the
new legislation shares the same preoccupation with accounting controls as did the proposed rules, the issue remains open whether section 13 could support rules directed at
other forms of internal controls. As is argued in the text accompanying note 602 infra,
the justification advanced to support proposed rule 13b-2 seems of particular interest,
because it is potentially capable of supporting other forms of internal controls.
596 Proposed Rule 13b-2, 42 Fed. Reg. 4,859 (1977) would require that:
[E]very issuer shall devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that:
(1) Transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific
authorization;
(2) Transactions are recorded as necessary (i) to permit preparation of financial
statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other
criteria applicable to such statements and (ii) to maintain accountability for assets;
(3) Access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's authorization;
(4) The recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at
reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any difference.
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aspect of management's stewardship responsibility is to provide
shareholders with reasonable assurances that the business is adequately controlled." 597
Although few topics seem less revolutionary than accounting
reform, the statement of the norm here is more generalized. Because the Release speaks in terms of assuring shareholders "that
the business is adequately controlled," it would seem to justify
other forms of internal compliance techniques besides simple accounting controls. The statutory source of authority cited by the
Release, section 12(b) of the 1934 Act, 598 seems equally capable of
fathering a requirement to install nonfinancial internal controls.
That section basically requires companies listed on national securities exchanges to file information about certain enumerated topics
to the extent that the Commission deems necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 599 To support its claim that the Commission was authorized to adopt rules
tightening accounting controls, the Release pointed to those subparagraphs of section 12(b)(1) that specifically refer to financial
records. 00 But other subparagraphs in that same section mandate
information regarding "the organization, financial structure, and
nature of the business," '01 as well as "directors" and "officers." "I"
If a reference to accounting records justifies rules ensuring that
financial information is reliable and protected by adequate internal controls, it seems equally arguable that references to the
597 [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,896, at 87,379. However, the
ABA's Federal Regulation of Securities Committee has suggested that the Commission
reconsider its authority to promulgate these proposed rules, particularly rule 13b-2, after
the decision in Santa Fe Industries. See Special Report No. 693, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH),
at 9-10 (May 11, 1977).
598 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970).
599 Id.
600 See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,185, [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
80,896, at 87,378 (Jan. 19, 1977). Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(b)(1)(J), (K), & (L),
15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(1)(J), (K), & (L) (1970), refer respectively to balance sheets, profit and
loss statements, and "any further financial statements which the Commission may deem
necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors."
601 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(1)(A) (1970).
602 Several subparagraphs of section 12(b)(1) require disclosure of the identity of certain
officers and directors, and information concerning their direct and indirect remuneration.
This specific emphasis on remuneration would seem to justify controls designed to prevent
misappropriation of slush funds by corporate officials. See id. § 12(b)(1)(D), (E), (F), &
(G), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(1)(D), (E), (F), 9- (G) (1970).
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"organization" and "structure" of the business justify rules requiring adequate controls with respect to these dimensions of the
corporation. Thus, carried to its logical extreme, the same reasoning in theory could justify a rule requiring an expanded staff for
the board, an auditing apparatus directed at nonfinancial records,
or even a mini-board structure. But even if such an end point is
never reached, there is an unexplored basis here for inducing
monitoring reforms that transcends the Commission's current
fixation with accounting controls.
Limiting SEC reform efforts to accounting controls does not
make sense from a policy perspective. Accountants have only recently and grudgingly conceded that they have any responsibility
for detecting corporate misconduct. They continue to insist (with
considerable justification) that they have neither the methodology,
the tools, nor the training to uncover most forms of corporate
misconduct, including outright frauds.0 Nor do most questionable corporate practices affecting the interests of either investors or
the public necessarily involve large payments or hidden slush
funds. To rely solely on the accountant as the internal Inspector
General of the public corporation, when he himself disclaims his
capability for such a role, requires a perverse form of tunnel vision.
Some fragmentary signs exist that the Commission will eventually escape its current fascination with accounting controls. The
Commission's staff has begun to experiment with another form of
internal control: the management audit. A relatively unnoticed
aspect of the consent orders negotiated by the Commission's staff
in the improper payments cases is a provision requiring the creation of a "special review committee" of the independent members
of the corporation's board. These committees typically have been
required to investigate the asserted misconduct and to determine
in effect if inadequacies existed in the corporation's internal monitoring system. °4 To the extent that such an approach seeks to
catalyze reform (rather than simply legislate corporate morality by
consent order), it complements rather than usurps the board's
role as the corporate superego.
Originally, the focus of these management audits was directed
simply at the payments themselves: in what amount, for what
603 See note 324 supra.
Herlihy & Levine, supra note 2, at 581-84, 586-87.

604
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purpose, and by whom made? To this degree, they shared the same
preoccupation with accounting controls as Release No. 13,185.
More recently, however, the scope of such mandated self-studies
has moved beyond the area of payments and financial records into
the broader topic of the adequacy of management's internal controls in general. The unheralded precedent for this expansion appears to have been the consent order agreed to by Allied Chemical
Corporation in March, 1977.05 No payments of any nature were
involved. Instead, the SEC's complaint charged Allied with discharging a toxic chemical called Kepone into Virginia's James
River, and ultimately into the Chesapeake Bay, causing substantial
pollution. The SEC in effect asserted that someone within the corporate hierarchy should have been alert to the pollution. The failure to disclose the material financial liabilities resulting from this
conduct, the complaint added, violated both the antifraud and
periodic reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. In the settlement decree, without admitting or denying the
allegations, Allied represented that its board had begun an "independent investigation of material environmental risk areas and
material environmental uncertainties in connection with its business." 60 However, in contrast to the substantive relief obtained
by the Commission in other decrees, Allied agreed only to take such
action as the company determined to be "necessary and proper in
the light of such investigation" (although it would give the Commission notice of that action) and to "maintain policies, practices
and procedures to apprise its management of material environmental risk areas and material environmental uncertainties in con606 SEC v. Allied Chem. Corp., Civil Action No. 77-0373 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 4, 1977).
The settlement in this case has been widely reported. See Accord by Allied Chemical and
SEC Reached in Suit Citing Antifraud Complaint, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1977, at 26, col.
2; Chemical Firm Bows to SEC Over Kepone, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 1977, at A-Il, col. 3.
Ironically, the Commission's success in using the securities laws to contest environmental
failures of this sort has come home to haunt it. In the second Natural Resources Defense
Council decision, Judge Richey cited this proceeding as a basis for finding arbitrary the
Commission's earlier refusal to expand its disclosure requirements to compel corporations
to provide more data about the environmental impact of their activities. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
96,057, at 91,762 n.12 (D.D.C. 1977). Hoist in effect on its own petard, the Commission
has been told that those theories it asserts in its consent orders also must be followed in
its rulemaking proceedings.
606 SEC v. Allied Chem. Corp., Civil Action No. 77-0373, at 2 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 4,
1977).
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nection with its business." 607 In short, the decree did not sacrifice
directional discretion. Rather, the internal corporate process for
alerting the board to such environmental problems was isolated
for study in order to clarify and reform internal lines of authority.
In sum, both proposed rule 13b-2 and settlements such as the
Allied Chemical case suggest that the idea of a body of federal
corporate law is not dead. Notwithstanding Santa Fe Industries,
the possibility of federal fiduciary standards generally applicable to
corporation governance remains alive today, albeit in a prenatal
stage of development. After issuing proposed rule 13b-2, the Commission announced the commencement of a broad reexamination
of the SEC's rules relating to shareholder democracy and "corporate governance generally." 608 Thus, while the bloom is clearly off
the rose of rule I Ob-5, there are definite signs that the Commission
is preparing a counterattack and, under sections 12, 13, and 14 of
the Exchange Act, will eventually reassert federal fiduciary principles that were rejected under rule 1Ob-5. These sections give the
Commission more definite and specific (although limited) grants of
authority than did section 10, and, unlike section 10, they do not
place courts in the awkward position of cantilevering an immense
body of common law from the slender foundation of a vague
catchall antifraud provision.
To be sure, this forthcoming assertion of implied authority may
suffer the same fate at the hands of the Supreme Court as did attempts to expand rule lOb-5. Whether Santa Fe Industries is construed broadly or narrowly, there are arguments that state law
"overlaps" and "conflicts" with proposed rule 13b-2.10 9 In addition, the legislative history of sections 12 and 13 indicates that
Congress never intended these sections to authorize substantive
607 Id.
608 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,482, [1977 Current Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)

81,130 (April 28, 1977). As its jurisdictional basis, this Release relies primarily on
section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (a) (1970), whose
legislative history does suggest definite congressional interest in preserving the ideal
of shareholder democracy. Congress's attention appears to have been focused on this
theme by the publication in 1932 of A. BEmRT & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). See also Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d
659, 676-78, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). Release 13,482
thus probably rested on stronger legislative authority than did Release 13,185.
609 See note 560 supra. In light of Sante Fe Industries, an ABA Committee has urged
the Commission to reconsider the proposed rule's scope. See note 597 supra.
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regulation of corporate conduct. 10 But when predicting the likely
judicial response to such an SEC assertion of authority, these
factors potentially are outweighed by the absence of an implied
private right of action under section 13.11 Thus, the "open flood-

gate" theme that appears to have motivated the Supreme Court's
recent decisions cutting back on rule 1Ob-5 would not apply here.
What would be the shape of this new federal law of fiduciary
duty? Potentially, it could revive on the federal level the oldest and
most neglected of fiduciary duties: the duty of due care. Certainly
proposed rule 13b-2 and the New York Stock Exchange's audit
committee requirement point in that direction. Two examples of
how such a federal duty of due care could develop are illustrative.
First, if rule 13b-2 were adopted in its present form and a corporate management's failure to establish adequate internal accounting controls proximately caused losses through defalcations that
otherwise should have been detected, those corporate officials responsible should be liable to their corporation under federal law.
Although the private litigant would lack standing to enforce the
rule, the SEC could require restitution to the corporation as an
ancillary equitable remedy. 12
610 The Senate version of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contained a subparagraph (d) to what is today section 12 of that Act. The subparagraph provided that
"nothing in this title shall be construed as authorizing the Commission to interfere with
the management of the affairs of an issuer." The conference committee, however, deleted
this provision. The House Conference Report explained: "This provision is omitted from
the substitute as unnecessary, since it is not believed that the bill is open to misconstruction in this respect." H. R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1934), reprinted in 5
J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY OF THE SECURITIES Acr OF 1933 AND
SECURITIES EXCHANGE Acr OF 1934, Item 20 (1973). Given this agreement by both houses
that the informational requirements of section 12 were not intended to authorize substantive regulation of corporate conduct, rule 13b-2's affirmative obligation to maintain
internal controls appears to lie at the edge of the Commission's authority.
611 See Levy v. Johnson, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f 95,899
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Meer v. United Brands Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) f 95,648 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
612 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.) ("[T]he SEC may
seek other than injunctive relief in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, so long as
such relief is remedial and is not a penalty assessment." (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971). For recent cases requiring restitution, see Mathews, Recent Trends in
SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Level Injunction Actions, 31 Bus. LAW. 1323,
1333-34, 1338 (1976). However, the statement in Texas Gulf Sulphur that a penalty assessment may not be imposed could well protect corporate officers from a requirement that
they reimburse the corporation for illegal payments that benefited the corporation.
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Second, assume that a corporation listed on the New York Stock
Exchange seeks to comply only minimally with that exchange's
audit committee rule. A pro forma committee is established but
seldom meets, and top management filters the flow of information
from the accountants to the committee. If such sham compliance
violates the rule, then there should be civil liability, enforceable by
private litigants against management to the extent that losses can
be said to have proximately resulted because they otherwise would
have been detected. Under present law, a private cause of action
for violation of this stock exchange rule might even be implied,
because the rule seems to be a "substitute" for direct federal regulation, or the rule might simply be cited to support an "evidence of
negligence" approach.6 13 Since the SEC virtually thrust the audit
committee rule upon the New York Stock Exchange, it cannot be
613 The leading decision on implied private rights of action for violation of stock
exchange rules remains Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966), in which Judge Friendly announced what now is
described as the "substitution" test. Under that test, a private right of action could be
implied when the Exchange rule alleged to have been violated served as a "substitute" for
regulation by the SEC, and particularly where it imposed an obligation or duty unknown
to the common law. The SEC involvement in persuading the New York Stock Exchange
to adopt the audit committee rule, see note 386 supra, certainly lends credence to the
argument that the rule is a substitute for direct federal regulation. In addition, such
a requirement is unquestionably unknown to the common law. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975), the Supreme Court established standards for implying private rights of action
that, in the view of one recent federal decision, accord with Judge Friendly's analysis
in Colonial Realty. See Zagari v. Dean Witter &- Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.
95,777, at 90,809 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
This analysis, however, is subject to several qualifications. First, such a private right of
action, though seemingly authorized by Colonial Realty, could be viewed as violating the
prohibition in Santa Fe Industries against "federalizing" state corporate law standards in
the absence of an express congressional intent to do so. See notes 558-60 supra and accompanying text. Second, the defendants whom we would seek to hold accountable (namely,
senior management, since to hold the corporation liable would only double the loss
it had already suffered because of the rule's violation) are not technically subject to the
audit committee rule, which applies to corporations rather than to individuals. Although
it would be possible to argue that such officers are liable as aiders and abettors of a
securities law violation, the simplest answer to these problems is to read the rule
as a self-regulatory standard which defines and gives specific content in this context
to the general standard of care expected of a fiduciary. Thus, it could be enforced by a
state court without regard to problems of federal jurisdiction or implied private
rights. See note 391 supra. One case has followed such an approach. In Mercury Inv. Co. v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Tex. 1969), the court first found that the
NASD's "suitability" rule did not give rise to an implied cause of action, but then found
with respect to the pendent claims of common-law negligence that violations of a self...
Id. at 1163.
regulatory rule "would be admissible as evidence of negligence.
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distinguished away as a private agreement among merchants that
creates no protected class. The dust has not yet settled on Santa Fe
Industries,but these examples suggest that any report of the death
of federal corporation law or federal fiduciary standards would be
a highly premature obituary.
CONCLUSION

Even the patient reader has his limits, so no attempt will be
made here to summarize in detail what has gone before. Rather, it
seems wiser to recall our purposes. Part I attempted a critique of
the organizational deficiencies that underlie modern corporate misconduct. The central tenet of our diagnosis was that the modem
corporation is characterized by inadequate information flow and a
decentralization of authority, which renders the board of directors
ineffective as a corporate superego. This finding supplied the
prism through which Part II analyzed the common law. Without
restating the specific suggestions made therein, it seems fair to
characterize them generally as procedural reforms that seek to
install internal self-corrective mechanisms within the corporation.
Twin goals are central to such a strategy: (1) increasing the information flow within the firm so that monitoring stations can
operate, and (2) raising the "independence" level of the board so
that it can both perform its monitoring responsibilities and transcend the tunnel vision of "group think." One reform without the
other is of little value, because the effectiveness of the corporate
conscience is constrained by its informational inputs, and knowledge without a breadth of vision yields scant returns.
This strategy can be described as an "organizational-adjustment"
in that its primary goal is neither to punish the individual wrong6
doer nor to raise the economic disincentives to the corporation.

14

Rather, its focus is on improving the quality of decisionmaking by
institutionalizing a more reflective and capable corporate superego.
This emphasis on procedural over substantive reform will not
satisfy everyone. In particular, the preference for positive over
614 I borrow the term "organizational-adjustment" from Professor Stone. For his distinction of such a strategy from strategies aimed either at the corporation or its employees, see
Stone, Controlling Corporate Misconduct, PuB. INTzmEsT, Summer 1977, at 55, 64-65. As
he points out, the fine charged a corporation is frequently de minimis when compared
with the expected profit, and prosecution of culpable employees is both rare and possibly
worth the risk to the dedicated careerist. Id.
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negative incentives and for reliance on the board and internal
monitoring rather than on the individual shareholder and mandatory public disclosure as the chief catalysts for change will displease
many. Opponents will argue that such reforms are piecemeal and
conservative, that the problem of corporate misconduct is sufficiently serious to justify bolder approaches and pioneering activism
by courts and agencies (even if the price of disregarding jurisdictional lines is the gradual and unplanned evolution of the SEC into
a Federal Corporations Commission desired by few).
The traditional answer to such arguments for urgent and radical
change is to suggest that they be directed to the legislature. And
legislative action does seem desirable. For example, whether in
the form of federal minimum standards, federal chartering, or an
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, legislative
action requiring public corporations to install adequate internal
compliance monitoring systems reporting directly to independent
boards would vastly outperform further attempts to expand the
already inflated definition of materiality.
But the better answer to those who argue for a more radical
intrusion upon the corporation's autonomy lies in focusing on the
multiple levers available for reform. Other levers, such as the criminal law and the law of torts, are better suited to supply the necessary general deterrence. The levers that touch upon the internal
affairs of the corporation, however, seem uniquely capable of
achieving something more subtle and sophisticated: the activation
of an internal self-corrective system. To use these levers as a club
to achieve deterrence by maximizing their in terrorem effect is to
ignore that the epee has its functions that the bludgeon cannot
perform.
Finally, it seems important to return in closing to two earlier
targets: "fiduciary ideology" and "therapeutic disclosure." This
article has been skeptical of the continued relevance to the modern
public corporation of the ancient body of law governing trusts and
agency. The lawyer's persistent affection for these concepts understandably is motivated by the conceptual handhold they give him.
Characterizing corporate officials as fiduciaries confers jurisdiction.
But a distinction must be recognized between using fiduciary concepts as a means of acquiring jurisdiction and as a mode of analysis.
Once past the threshold stage, courts would be better guided not
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by "the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive," but by the businessman's maxim that "structure must follow strategy."
To question in addition the idea of using disclosure as a deterrent may seem to some conclusive evidence of a meanspirited and
cynical perspective. Clearly, such skepticism goes against the grain
at a time when Justice Brandeis's aphorism that "[s]unlight is...
the best of disinfectants" 'I- is rapidly evolving from the status of a
perceptive legal apercu to that of an iron law. Yet, before this enshrinement is completed, it is worth noting that even outside the
context of organization theory, there are other heretics who today
also are beginning to question whether a prescription of disclosure
and more disclosure as a remedy for misconduct is an answer or
simply a self-fulfilling prophecy. 1" What has been suggested herein
is that we consider more carefully who the appropriate audience is
for various types of disclosures. Particularly where disclosure to
the world will ripen contingent liabilities into actual losses, the
appropriate audience for mandatory disclosure might in turn
better be the board as the corporation's monitoring organ. Under
615 L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S*fONEY 92 (1932).
616 Harvard sociologist Nathan Glazer has raised the theme that disclosure may do more
than simply disinfect, but may overprotect and distort by magnifying dangers that are
not truly threatening: "The laws of protection . . . draw attention to an issue and then
extend it." See The Chilling Impact of Litigation, Bus. WEEK, June 6, 1977, at 61, 64. A
disclosure system then may have a built-in tendency toward self-perpetuation.
One experienced corporate observer has applied this theme specifically to the corporate
context at a recent American Assembly conference on business ethics. A basic circularity of
reasoning is present, he asserted, "when intellectuals, having given to the public a distorted
picture of the ethical situation in business, then urge that business be reformed because
the public lacks confidence in business conduct." He then added, "There is no guarantee
-or even a probability-that if business conduct quickly improved the public would hear
the news for years, if ever. Some scandals will always be available to observers who will
not tackle the hard task of communicating business normality." Ways, A Plea for Perspective, in THE ETHICS OF CORPORATE CONDUCT 106, 113 (C. Walton ed. 1977) (emphasis
in original).
To the journalist, of course, business normality is a dog-bites-man story that has little
intrinsic appeal. These arguments do not mean that we should reject disclosure as a
remedy, but only reognize that, as with all other cures, it is not a panacea. Its characteristic
problems are a tendency to overkill, to taint all corporations through a guilt by association
process, and to be unable to make relevant distinctions-either because of the limited
attention span of the public or the inadequate knowledge of the journalist. In contrast,
the arguments for giving a relative priority to an internalized model for corporate reform
is that it permits greater flexibility, may elicit more information, certainly can make finer
distinctions in an area where broad generalizations seem usually inaccurate, and does not
subordinate investors' interests to those of the public at large or involve the same dangers
of "agency intrusion." See text accompanying note 538 supra.
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such an approach, the focus of disclosure to investors might better
be concentrated not on the details of misconduct, but on the
adequacy of that monitoring system.
In place of reliance on fiduciary ideology and a confessional
system of disclosure, this article has asserted two general propositions about the proper structure of an effective system of corporate
accountability. First, a board-based system should outperform (and
is to a degree inconsistent with) a shareholder-based system of corporate accountability. 617 Second, decentralization-the tactic by
which modern corporations have dealt with the problem of informational overload-has equal relevance to any attempt to redesign the corporation's conscience. These assertions are debatable.
But they at least attempt to align structure and strategy. Until
that is done, our attempts to reform corporate behavior may continue to run afoul of Forrester's Law.

617 Beyond the scope of this article is the recent provocative assertion by Professor
Walter Werner that our current lack of a corporate superego is itself a shareholdermandated result, since management is disciplined by the need to maximize share values in
an efficient capital market. Werner argues that behavior such as that of Gulf President
Dorsey is not a symptom of the breakdown of internal controls, but of shareholder
preferences. See Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and
Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUm. L. REv. 388 (1977). Implicit in this view is an acceptance
of a relatively strong version of the efficient capital market hypothesis, with which- this
article would disagree. The perspective of the economist and that of the organization
theorist are necessarily in some degree of conflict, and this article has contented itself
with exploring the implication of that latter view.

